The Treatment of Hate Speech in German Constitutional Law (Part II)

2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Winfried Brugger
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Hate Speech ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Specific Determination ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Constitutional Law

As pointed out by the Federal Constitutional Court, a specific determination of the appropriateness of hate speech prohibitions can be based only on the circumstances of individual cases. Some particularly prominent cases are now reviewed.

scholarly journals The Mediation Committee of the Bundestag and Bundesrat: A Special Institution of German Constitutional Law

2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-42
Author(s):  
Claus Koggel
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Current Case ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Legislative Procedure ◽  
German Constitutional Law

AbstractThe Mediation Committee of the Bundestag and Bundesrat – is it “one of the most felicitous innovations in our constitutional activities”, “the most positive institution in the entire Basic Law” or, as some critics assert “a substitute and superordinate parliament” or indeed the “mysterious darkroom of the legislative process”? This article seeks to provide answers to these questions. It is however clear that the Mediation Committee has become an important instrument for attaining political compromises in Germany's legislative procedure. The Committee's purpose is to find a balance between the differing opinions of the Bundestag and Bundesrat concerning the content of legislation, and, through political mediation and mutual concessions, to find solutions that are acceptable to both sides. Thanks to this approach, the Mediation Committee has helped save countless important pieces of legislation from failure since it was established over 65 years ago, thus making a vital contribution to ensure the legislative process works efficiently. The lecture will address the Mediation Committee's status and role within the German legislative process. It will explain the composition of this body as well as its most important procedural principles also against the backdrop of current case law from the Federal Constitutional Court. Finally, the lecture will consider how particular constellations of political power impact on the Mediation Committee's work.

scholarly journals “OBJEKTFORMEL” – EVENTUAL ACTS OF DAMAGE TO HUMAN DIGNITY

2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 19-26
Author(s):  
Izabela Bratiloveanu
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
European Court ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Constitutional Law ◽  
First Time

 The Object formula („Objecktformel”) has been designed and developed in the mid century XX by Günter Dürig, starting from the second formula of Kant's categorical imperative. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany took the formula and applied it for the first time in the case of the telephone conversations of December 15, 1970. The Object formula („Objecktformel”) was taken from the German constitutional law and applied in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.

David Currie and German Constitutional Law

2008 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 2081-2094
Author(s):  
Peter E. Quint
Keyword(s):  
Federal Republic ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Federal Republic Of Germany ◽  
Major Work ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
German Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Jurisprudence

Without much doubt, the two great pillars of American scholarship on the German Basic Law and the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court are (in the order of first appearance) Donald Kommers's monumental casebook, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany and David Currie's magisterial treatise, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. Professor Kommers's comprehensive work was a milestone in a long career that has been very substantially devoted to the study of German constitutional law. In the late 1960s, Kommers spent a research year at the German Constitutional Court and, drawing in part on personal interviews with the justices, he published the first major work in English on that court. Since then, Kommers has produced a steady stream of significant works on German constitutional law.

German Constitutional Law

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bumke Christian ◽  
Voßkuhle Andreas
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Equal Treatment ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
German Constitution ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Book Covers ◽  
The Right ◽  
German Constitutional Law

This book provides a comprehensive summary of German constitutional law, in particular the case law of the German Federal Constitutional Court. It provides first-hand insight into the complex principles of the Basic Law, or Grundgesetz (GG), and an authoritative introduction to the history of the German constitution, the Basic Law, and the methodology of the Federal Constitutional Court. As well as an analysis of the general principles of German constitutional law, the book covers the salient articles of the German constitution and offers relevant extracts of the Court's most important decisions on the provisions of the Basic Law. It provides notes and discussions of landmark cases to illustrate their legal and historical context and give the reader a clear understanding of the principles governing German constitutional law. The book covers the fundamental rights catalogue of the Basic Law and offers a comprehensive account of its intellectual moorings. It includes landmark jurisprudence on the equal treatment of same-sex couples, life imprisonment, the legal structure of property, the right to assembly, and the right to informational self-presentation. The book also covers the provisions and respective case law governing the state structure of Germany, for instance the recent decisions on the prohibition of the far-right German nationalist party, and the Court's jurisprudence on European integration, including the most recent decisions on the OMT program of the European Central Bank.

The German Federal Constitutional Court

2020 ◽  
pp. 279-356
Author(s):  
Anuscheh Farahat
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
New Era ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
Post War ◽  
Nazi Era ◽  
German Constitutional Law ◽  
The Guardian ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court

This chapter discusses the German constitutional court, otherwise known as the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht; ‘BVerfG’). It first traces the development of the German process of constitutional jurisdiction from its pre-Nazi era roots to its astounding post-war transformation into one of the world’s leading courts. The chapter looks at the challenges inherent in the founding of the BVerfG before providing an overview of the organization and role and functions of the BVerfG. It shows how the BVerfG acts as the ‘guardian’ of German constitutional law. To conclude, this chapter reflects on the increasing Europeanization of constitutional law and what it means for the BVerfG to navigate this new era of constitutional pluralization.

Parliamentary Consent to the Use of German Armed Forces Abroad: The 2008 Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in theAWACS/Turkey Case

2008 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 2223-2236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helmut Philipp Aust ◽  
Mindia Vashakmadze
Keyword(s):  
International Organizations ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Adriatic Sea ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
German Armed Forces ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Constitutional Law ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

Since the German Federal Constitutional Court's 1994 decision on the deployment of AWACS surveillance aircraft over the Adriatic Sea, it is one of the cornerstones of German constitutional law that Parliament (theBundestag) needs to consent to the external use of German Armed Forces in situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is likely. However, theBundestagmay neither determine “the modalities, the dimension and the duration of the operations, nor the necessary coordination within and with the organs of international organizations.” As the requirement of constitutive parliamentary approval is not directly set out in the German Basic Law, the Federal Constitutional Court (in the following: FCC or the Court) derived it from the general constitutional framework. The concept of “parliamentary army”, designed by the Court, attempts to strike a balance between executive effectiveness and parliamentary participation.

scholarly journals Foreign Law, Democracy, and Constitutional Interpretation: A German-American Comparison

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (8) ◽  
pp. 1119-1139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shu-Perng Hwang
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
National Level ◽  
American Exceptionalism ◽  
The United States ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Foreign Law ◽  
Important Argument ◽  
The One ◽  
German Constitutional Law

AbstractDemocracy is usually relied upon as an important argument against the excessive influence of international and foreign law on the domestic legal order, and especially on domestic constitutional law. Both in Germany and the United States, skeptics and opponents of the Europeanization or internationalization of domestic constitutional law repeatedly raise democratic concerns. From a comparative perspective, this Article examines the German and American democratic arguments against an overreliance on international and foreign law in constitutional interpretations. In exploring the democratic concerns expressed in German and American discussions, this Article focuses especially on the contrast between German dualism on the one hand and American exceptionalism on the other hand. This Article shows that, while the German dualists and the American exceptionalists base their arguments on different understandings of democracy, they share the viewpoint that democracy can only be realized on the national level, whereas international law aims at uniformity und thus inevitably runs counter to democratic self-governance and self-determination of the states. Precisely in this sense, it can be said that there is no qualitative, but rather only a quantitative distinction between German and American democratic arguments. Thus conceived, the alleged contrast between the principle of open statehood emphasized by German constitutional law scholars and the Constitutional Court and the idea of American exceptionalism embraced by a number of critics of the use of foreign law lies only in the extent to which the reference to international or foreign law in interpreting the domestic Constitution is deemed legitimate and justifiable.

Finanzfolgen höchstrichterlicher Entscheidungen

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia Wiechmann
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
German State ◽  
Tax State ◽  
Financial Interests ◽  
Federal Constitutional

The German state is a tax state and relies on current revenues. If a tax is declared incompatible with the constitutional law, the Federal Constitutional Court regularly orders its continued application until a new regulation is adopted. The taxpayer must then pay an unconstitutional tax without receiving any compensation for it. The order for continued application does not eliminate the constitutional infringement, but maintains it. The ECJ takes a much stricter approach to violations of EU law, since in its view the financial interests of a state are never suitable for maintaining an unconstitutional state. The work attempts to strike an appropriate balance between these two positions.

Sozio-ökonomische Ungleichheit: Verfassungstheoretische Bedeutung, verfassungsrechtliche Reaktionen

Der Staat ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-210
Author(s):  
Konstantin Chatziathanasiou
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Economic Inequality ◽  
Wealth Inequality ◽  
Social Dimension ◽  
Economic Research ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Minimum Requirements ◽  
Federal Constitutional

Der Beitrag behandelt sozio-ökonomische Ungleichheit als verfassungsrelevante Herausforderung unter dem Grundgesetz. Theoretisch sind unterschiedliche Wirkzusammenhänge zwischen Verfassung und sozio-ökonomischer Ungleichheit möglich. Insbesondere kann sozio-ökonomische Gleichheit als faktische Legitimitätsressource und als demokratische Funktionsbedingung wirken. Empirisch deutet die ökonomische Ungleichheitsforschung auf eine wachsende Vermögensungleichheit in Deutschland hin. Verfassungstheorie und empirische Zustandsbeschreibung treffen sich in der Auslegung des geltenden Verfassungsrechts, das im Hinblick auf das Soziale nur schwach determiniert ist. Die Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts formuliert Mindestanforderungen, überlässt die Konkretisierung des Sozialen aber weitgehend der Politik. Die Verfassungsrechtswissenschaft sollte diesen Prozess konstruktiv begleiten, dabei aber zwischen Recht und Theorie unterscheiden. The article addresses socio-economic inequality as a constitutional challenge under the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz). Theoretically, several causal relationships between the constitution and socio-economic inequality are possible and plausible. In particular, socio-economic equality can be a resource of de facto legitimacy and a condition of democracy. Empirically, current economic research indicates growing wealth inequality in Germany. Constitutional theory and empirical description meet in the interpretation and application of actual constitutional law, whose social dimension is only weakly determined. The Federal Constitutional Court formulates minimum requirements, but leaves the concretization of the social dimension essentially to the political branches of government. Constitutional law scholarship should analyse this process constructively, while distinguishing between law and theory.

Verfassungsanalogien – Das Bundesverfassungsgericht an der Grenze der Verfassungsinterpretation

Der Staat ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-41
Author(s):  
Carsten Bäcker
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Federal State ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Sich Eine ◽  
Statutory Interpretation ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Federal Constitutional

Analogien sind methodologisch hoch umstritten; sie bewegen sich an der Grenze der Gesetzesinterpretation. Dem methodologischen Streit um die Analogien unterliegt die Frage nach den Grenzen der Gesetzesinterpretation. In der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts finden sich eine Reihe von Verfassungsanalogien. Diese Analogien zum Verfassungsgesetz werden zwar nur selten ausdrücklich als solche bezeichnet, sie finden sich aber in einer Vielzahl von dogmatischen Konstruktionen in der Rechtsprechung – wie etwa der Erweiterung des Grundrechtsschutzes für Deutsche auf EU-Bürger oder der Annahme von Gesetzgebungskompetenzen des Bundes als Annex zu dessen geschriebenen Kompetenzen. Die Existenz derartiger Analogien zum Verfassungsgesetz verlangt nach Antworten auf die Fragen nach den Grenzen der Kompetenz zur Verfassungsinterpretation. Der Beitrag spürt diesen Grenzen nach – und schließt mit der Aufforderung an das Bundesverfassungsgericht, die Annahme von Verfassungsanalogien zu explizieren und die sich darin spiegelnden Annahmen über die Grenzen der Kompetenz zur Verfassungsinterpretation zu reflektieren. Constitutional analogies. The Federal Constitutional Court at the limit of constitutional interpretation From a methodological point of view, the use of analogies in legal argument is highly controversial, for they reach to the limits of statutory interpretation. Underlying the methodological dispute over analogies is the question of what the limits of statutory interpretation are or ought to be. A number of analogies from constitutional law can be found in the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court. Although these analogies to constitutional law are rarely explicitly designated as such, in the case law they can be found in a variety of dogmatic constructions – for example, in the extension of Germans’ fundamental rights protection to EU citizens, or the assumption of legislative powers of the federal state as an appendix to its written powers. The existence of such analogies to constitutional law calls for answers to the question of the limits of the power to interpret the Constitution. It is the aim of this article to trace these limits, and in its conclusion it calls on the Federal Constitutional Court to explicate the adoption of analogies in constitutional law and to reflect on the assumptions found therein – respecting the limits of the power to interpret the Constitution.

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