scholarly journals Does social trust speed up reforms? The case of central-bank independence

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 395-415 ◽  
Author(s):  
NICLAS BERGGREN ◽  
SVEN-OLOV DAUNFELDT ◽  
JÖRGEN HELLSTRÖM

AbstractMany countries have undertaken central-bank independence reforms, but the years of implementation differ. What explains such differences in timing? This is of interest more broadly, as it sheds light on factors that matter for the speed at which economic reforms come about. We study a rich set of potential determinants, both economic and political, but put special focus on a cultural factor, i.e. social trust. We find empirical support for an inverse u-shape: Countries with low and high social trust implemented their reforms earlier than countries with intermediate levels. We make use of two factors to explain this pattern: the need to undertake reform (which is more urgent in countries with low social trust) and the ability to undertake reform (which is greater in countries with high social trust). Overall, our findings imply that culture matters for institutional change.

Author(s):  
Niclas Berggren ◽  
Sven-Olov Daunfeldt ◽  
Jörgen Hellström

2002 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 751-774 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Keefer ◽  
David Stasavage

In this article, we argue that the effectiveness of central bank independence and exchange-rate pegs in solving credibility problems is contingent on two factors: political institutions and information asymmetries. However, the impact of these two factors differs. We argue that the presence of one institution—multiple political veto players—should be crucial for the effectiveness of central bank independence, but should have no impact on the efficacy of exchange-rate pegs. In contrast, exchange-rate pegs should have a greater anti-inflationary impact when it is difficult for the public to distinguish between inflation generated by policy choice and inflation resulting from exogenous shocks to the economy. Such information asymmetries between the public and the government, however, do not increase the efficacy of central bank independence. Empirical tests using newly developed data on political institutions provide strong support for our hypotheses.


2014 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 425-439 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niclas Berggren ◽  
Sven-Olov Daunfeldt ◽  
Jörgen Hellström

Author(s):  
Donato Masciandaro ◽  
Davide Romelli

This chapter investigates the endogenous evolution of central bank institutional design over the past four decades. From a theoretical perspective, it employs a stylized political economy model to highlight some key determinants of the level of central bank independence as a function of macroeconomic shocks and political economy characteristics of countries. It then employs recently developed dynamic indices of central bank design to describe the evolution of central bank independence over the period 1972–2014. In a sample of sixty-five countries, it shows that the increasing trend in central bank independence during 1972–2007 has been reversing after the 2008 financial crisis, mainly due to significant changes to the roles of central banks in banking supervision. The authors find that this evolution can be related to several macroeconomic shocks, such as inflationary, fiscal, and exchange-rate shocks.


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