Legislating personhood: realising the right to support in exercising legal capacity

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eilionoir Flynn ◽  
Anna Arstein-Kerslake

AbstractThis paper examines the regulation of ‘personhood’ through the granting or denying of legal capacity. It explores the development of the concept of personhood through the lens of moral and political philosophy. It highlights the problem of upholding cognition as a prerequisite for personhood or the granting of legal capacity because it results in the exclusion of people with cognitive disabilities (intellectual, psycho-social, mental disabilities, and others). The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) challenges this notion by guaranteeing respect for the right to legal capacity for people with disabilities on an equal basis with others and in all areas of life (Article 12). The paper uses the CRPD to argue for a conception of personhood that is divorced from cognition and a corresponding recognition of legal capacity as a universal attribute that all persons possess. Finally, a support model for the exercise of legal capacity is proposed as a possible alternative to the existing models of substituted decision-making that deny legal capacity and impose outside decision-makers.

Author(s):  
Fennell Phil

This chapter examines Article 15 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), which prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment (CIDTP), irrespective of the circumstances and the victim’s behaviour. Article 15 rights overlap with rights under other CRPD articles, including the right to legal capacity on an equal basis with others under Article 12; the right to liberty and security under Article 14; the right to protection against violence, exploitation and abuse under Article 16; the right to physical and mental integrity under Article 17 and; the right to health care on an equal basis with others and based on informed consent under Article 25.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jill Stavert

Article 12(3) CRPD requires states parties to provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity. This is to ensure that the rights, will and preferences of persons with disabilities are enjoyed on an equal basis with others [Articles 12(1)(2) and (4) CRPD]. Moreover, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has made it clear that supported decision-making must replace substitute decision-making arrangements as these are discriminatory and deny equal enjoyment of the right to exercise of legal capacity for persons. At the same time, there is ongoing debate as to whether or not the absence of substitute decision-making regimes is essential for the non-discriminatory realization of an individual's rights, will and preferences to be achieved. To resolve this debate, however, specific attention needs to be paid to the CRPD message on what it actually means to give effect to the equal and non-discriminatory enjoyment of rights for all. In the context of persons with mental disabilities this requires looking beyond human rights simply in terms of limiting unwarranted interventions to the proactive removal of obstacles to full rights enjoyment and the creation of environments that respect and support such enjoyment. With this in mind this paper will therefore critically consider the use of supported decision-making within existing substitute decision-making regimes with particular reference to Scotland's mental health and capacity laws. It will consider the challenges this poses and whether it is indeed possible to adapt existing regimes to achieve CRPD compliance. In doing so, it is suggested that a full appreciation of the overarching CRPD message about equality and non-discrimination in the enjoyment of rights is required to bring about such compliance.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-183
Author(s):  
Matthew S Smith ◽  
Michael Ashley Stein

Abstract This Article explores the juridical implications of indigenous peoples’ right to legal capacity in the Inter-American system for cases involving the same right of persons with disabilities within that system and beyond. It explicates the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (IACtHR) three-factor test in Saramaka People v Suriname and analogizes its reasoning with rationales underpinning the right to legal capacity under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (crpd). It then demonstrates how the IACtHR can apply a Saramaka-style test to future cases brought by persons with disabilities challenging legal capacity restrictions. The Article further argues that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) should also apply this rule to align its legal capacity jurisprudence with the crpd’s mandates. Finally, it suggests that the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (crpd Committee) ought to consider this rule when resolving individual communications and thereby guide courts.


2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marie Fallon-Kund ◽  
Jerome E Bickenbach

AbstractSeveral state parties to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) undertook recent revisions of their national legal capacity laws. These revisions aim to promote the autonomy of persons with disabilities as set forward by the CRPD. At the same time, the CRPD Committee calls for the abolishment of all forms of substitute decision-making through its first General Comment on Article 12 of the Convention. We thus describe the main components of new legal capacity laws of Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, and Switzerland and assess those in light of the General Comment. We argue that none of these countries completely abolished substitute decision-making regimes and align with the views that a more realistic interpretation should be given to the CRPD. Such interpretation would provide better guidance for countries in the implementation of Article 12.


Author(s):  
Nilsson Lucy Series and Anna

This chapter examines Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Article 12 of the CRPD is concerned with how legal systems enable and disable people as legal actors. In the view of the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and many of those involved in negotiating Article 12, it introduces a new paradigm of ‘universal legal capacity’ that cannot be limited on grounds of disability or mental incapacity. The Committee maintains that this requires the abolition of all forms of substitute decision-making. This interpretation of Article 12 is contested in the literature, but for many involved in the disability movement, ending guardianship and other forms of substitute decision-making is central to wider advocacy goals of ending institutionalization, forced treatment, and loss of fundamental citizenship rights such as the ability to vote, marry, and own property.


2022 ◽  
Vol 121 (831) ◽  
pp. 30-35
Author(s):  
Chester A. Finn ◽  
Matthew S. Smith ◽  
Michael Ashley Stein

Paternalistic attitudes about what is in the interests of a person with an intellectual disability have long led to abuses, and are embedded in the guardianship laws still in place in most countries. Self-advocates, who identify as people with intellectual or other disabilities and are committed to demanding their rights and educating others about them, are calling for a new approach. They have found support for reforms in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted by the United Nations in 2006 and since acceded to by 182 countries. By supporting the fundamental right of those with disabilities to make decisions, it has enabled disability rights advocates to successfully challenge legal capacity restrictions and push for “supported decision-making.”


Author(s):  
Kovudhikulrungsri Lalin ◽  
Hendriks Aart

This chapter examines Article 20 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Personal mobility is a prerequisite for inclusion in a society. According to the European Court of Human Rights, to be mobile and to have access to transport, housing, cultural activities, and leisure is a precondition for the ‘right to establish and develop relations with other human beings’, ‘in professional or business contexts as in others’. The CRPD does not establish new rights for persons with disabilities. It is merely thought to identify specific actions that states and others must take to ensure the effectiveness and inclusiveness of all human rights and to protect against discrimination on the basis of disability. However, the fact that there is no equivalent of the right to personal mobility in any other human rights treaty makes it particularly interesting to examine the genesis and meaning of this provision.


Author(s):  
Nizar Smitha

This chapter examines Article 10 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), which affirms every human being’s right to life. It first explores the efforts made by the drafters of the CRPD to frame the right to life of all human beings. It further examines the wider meaning of the right to life and its application, and traces the interpretation given by the CRPD Committee in its concluding observations. In order to understand the micro-level application of the right, the chapter examines the interpretation and its application by domestic and regional courts. Finally, it explores the individual complaints made under the optional protocol and the consequent interpretation provided. This is done to define the jurisprudence surrounding the right to life and the required measures to strengthen and facilitate its wider application as envisaged under the Convention.


Author(s):  
Bantekas Ilias

This chapter examines Article 7 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). The first instrument to specifically address the rights of children with disabilities was the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).The CRC recognizes four key guiding principles that permeate our understanding and construction of all pertinent rights related to children. These principles are: a) the best interests of the child (Article 3 CRC); b) respect for the views of the child (Article 12 CRC); c) the right to life, survival, and development (Article 6 CRC); and d) non-discrimination (Article 2 CRC). The CRC was also the first instrument specifically to address the rights of children with disabilities, particularly in Article 2(1) (non-discrimination) and Article 23 (general welfare for disabled children). However, Article 7 CRPD and other children-related rights in the CRPD (eg Article 23) constitute a significant improvement to Article 23 CRC.


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