Lessons for human rights and humanitarian law in the war on terror: comparing Hamdan and the Israeli Targeted Killings case

2007 ◽  
Vol 89 (866) ◽  
pp. 373-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marko Milanovic

AbstractThe article examines and compares two recent judgments which provide some of the most valuable examples of the difficulties surrounding the application of international humanitarian law to the phenomenon of terrorism: the Hamdan judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the Targeted Killings judgment of the Supreme Court of Israel. Both judgments deal with the thresholds of applicability of the law of armed conflict, as well as with the concept of unlawful combatancy and the relationship between human rights law and humanitarian law. Both judgments are at times inconsistent and lacking in analysis, with the Hamdan judgment in particular misinterpreting the relevant international authorities, including the Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions. Despite these flaws, or because of them, both of these judgments remain instructive. The purpose of this article is to present the lessons for the future that these two decisions might bring to ongoing debates on the impact of global terrorism on the law of armed conflict.

Author(s):  
Tsvetelina van Benthem

Abstract This article examines the redirection of incoming missiles when employed by defending forces to whom obligations to take precautions against the effects of attacks apply. The analysis proceeds in four steps. In the first step, the possibility of redirection is examined from an empirical standpoint. Step two defines the contours of the obligation to take precautions against the effects of attacks. Step three considers one variant of redirection, where a missile is redirected back towards the adversary. It is argued that such acts of redirection would fulfil the definition of attack under the law of armed conflict, and that prima facie conflicts of obligations could be avoided through interpretation of the feasibility standard embedded in the obligation to take precautions against the effects of attacks. Finally, step four analyzes acts of redirection against persons under the control of the redirecting State. Analyzing this scenario calls for an inquiry into the relationship between the relevant obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law.


2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Corn

AbstractOne of the most complex contemporary debates related to the regulation of armed conflict is the relationship between international humanitarian law (or the law of armed conflict) and international human rights law. Since human rights experts first began advocating for the complementary application of these two bodies of law, there has been a steady march of human rights application into an area formerly subject to the exclusive regulation of the law of armed conflict (LOAC). While the legal aspects of this debate are both complex and fascinating, like all areas of conflict regulation the outcome must ultimately produce guidelines that can be translated into an effective operational framework for war-fighters. In an era of an already complex and often confused battle space, there can be little tolerance for adding complexity and confusion to the rules that war-fighters must apply in the execution of their missions. Instead, clarity is essential to aid them in navigating this complexity. This article will explore this debate from a military operational perspective. It asserts the invalidity of extreme views in this complementarity debate, and that the inevitable invocation of human rights obligations in the context of armed conflict necessitates a careful assessment of where symmetry between these two sources of law is operationally logical and where that logic dissipates.


2019 ◽  
pp. 279-302
Author(s):  
Anders Henriksen

This chapter examines those parts of international law that regulate how military operations must be conducted—jus in bello. It begins in Section 14.2 with an overview of the most important legal sources. Section 14.3 discusses when humanitarian law applies and Section 14.4 examines the issue of battlefield status and the distinction between combatants and civilians. Section 14.5 provides an overview of some of the most basic principles governing the conduct of hostilities while Section 14.6 concerns belligerent occupation and Section 14.7. deals with the regulation of non-international armed conflict. Finally, Section 14.8 explores the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law in times of armed conflict.


Author(s):  
Anders Henriksen

This chapter examines those parts of international law that regulate how military operations must be conducted — jus in bello. It begins in Section 14.2 with an overview of the most important legal sources. Section 14.3 discusses when humanitarian law applies. Section 14.4 examines the issue of battlefield status and the distinction between combatants and civilians. Section 14.5 provides an overview of some of the most basic principles governing the conduct of hostilities while Section 14.6 deals with the issue of regulation of non-international armed conflict. Finally, Section 14.7 explores the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law in times of armed conflict.


1999 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 613-624 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terry Gill

The 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion of the International Court has been both hailed and criticized on various grounds. However, one area, namely the Court's treatment of the distinction between the law regulating the use of force and the humanitarian law of armed conflict, has received relatively little attention. This author is convinced and concerned that the Court's treatment of this issue misconstrued the relationship between these two branches of the law, and in doing so potentially weakened any restraining influence the law of armed conflict might have on the potential use of nuclear weapons.


1997 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith Gardam

The aim of this article is to extend the critique of human rights law by feminist scholars to humanitarian law—or the law of armed conflict, as it is more traditionally known. When reflecting generally on the role that international law plays in providing protection for women from the effects of violence the obvious starting point is the regime of human rights. So much of human suffering in today's world occurs, however, in the context of armed conflict where to a large extent human rights are in abeyance and individuals must rely on the protections offered by the law of armed conflict.1The debate that has been taking place for some years in the context of human rights as to the extent to which that system takes account of women&s lives needs to extend to the provisions of the law of armed conflict. Although commentators have convincingly demonstrated the limitations of the existing body of human rights law adequately to take account of the reality of women&s experience of the world,2the law of armed conflict is even more deficient. Moreover, despite the recent focus on rape in armed conflict as a result of the international outrage at the sexual abuse of women in the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia, these shortcomings remain largely unaddressed.3At first glance this seems somewhat surprising until the special difficulties that flow from certain characteristics of the law of armed conflict are appreciated.


1971 ◽  
Vol 11 (121) ◽  
pp. 183-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. Kalshoven

The Henry Dunant Institute is inaugurating its collection of scientific works with an important book by F. Kalshoven which is reviewed in this issue. We are pleased to publish below a paper which this writer delivered at the International Congress on Humanitarian Law in San Remo last September. (Ed.)


Legal Ukraine ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 36-43
Author(s):  
Viktor Bazov

The article discusses topical issues of the formation and further development of the theory of international humanitarian law. Explored the basic concepts of this area of humanitarian public law. For the first time, international humanitarian law is defined as a set of conventional and customary international legal norms that govern the law of armed conflict and human rights law. The processes of globalization of modern international relations, characterized by increasing influence of leading international organizations and crises in individual states, objectively affect the renewal and further development of the theory of international humanitarian law as one of the rapidly developing branches of public international law. New conceptual approaches to the modern definition of international humanitarian law, its philosophy and legal nature require a rethinking of scientific views as classics of international law, including the founder of the theory of natural law and modern science of international law Hugo Grotius, researcher of state interests in «just war» Thomas Hobbes and the founder of the «social contract», the sentimentalist Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and the views of such prominent scholars as Immanuel Kant, Fedor Martens and Jean Pictet. Given the normative definition, «the law of armed conflict» and «the law of human rights» are two independent legal systems within the framework of international humanitarian law, which operate mainly in different periods: during armed conflicts or in peacetime, respectively. These legal systems, although closely interlinked within the framework of international humanitarian law, are still independent and relatively independent of each other, as they have features in the sources and mechanisms of implementation and control over compliance with their norms and principles. Key words: theory of international humanitarian law, international relations, state, international organization, international court.


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