scholarly journals A STRONG REFLECTION PRINCIPLE

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 651-662 ◽  
Author(s):  
SAM ROBERTS
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Reflection Principle ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Proper Class ◽  
Strong Reflection ◽  
Reflection Principles ◽  
Extendible Cardinals ◽  
Order Set

AbstractThis article introduces a new reflection principle. It is based on the idea that whatever is true in all entities of some kind is also true in a set-sized collection of them. Unlike standard reflection principles, it does not re-interpret parameters or predicates. This allows it to be both consistent in all higher-order languages and remarkably strong. For example, I show that in the language of second-order set theory with predicates for a satisfaction relation, it is consistent relative to the existence of a 2-extendible cardinal (Theorem 7.12) and implies the existence of a proper class of 1-extendible cardinals (Theorem 7.9).

scholarly journals RELATIVE PREDICATIVITY AND DEPENDENT RECURSION IN SECOND-ORDER SET THEORY AND HIGHER-ORDER THEORIES

2014 ◽  
Vol 79 (3) ◽  
pp. 712-732 ◽  
Author(s):  
SATO KENTARO
Keyword(s):  
Number Theory ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Order Number ◽  
Recursion Scheme ◽  
Transfinite Recursion ◽  
The Given ◽  
The Universe ◽  
Order Set

AbstractThis article reports that some robustness of the notions of predicativity and of autonomous progression is broken down if as the given infinite total entity we choose some mathematical entities other than the traditional ω. Namely, the equivalence between normal transfinite recursion scheme and new dependent transfinite recursion scheme, which does hold in the context of subsystems of second order number theory, does not hold in the context of subsystems of second order set theory where the universe V of sets is treated as the given totality (nor in the contexts of those of n+3-th order number or set theories, where the class of all n+2-th order objects is treated as the given totality).

Categoricity and the sets

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Button ◽  
Sean Walsh
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
The Status ◽  
Second Order Logic ◽  
Philosophy Of Set Theory ◽  
Order Set

In this chapter, the focus shifts from numbers to sets. Again, no first-order set theory can hope to get anywhere near categoricity, but Zermelo famously proved the quasi-categoricity of second-order set theory. As in the previous chapter, we must ask who is entitled to invoke full second-order logic. That question is as subtle as before, and raises the same problem for moderate modelists. However, the quasi-categorical nature of Zermelo's Theorem gives rise to some specific questions concerning the aims of axiomatic set theories. Given the status of Zermelo's Theorem in the philosophy of set theory, we include a stand-alone proof of this theorem. We also prove a similar quasi-categoricity for Scott-Potter set theory, a theory which axiomatises the idea of an arbitrary stage of the iterative hierarchy.

scholarly journals MODAL STRUCTURALISM AND REFLECTION

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 823-860 ◽  
Author(s):  
SAM ROBERTS
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Reflection Principle ◽  
Reflection Principles

AbstractModal structuralism promises an interpretation of set theory that avoids commitment to abstracta. This article investigates its underlying assumptions. In the first part, I start by highlighting some shortcomings of the standard axiomatisation of modal structuralism, and propose a new axiomatisation I call MSST (for Modal Structural Set Theory). The main theorem is that MSST interprets exactly Zermelo set theory plus the claim that every set is in some inaccessible rank of the cumulative hierarchy. In the second part of the article, I look at the prospects for supplementing MSST with a modal structural reflection principle, as suggested in Hellman (2015). I show that Hellman’s principle is inconsistent (Theorem 5.32), and argue that modal structural reflection principles in general are either incompatible with modal structuralism or extremely weak.

scholarly journals MINIMUM MODELS OF SECOND-ORDER SET THEORIES

2019 ◽  
Vol 84 (02) ◽  
pp. 589-620
Author(s):  
KAMERYN J. WILLIAMS
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Countable Model ◽  
Main Question ◽  
Minimal Models ◽  
Transitive Model ◽  
Transfinite Recursion ◽  
Order Set ◽  
Countable Models

AbstractIn this article I investigate the phenomenon of minimum and minimal models of second-order set theories, focusing on Kelley–Morse set theory KM, Gödel–Bernays set theory GB, and GB augmented with the principle of Elementary Transfinite Recursion. The main results are the following. (1) A countable model of ZFC has a minimum GBC-realization if and only if it admits a parametrically definable global well order. (2) Countable models of GBC admit minimal extensions with the same sets. (3) There is no minimum transitive model of KM. (4) There is a minimum β-model of GB+ETR. The main question left unanswered by this article is whether there is a minimum transitive model of GB+ETR.

scholarly journals A Note on Identity and Higher Order Quantification

2009 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafal Urbaniak
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Identity Relation ◽  
First Order ◽  
Order Language ◽  
Order Set

It is a commonplace remark that the identity relation, even though not expressible in a first-order language without identity with classical set-theoretic semantics, can be defined in a language without identity, as soon as we admit second-order, set-theoretically interpreted quantifiers binding predicate variables that range over all subsets of the domain. However, there are fairly simple and intuitive higher-order languages with set-theoretic semantics (where the variables range over all subsets of the domain) in which the identity relation is not definable. The point is that the definability of identity in higher-order languages not only depends on what variables range over, but also is sensitive to how predication is construed. This paper is a follow-up to (Urbaniak 2006), where it has been proven that no actual axiomatization of Leśniewski’s Ontology determines the standard semantics for the epsilon connective.

Higher‐order Logic Reconsidered

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ignacio Jané
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Logical Consequence ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Higher Order Logic ◽  
Consequence Relation ◽  
Fourth Section ◽  
Second Order Logic

This article discusses canonical (i.e., full, or standard) second-order consequence and argues against it being a case of logical consequence. The discussion is divided into three parts. The first part comprises the first three sections. After stating the problem in Section 1, Sections 2 and 3 examine the role that the consequence relation is expected to play in axiomatic theories. This leads to put forward two requirements on logical consequence, which are called “formality” and “noninterference.” It is this last requirement that canonical second-order consequence violates, as the article sets out to substantiate. The fourth section argues that canonical second-order logic is inadequate for axiomatizing set theory, on the grounds that it codes a significant amount of set-theoretical content.

scholarly journals Second-Order Logic and Foundations of Mathematics

2001 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 504-520 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jouko Väänänen
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
The Other ◽  
Foundations Of Mathematics ◽  
Mathematical Concepts ◽  
Informal Reasoning ◽  
First Order ◽  
Second Order Logic ◽  
Order Set

AbstractWe discuss the differences between first-order set theory and second-order logic as a foundation for mathematics. We analyse these languages in terms of two levels of formalization. The analysis shows that if second-order logic is understood in its full semantics capable of characterizing categorically central mathematical concepts, it relies entirely on informal reasoning. On the other hand, if it is given a weak semantics, it loses its power in expressing concepts categorically. First-order set theory and second-order logic are not radically different: the latter is a major fragment of the former.

Higher order reflection principles

1989 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 474-489 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Victoria Marshall R.
Keyword(s):  
Measurable Cardinal ◽  
Reflection Principle ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Weakly Compact ◽  
Class Theory ◽  
First Order ◽  
Transitive Set ◽  
Reflection Principles ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Order Reflection

In [1] and [2] there is a development of a class theory, whose axioms were formulated by Bernays and based on a reflection principle. See [3]. These axioms are formulated in first order logic with ∈:(A1)Extensionality.(A2)Class specification. Ifϕis a formula andAis not free inϕ, thenNote that “xis a set“ can be written as “∃u(x∈u)”.(A3)Subsets.Note also that “B⊆A” can be written as “∀x(x∈B→x∈A)”.(A4)Reflection principle. Ifϕ(x)is a formula, thenwhere “uis a transitive set” is the formula “∃v(u∈v) ∧ ∀x∀y(x∈y∧y∈u→x∈u)” andϕPuis the formulaϕrelativized to subsets ofu.(A5)Foundation.(A6)Choice for sets.We denote byB1the theory with axioms (A1) to (A6).The existence of weakly compact and-indescribable cardinals for everynis established inB1by the method of defining all metamathematical concepts forB1in a weaker theory of classes where the natural numbers can be defined and using the reflection principle to reflect the satisfaction relation; see [1]. There is a proof of the consistency ofB1assuming the existence of a measurable cardinal; see [4] and [5]. In [6] several set and class theories with reflection principles are developed. In them, the existence of inaccessible cardinals and some kinds of indescribable cardinals can be proved; and also there is a generalization of indescribability for higher-order languages using only class parameters.The purpose of this work is to develop higher order reflection principles, including higher order parameters, in order to obtain other large cardinals.

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