Finanzfolgen höchstrichterlicher Entscheidungen

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia Wiechmann
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
German State ◽  
Tax State ◽  
Financial Interests ◽  
Federal Constitutional

The German state is a tax state and relies on current revenues. If a tax is declared incompatible with the constitutional law, the Federal Constitutional Court regularly orders its continued application until a new regulation is adopted. The taxpayer must then pay an unconstitutional tax without receiving any compensation for it. The order for continued application does not eliminate the constitutional infringement, but maintains it. The ECJ takes a much stricter approach to violations of EU law, since in its view the financial interests of a state are never suitable for maintaining an unconstitutional state. The work attempts to strike an appropriate balance between these two positions.

Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) Case

2021 ◽  
Vol 192 ◽  
pp. 451-511
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

451Economics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Fiscal sovereignty — Public debt — Monetary policy — Economic policy — European Union — Asset purchase programme — Quantitative easing — Central banks — European Central Bank — European System of Central Banks — BundesbankTreaties — Treaty-making powers — Constitutional limitations on treaty-making powers — Transfers of powers by States to intergovernmental and other transnational authorities — Whether compatible with constitutional prerogatives of national parliament — Overall budgetary responsibility — Basic Law of GermanyInternational organizations — European Union — Powers — Member States as masters of the treaties — Principle of conferral — Whether Union having competence to determine or extend its own powers — Principle of subsidiarity — Court of Justice of the European UnionRelationship of international law and municipal law — European Union law — Interpretation — Application — Judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Weiss — Principle of proportionality — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether German Federal Constitutional Court having absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Compatibility with Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany — Openness of German Basic Law to European integration — Whether purchase programme ultra vires — Whether ultra vires acts applicable in Germany — Whether having binding effect in relation to German constitutional organsJurisdiction — European Union institutions — Whether jurisdiction of German Federal Constitutional Court extending to Court of Justice of the European Union and European Central Bank — Whether acts of EU institutions subject to national constitutional review — Ultra vires review — Review of core identity of national constitution — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — The law of Germany

scholarly journals The Mediation Committee of the Bundestag and Bundesrat: A Special Institution of German Constitutional Law

2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-42
Author(s):  
Claus Koggel
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Current Case ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Legislative Procedure ◽  
German Constitutional Law

AbstractThe Mediation Committee of the Bundestag and Bundesrat – is it “one of the most felicitous innovations in our constitutional activities”, “the most positive institution in the entire Basic Law” or, as some critics assert “a substitute and superordinate parliament” or indeed the “mysterious darkroom of the legislative process”? This article seeks to provide answers to these questions. It is however clear that the Mediation Committee has become an important instrument for attaining political compromises in Germany's legislative procedure. The Committee's purpose is to find a balance between the differing opinions of the Bundestag and Bundesrat concerning the content of legislation, and, through political mediation and mutual concessions, to find solutions that are acceptable to both sides. Thanks to this approach, the Mediation Committee has helped save countless important pieces of legislation from failure since it was established over 65 years ago, thus making a vital contribution to ensure the legislative process works efficiently. The lecture will address the Mediation Committee's status and role within the German legislative process. It will explain the composition of this body as well as its most important procedural principles also against the backdrop of current case law from the Federal Constitutional Court. Finally, the lecture will consider how particular constellations of political power impact on the Mediation Committee's work.

scholarly journals “OBJEKTFORMEL” – EVENTUAL ACTS OF DAMAGE TO HUMAN DIGNITY

2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 19-26
Author(s):  
Izabela Bratiloveanu
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
European Court ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Constitutional Law ◽  
First Time

 The Object formula („Objecktformel”) has been designed and developed in the mid century XX by Günter Dürig, starting from the second formula of Kant's categorical imperative. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany took the formula and applied it for the first time in the case of the telephone conversations of December 15, 1970. The Object formula („Objecktformel”) was taken from the German constitutional law and applied in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.

Sozio-ökonomische Ungleichheit: Verfassungstheoretische Bedeutung, verfassungsrechtliche Reaktionen

Der Staat ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-210
Author(s):  
Konstantin Chatziathanasiou
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Economic Inequality ◽  
Wealth Inequality ◽  
Social Dimension ◽  
Economic Research ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Minimum Requirements ◽  
Federal Constitutional

Der Beitrag behandelt sozio-ökonomische Ungleichheit als verfassungsrelevante Herausforderung unter dem Grundgesetz. Theoretisch sind unterschiedliche Wirkzusammenhänge zwischen Verfassung und sozio-ökonomischer Ungleichheit möglich. Insbesondere kann sozio-ökonomische Gleichheit als faktische Legitimitätsressource und als demokratische Funktionsbedingung wirken. Empirisch deutet die ökonomische Ungleichheitsforschung auf eine wachsende Vermögensungleichheit in Deutschland hin. Verfassungstheorie und empirische Zustandsbeschreibung treffen sich in der Auslegung des geltenden Verfassungsrechts, das im Hinblick auf das Soziale nur schwach determiniert ist. Die Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts formuliert Mindestanforderungen, überlässt die Konkretisierung des Sozialen aber weitgehend der Politik. Die Verfassungsrechtswissenschaft sollte diesen Prozess konstruktiv begleiten, dabei aber zwischen Recht und Theorie unterscheiden. The article addresses socio-economic inequality as a constitutional challenge under the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz). Theoretically, several causal relationships between the constitution and socio-economic inequality are possible and plausible. In particular, socio-economic equality can be a resource of de facto legitimacy and a condition of democracy. Empirically, current economic research indicates growing wealth inequality in Germany. Constitutional theory and empirical description meet in the interpretation and application of actual constitutional law, whose social dimension is only weakly determined. The Federal Constitutional Court formulates minimum requirements, but leaves the concretization of the social dimension essentially to the political branches of government. Constitutional law scholarship should analyse this process constructively, while distinguishing between law and theory.

Verfassungsanalogien – Das Bundesverfassungsgericht an der Grenze der Verfassungsinterpretation

Der Staat ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-41
Author(s):  
Carsten Bäcker
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Federal State ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Sich Eine ◽  
Statutory Interpretation ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Federal Constitutional

Analogien sind methodologisch hoch umstritten; sie bewegen sich an der Grenze der Gesetzesinterpretation. Dem methodologischen Streit um die Analogien unterliegt die Frage nach den Grenzen der Gesetzesinterpretation. In der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts finden sich eine Reihe von Verfassungsanalogien. Diese Analogien zum Verfassungsgesetz werden zwar nur selten ausdrücklich als solche bezeichnet, sie finden sich aber in einer Vielzahl von dogmatischen Konstruktionen in der Rechtsprechung – wie etwa der Erweiterung des Grundrechtsschutzes für Deutsche auf EU-Bürger oder der Annahme von Gesetzgebungskompetenzen des Bundes als Annex zu dessen geschriebenen Kompetenzen. Die Existenz derartiger Analogien zum Verfassungsgesetz verlangt nach Antworten auf die Fragen nach den Grenzen der Kompetenz zur Verfassungsinterpretation. Der Beitrag spürt diesen Grenzen nach – und schließt mit der Aufforderung an das Bundesverfassungsgericht, die Annahme von Verfassungsanalogien zu explizieren und die sich darin spiegelnden Annahmen über die Grenzen der Kompetenz zur Verfassungsinterpretation zu reflektieren. Constitutional analogies. The Federal Constitutional Court at the limit of constitutional interpretation From a methodological point of view, the use of analogies in legal argument is highly controversial, for they reach to the limits of statutory interpretation. Underlying the methodological dispute over analogies is the question of what the limits of statutory interpretation are or ought to be. A number of analogies from constitutional law can be found in the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court. Although these analogies to constitutional law are rarely explicitly designated as such, in the case law they can be found in a variety of dogmatic constructions – for example, in the extension of Germans’ fundamental rights protection to EU citizens, or the assumption of legislative powers of the federal state as an appendix to its written powers. The existence of such analogies to constitutional law calls for answers to the question of the limits of the power to interpret the Constitution. It is the aim of this article to trace these limits, and in its conclusion it calls on the Federal Constitutional Court to explicate the adoption of analogies in constitutional law and to reflect on the assumptions found therein – respecting the limits of the power to interpret the Constitution.

The Treatment of Hate Speech in German Constitutional Law (Part II)

2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Winfried Brugger
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Hate Speech ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Specific Determination ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Constitutional Law

As pointed out by the Federal Constitutional Court, a specific determination of the appropriateness of hate speech prohibitions can be based only on the circumstances of individual cases. Some particularly prominent cases are now reviewed.

Direct Cooperation Has Begun: Some Remarks on the Judgment of the ECJ on the OMT Decision of the ECB in Response to the German Federal Constitutional Court's First Request for a Preliminary Ruling

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 1025-1048 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sven Simon
Keyword(s):  
Financial Stability ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Preliminary Ruling ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Critical Question ◽  
Political Problem ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism

By its first request for a preliminary ruling, the German Constitutional Court aired its doubts about the lawfulness of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) program. In this article it is argued that the ECB's pledge in the summer of 2012 to do “whatever it takes” to safeguard the monetary policy transmission mechanism in all countries of the euro area by buying government bonds was generally compatible with EU law. However, it is argued that there is some potential for the ECB to infringe the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) while acting according to this announcement. The peculiarity of the situation, the author argues, is that we might be dealing with a “self-fulfilling prophecy” in that the ECB announces a particular policy, which might not be compatible with EU law, but the act announced, will never take place because the political problem would have been resolved by the measure previously announced. The critical question in this scenario refers to how a court should react to such a situation. The author argues that a court in such a situation has to show the legal limits of the particular institution, but neither the ECJ nor the German Constitutional Court may replace the central banks' task to maintain financial stability. Finally, a comment is given on how the German Constitutional Court will react to the ECJ's decision in that case.

David Currie and German Constitutional Law

2008 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 2081-2094
Author(s):  
Peter E. Quint
Keyword(s):  
Federal Republic ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Federal Republic Of Germany ◽  
Major Work ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
German Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Jurisprudence

Without much doubt, the two great pillars of American scholarship on the German Basic Law and the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court are (in the order of first appearance) Donald Kommers's monumental casebook, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany and David Currie's magisterial treatise, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. Professor Kommers's comprehensive work was a milestone in a long career that has been very substantially devoted to the study of German constitutional law. In the late 1960s, Kommers spent a research year at the German Constitutional Court and, drawing in part on personal interviews with the justices, he published the first major work in English on that court. Since then, Kommers has produced a steady stream of significant works on German constitutional law.

Federal Constitutional Court Defines the Power of Parliamentary Minorities in the Constitutionally Established, Parliamentary Investigative Committees

2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (10) ◽  
Author(s):  
Volker Röben
Keyword(s):  
Max Weber ◽  
Specific Aspect ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Central Function ◽  
German State ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Parliamentary Committee ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Right

The Untersuchungsausschuss-Fall (Parliamentary Committee Case) 2 BvE 2/01, decided by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court) on 8 April 2002, concerns the so-called right of enquête, a central function of Parliament under the parliamentary system designed by the German Basic Law. The right of enquête, the investigation by Parliament by taking evidence complete with the subpoena powers normally reserved to criminal investigations, has been an integral part of both the Weimar and the Bonn Constitutions. Max Weber, in the era of the Bismarck-Constitution for the German state founded in 1871, made a forceful pitch for the equality of the Parliament and Executive. He argued that members of Parliament needed to be professionals and to have full access to the information that, traditionally, was the source of power of the executive. Instituting committees of investigation with the power to take evidence was the means to do so. In fact, Weber went further, arguing that the right to call for an investigative parliamentary committee needed to be vested in a (qualified) minority of the members of Parliament. There is no equivalent of this specific aspect in the other European parliamentary systems. Article 34 of the Weimar Constitution provided that one fifth of the members of Parliament could ask for the institution of a committee of investigation. The same quorum had the right to move for the hearing of specific evidence by the committee.

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