scholarly journals Introduction to the special issue on the Centenary of Frank H. Knight's Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit

Author(s):  
Per L. Bylund

Abstract Frank H. Knight's magnum opus Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, published in 1921, is widely recognized for introducing and establishing the distinction between risk and uncertainty. It is also known for developing a novel theory of the firm and business profit based on entrepreneurial judgment. However, the work's relevance for institutionalism has only rarely been addressed or even acknowledged. This introduction to the special issue organized to celebrate the centenary of Knight's tome briefly summarizes the work's institutionalist implications and the articles that comprise the special issue.

1996 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolai J. Foss

In his contribution to the 1987 conference that celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of Ronald Coase's “The Nature of the Firm” (1937), Harold Demsetz noted that from the birth of modern economics to 1970, “only two works seem to have been written about the theory of the firm that have altered the perspectives of the profession: Knight's Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (1921) and Coase's ‘The Nature of the Firm’” (Demsetz 1993, in Williamson and Winter 1993, p. 159). It is easy to feel uncomfortable with this observation. First, Coase's article was ignored for decades. Second, Knight's book did not receive much attention because of its theory of economic organization, but because of its statement of the theory of perfect competition (Stigler 1957; Machovec 1995), its distinction between risk and uncertainty, and its theory of profits (see, e.g., Boulding 1942 and Papandreou 1952).'


2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (9) ◽  
pp. 1291-1291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giuseppe T. Aronica ◽  
Heiko Apel ◽  
Giuliano Di Baldassarre ◽  
Guy J-P. Schumann

Author(s):  
Malte F. Dold ◽  
Mario J. Rizzo

Abstract In Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (RUP), Knight (1921) develops a theory of the firm that stresses the important role of entrepreneurial judgment for a firm's success. For Knight, entrepreneurial judgment is first and foremost the selection of ‘proxy entrepreneurs’ who are capable of making good judgments under uncertainty. In this sense, entrepreneurial judgment is essentially ‘judgment of judgment’. An overlooked implication of Knight's position is the fact that it leads to an endorsement of distributed entrepreneurship and responsibility. We deem this a very modern idea that challenges a completely hierarchical understanding of the firm. Knight himself does not thoroughly examine the institutional implications of the analytical framework he sets up in RUP. In this paper, we summarize the ‘philosophical vision’ of Knight's framework and illustrate his rationale behind the distribution of entrepreneurship. We conclude the paper with a discussion of potential institutional implications by referring to the danger of monocultures, the additional value created by cognitively diverse teams, and the effectiveness of venture capitalists.


Author(s):  
Randall E. Westgren ◽  
Travis L. Holmes

AbstractAt the centenary of Frank H. Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (1921), we explore the continuing relevance of Knightian uncertainty to the theory and practice of entrepreneurship. There are three challenges facing such assessment. First, RUP is complex and difficult to interpret. The key but neglected element of RUP is that Knight’s account is not solely about risk and uncertainty as states of nature, but about how an agent’s beliefs about uncertain outcomes and confidence in those beliefs guide their choices. Second, RUP is Knight’s only effort in this area. His subsequent career led elsewhere, so he did not engage with subsequent interpretations of this work. Third, much of the current literature emphasizes that decisions must be different under the two states of nature with a consequent misunderstanding of entrepreneurial agency. This paper addresses each challenge in sequence. First, we explicate Knight’s (1921) approach and explain why that approach is murky. Second, as a complement to Knight’s interpretation, we examine Frank P. Ramsey’s approach to subjective probabilities to help clarify Knight’s murky approach. What links Knight and Ramsey is a shared pragmatism about entrepreneurial agency under uncertainty that depends upon the beliefs about, and confidence in, their judgments of possible outcomes. This Knight-Ramsey approach does not require actor’s behaviors to be determined by the class of uncertain environment (whether risk, uncertainty, or ambiguity) they face. We focus on the response by the entrepreneur to the existence of uncertainty in all its forms. We argue that this reductive account provides a foundation to examine common problems in management, including managerial hubris, the interaction between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, and the need for experimentation (such as prototyping and market research) in advance of new product and venture launches. Third, we critique current literature that favors epistemic purism about the ontology of risk and uncertainty and ignores Knight-Ramsey pragmatism in meeting uncertainty, such as using formal and informal institutions for uncertainty mitigation. Our account locates Frank Knight’s subtleties in entrepreneurial behavior firmly in the literature on entrepreneurial agency a century later.


2020 ◽  
Vol 42 (5) ◽  
pp. 559-561
Author(s):  
Susanna Priest ◽  
Jessica G. Myrick

2014 ◽  
Vol 33 (5) ◽  
pp. 429-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
J.C. Spender

Purpose – There has been considerable discussion recently about business schools’ shortcomings and how their curriculum should be changed. Many presume discipline-wide agreement that managing is a rational and model-able decision-making practice. But practitioners are not convinced and often suggest rationality-dominated business schools are teaching impractical ideas. The purpose of this paper is to look at this discussion's micro foundations and offers a novel approach that presumes managerial judgment is crucial to firms’ processes and, indeed, is the reason firms exist. Design/methodology/approach – The paper combines discussion of the conceptual nature of firms and managing them with data about business schools’ growth and curriculum evolution. Findings – If we presume firms are rational apparatus for achieving known goals, managing is little more than computing; and if Knightian uncertainty is taken seriously, managerial judgment becomes the core of the analysis. But schools that attempt to train students’ judgment are extraordinarily difficult to manage, especially in the current academic environment. Originality/value – While many are aware of Knight's influential thinking, it has not yet been brought into a theory of the firm or of managing. The paper works toward a novel theory of the managed firm (TMF) in which management's uncertainty-resolving judgments are key.


1993 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Patrick Gunning

Frank Knight was a “grand theorist.” Like other grand theorists from Adam Smith to Friedrich A. Hayek, his interests extended beyond economics. In economics, his major writings focused on the most general problems of the discipline, his goal being to show the merits and limitations of the free enterprise system. He took a special interest in intersubjective uncertainty and the accompanying problem of agency. To benefit from an economic transaction an individual must rely on others (agents, broadly speaking) to perform actions even though he or she cannot be certain that the others will decide to perform the actions. Agency, in the broadest sense, is present in all relationships that are properly defined as economic. Knight apparently recognized that both the classical liberal's trust in free enterprise and the interventionist's distrust stem from their different views of the agency problem and of how best to solve it. Accordingly, he made the problem a centerpiece of his investigation of free enterprise in his celebrated Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921). The agency problem also plays an important role in the modern, or new institutionalist, theory of the firm. The new institutionalists aim to show that some observable economic relationship, rule or procedure in an organization, most notably a Coasean firm, is a result of the efforts of individuals to deal with the agency problem.


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