Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades The Logical Limit of Applying Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflict

2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Corn

AbstractOne of the most complex contemporary debates related to the regulation of armed conflict is the relationship between international humanitarian law (or the law of armed conflict) and international human rights law. Since human rights experts first began advocating for the complementary application of these two bodies of law, there has been a steady march of human rights application into an area formerly subject to the exclusive regulation of the law of armed conflict (LOAC). While the legal aspects of this debate are both complex and fascinating, like all areas of conflict regulation the outcome must ultimately produce guidelines that can be translated into an effective operational framework for war-fighters. In an era of an already complex and often confused battle space, there can be little tolerance for adding complexity and confusion to the rules that war-fighters must apply in the execution of their missions. Instead, clarity is essential to aid them in navigating this complexity. This article will explore this debate from a military operational perspective. It asserts the invalidity of extreme views in this complementarity debate, and that the inevitable invocation of human rights obligations in the context of armed conflict necessitates a careful assessment of where symmetry between these two sources of law is operationally logical and where that logic dissipates.

Author(s):  
Tsvetelina van Benthem

Abstract This article examines the redirection of incoming missiles when employed by defending forces to whom obligations to take precautions against the effects of attacks apply. The analysis proceeds in four steps. In the first step, the possibility of redirection is examined from an empirical standpoint. Step two defines the contours of the obligation to take precautions against the effects of attacks. Step three considers one variant of redirection, where a missile is redirected back towards the adversary. It is argued that such acts of redirection would fulfil the definition of attack under the law of armed conflict, and that prima facie conflicts of obligations could be avoided through interpretation of the feasibility standard embedded in the obligation to take precautions against the effects of attacks. Finally, step four analyzes acts of redirection against persons under the control of the redirecting State. Analyzing this scenario calls for an inquiry into the relationship between the relevant obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law.


2007 ◽  
Vol 89 (866) ◽  
pp. 373-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marko Milanovic

AbstractThe article examines and compares two recent judgments which provide some of the most valuable examples of the difficulties surrounding the application of international humanitarian law to the phenomenon of terrorism: the Hamdan judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the Targeted Killings judgment of the Supreme Court of Israel. Both judgments deal with the thresholds of applicability of the law of armed conflict, as well as with the concept of unlawful combatancy and the relationship between human rights law and humanitarian law. Both judgments are at times inconsistent and lacking in analysis, with the Hamdan judgment in particular misinterpreting the relevant international authorities, including the Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions. Despite these flaws, or because of them, both of these judgments remain instructive. The purpose of this article is to present the lessons for the future that these two decisions might bring to ongoing debates on the impact of global terrorism on the law of armed conflict.


2019 ◽  
pp. 279-302
Author(s):  
Anders Henriksen

This chapter examines those parts of international law that regulate how military operations must be conducted—jus in bello. It begins in Section 14.2 with an overview of the most important legal sources. Section 14.3 discusses when humanitarian law applies and Section 14.4 examines the issue of battlefield status and the distinction between combatants and civilians. Section 14.5 provides an overview of some of the most basic principles governing the conduct of hostilities while Section 14.6 concerns belligerent occupation and Section 14.7. deals with the regulation of non-international armed conflict. Finally, Section 14.8 explores the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law in times of armed conflict.


Author(s):  
Sandesh Sivakumaran

This chapter examines international humanitarian law, the principal body of international law which applies in times of armed conflict, and which seeks to balance the violence inherent in an armed conflict with the dictates of humanity. International humanitarian law protects the civilian population from the ravages of conflict, and establishes limitations on the means and methods of combat. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 considers the nature of international humanitarian law and identifies some of its cardinal principles and key rules. Section 3 explores the similarities and differences between international humanitarian law and international human rights law, comparing and contrasting their historical origins and conceptual approaches. Given that international humanitarian law applies during armed conflict, Section 4 considers whether there is a need for international human rights law also to apply. Section 5 ascertains the relationship between the two bodies of law and Section 6 considers some of the difficulties with the application of international human rights law in time of armed conflict.


Author(s):  
Anders Henriksen

This chapter examines those parts of international law that regulate how military operations must be conducted — jus in bello. It begins in Section 14.2 with an overview of the most important legal sources. Section 14.3 discusses when humanitarian law applies. Section 14.4 examines the issue of battlefield status and the distinction between combatants and civilians. Section 14.5 provides an overview of some of the most basic principles governing the conduct of hostilities while Section 14.6 deals with the issue of regulation of non-international armed conflict. Finally, Section 14.7 explores the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law in times of armed conflict.


2013 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne

The nature of armed conflict has changed dramatically in recent decades. In particular, it is increasingly the case that hostilities now occur alongside ‘everyday’ situations. This has led to a pressing need to determine when a ‘conduct of hostilities’ model (governed by international humanitarian law – IHL) applies and when a ‘law enforcement’ model (governed by international human rights law – IHRL) applies. This, in turn, raises the question of whether these two legal regimes are incompatible or whether they might be applied in parallel. It is on this question that the current article focuses, examining it at the level of principle. Whilst most accounts of the principles underlying these two areas of law focus on humanitarian considerations, few have compared the role played by necessity in each. This article seeks to address this omission. It demonstrates that considerations of necessity play a prominent role in both IHL and IHRL, albeit with differing consequences. It then applies this necessity-based analysis to suggest a principled basis for rationalising the relationship between IHL and IHRL, demonstrating how this approach would operate in practice. It is shown that, by emphasising the role of necessity in IHL and IHRL, an approach can be adopted that reconciles the two in a manner that is sympathetic to their object and purpose.


1999 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 613-624 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terry Gill

The 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion of the International Court has been both hailed and criticized on various grounds. However, one area, namely the Court's treatment of the distinction between the law regulating the use of force and the humanitarian law of armed conflict, has received relatively little attention. This author is convinced and concerned that the Court's treatment of this issue misconstrued the relationship between these two branches of the law, and in doing so potentially weakened any restraining influence the law of armed conflict might have on the potential use of nuclear weapons.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document