scholarly journals The Spanish Constitutional Court and Fundamental Rights Adjudication After the First Preliminary Reference

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1509-1528
Author(s):  
Miryam Rodríguez-Izquierdo Serrano
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Legal Doctrine ◽  
Law System ◽  
Community Law ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights

The purpose of the preliminary reference procedure is to ensure a uniform application and interpretation of Community law across all the Member States, including European fundamental rights as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The entry into force of the Charter has reinforced the authority of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the field of fundamental rights adjudication. But the Charter may also be a new source of conflicts between the jurisdiction of the CJEU and the jurisdiction of national constitutional courts. Indeed, compliance with the indirect rulings over national law contained in the CJEU decisions became something logical for the national ordinary courts from the beginning of the integration process, but it was not the same for national constitutional courts. Most of them have always disliked the idea of asking for the CJEU's opinion on a conflict of law involving national constitutional provisions. The CJEU succeeded in establishing a legal doctrine through principles of Community law—supremacy and direct effect being the pioneers—that meant a material constitutionalization of the European Union (EU) law system. And for the national constitutional courts, such an understanding of EU law made a rival of the CJEU.

Fundamental Rights Protection between Strasbourg and Luxembourg

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katalin Ligeti
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
European Court ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
Grand Chamber

Since long before the entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU), the two highest courts in Europe, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have sought to develop their respective jurisprudence in such a way as to ensure a strong protection of individual rights, whilst avoiding clashes between the decisions taken in Luxembourg and Strasbourg. An important statement in this regard is provided by the Bosphorus judgment, in which the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR recognised the existence of a presumption of equivalent protection of fundamental rights under EU law. The presumption is rebuttable, but expresses the trustful attitude (and a certain degree of deference) of Strasbourg towards the ability of EU law (and of the CJEU) to protect Convention rights.

The German Constitutional Court and Preliminary References—Still a Match not Made in Heaven?

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1491-1508
Author(s):  
Eva Julia Lohse
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
In The Beginning ◽  
The Eu

So far, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, henceforth:BVerfG) has only made a single preliminary reference to the (now) Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), despite frequent rulings on matters connected with European Union (EU) Law. Its apparent reluctance seemed odd considering the atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation which prevails between the non-constitutional courts and the EU courts. This situation might, however, have changed with the preliminary reference from January 2014, proving predictions on the perceived “most powerful constitutional court” and its relationship to the EU partly wrong. The legal effects of its preliminary reference on the interpretation of Articles 119, 123, 127 ff. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the validity of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the European Central Bank (ECB) under EU Law are as yet unclear; although the Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón was delivered in the beginning of 2015, which did not confirm the doubts expressed by theBVerfGabout the conformity of the OMT programme with EU law. Nonetheless, the interpretative scheme and the normative questions as to the reluctance of theBVerfGremain the same after this single referral and offer explanations as to why theBVerfGhad for nearly sixty years not referred a question to the former European Court of Justice (ECJ).

European Integration Through Preliminary Rulings? The Case of the Bulgarian Constitutional Court

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1591-1622
Author(s):  
Mihail Vatsov
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Reference Procedure ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Do So

The preliminary reference procedure under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is instrumental for the so-called “judicial dialogue” within the European Union (EU). The goals of the preliminary reference procedure are to ensure the uniform interpretation and application of EU law and to contribute to the harmonious development of the law throughout the EU. It was through the preliminary reference procedure to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) that the principles of direct effect and supremacy were developed. It took many years before the first request by a Constitutional Court was sent to the CJEU. So far, the Constitutional Courts of Belgium, Austria, Lithuania, Italy, Spain, France, Germany, and most recently Slovenia, have sent requests for preliminary rulings to the CJEU. By far the most active of these in sending requests has been the Belgian Court. The Portuguese Constitutional Court has indicated that it can request preliminary rulings from the CJEU but is yet to do so. In the other Member States (MS) with Constitutional Courts, references have not been sent yet, although worthy occasions in terms of EU-law-related cases have occurred, as also observed in various contributions in this special issue. These MSs include Bulgaria.

scholarly journals Scope and Exercise of the Exclusive Competences of the Member States of the European Union

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 23-46
Author(s):  
Edyta Anna Krzysztofik
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Member States ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Uniform Manner ◽  
Constitutional Identity ◽  
The Eu

The process of European integration has introduced the Member States into a new legal reality. The existing exclusivity in the area of competence implementation has been replaced by a two-stage model of their exercise. The Member States, when conferring part of their supervisory powers, did not specify the scope of their own competences. The so-called European clauses were analysed in the Constitutions of selected Member States, which showed that they define the recipient of the conferral and, in a non-uniform manner, specify the subject of the conferral.  The analysis of the indicated provisions clearly shows that the Constitutions of the Member States exclude full conferral of competences on the European Union. There is no specification of the scope of competences that may be conferred. However, this issue was addressed by Constitutional Courts of the Member States. The article refers to the judgements of the German Federal Constitutional Court and the Polish Constitutional Court. It has been shown that they equate exclusive competences of the Member States with the scope of the concept of constitutional identity reduced to basic principles of the state. The Court of Justice of the European Union analysed the scope of competences of both entities. The article presents the analysis of judgements on: entries in Civil Registry regarding transcription of surnames, the issue of recognition of same-sex marriages, reform of the judiciary system in Poland, and the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the areas that do not fall under EU competence. Regardless of the division of competences, the EU is bound by the principle of respect for national identity of the Member States, including constitutional identity. It both obligates the EU to respect the exclusive competences of the Member States and is a premise restricting the achievement of EU objectives.

scholarly journals Die Wandlung des Grundrechtsschutzes durch das Bundesverfassungsgericht – Recht auf Vergessen I und II als „Solange III“?

2019 ◽  
Vol 102 (4) ◽  
pp. 277-292
Author(s):  
Rainer Hofmann ◽  
Alexander Heger ◽  
Tamara Gharibyan
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Level System ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
German Constitution ◽  
Multi Level ◽  
The Relationship

The relationship between the fundamental rights as laid down in the German Constitution and the fundamental rights contained in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union has been exceedingly conflict-prone ever since the early days of the European Union. Related thereto is the ongoing controversy on the judicial prerogative of the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) within that system. Thus, two big players in the European multi level system, i.e. the BVerfG and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), clash with their judicial powers and diverging interests. With its two recent decisions, 1 BvR 16/13 and 1 BvR 276/17 of November 6, 2019, the First Senate of the BVerfG introduced a far-reaching change in its approach of protecting basic rights by clarifying the relationship between the EU fundamental rights and the fundamental rights of the German Constitution. At the same time, the BVerfG has made a strong effort to maintain its position within the multilevel cooperation of the constitutional courts of EU member states, particularly in relation to the ECJ, which by both sides is referred to as a "cooperative relationship". This article explains the repercussions of the aforementioned judgments on the protection of fundamental rights in the European multi-level system.

scholarly journals Supremacía de la constitución versus primacía del derecho de la UE en materia derechos fundamentales: concordancias y discordancias entre el tribunal constitucional y el tribunal de justicia de la UE en el asunto Melloni

2017 ◽  
pp. 637
Author(s):  
Francisco Javier Donaire Villa
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
National Level ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Union Law ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Arrest Warrant ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Eu

Se analiza en este artículo el primer diálogo judicial directo entre el TC español y el Tribunal de Justicia de la UE, sobre la Euroorden y la interpretación del artículo 53 de la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la UE cuando el nivel nacional de protección de los derechos es superior al dispensado por una norma de Derecho derivado de la Unión. Se ponen de manifiesto las posibles tensiones entre supremacía constitucional y primacía del Derecho de la Unión Europea, y la evocación por el Tribunal Constitucional de su doctrina de los derechos constitucionalmente reconocidos como límites a la integración en la Sentencia que cierra el diálogo con el Tribunal de Justicia en el Asunto Melloni.This paper surveys the first direct judicial dialogue between the Spanish Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union on the European Arrest Warrant and the interpretation of Article 53 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU when the national level of protection of rights is higher than that provided by a rule of secondary legislation of the Union. It highlights the possible tensions between constitutional supremacy and primacy of European Union law, and the evocation made by the Constitutional Court of its doctrine on rights constitutionally recognized as limits to the European integration contained in the judgment which closes the dialogue between both Courts within the so-called Melloni case.

Briefly Noted

2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 528-529
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Selection Process ◽  
National Court ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Background Checks ◽  
Judicial Appointments ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights

On Tuesday, April 20, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled in Case C-896/19, Repubblika v. Il-Prim Ministru that Malta's system for appointing judges did not contradict EU law. As reported by JURIST, the ruling went before the national court when Repubblika, an association created to promote the rule of law in Malta, had challenged the procedure, which was provided by the Constitution of Malta. The process in the Maltese Constitution stated that judiciary members are appointed by the president acting under the advisement of the prime minister. However, appointees must satisfy certain conditions and are subject to background checks or other examinations by the Judicial Appointments Committee, whose purpose is to assess candidates and provide feedback to the prime minister. The national court brought this to the CJEU to decide whether this system was constitutional under EU law, specifically under Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union, in light of Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which states that member states must provide conditions for a fair, independent, and impartial trial to ensure true justice. The court reached the conclusion that this practice was not prohibited by EU law because, in order to guarantee conditions of judicial independence and impartiality, procedures must exist to ensure that appointees are free from influence from the legislature and/or executive with regard to judiciary proceedings. The Court found that power of the prime minister to submit a candidate that was not suggested by the Judicial Appointments Committee was not contrary to EU law because of various safeguarding measures included in the Constitution. The Court held: “Inasmuch as the Prime Minister exercises that power only in quite exceptional circumstances and adheres to strict and effective compliance with that obligation to state reasons, that power is not such as to give rise to legitimate doubts concerning the independence of the candidates selected” (para. 71). Therefore, the Court concluded that the national provisions at issue do not give rise to any legitimate uncertainties, or doubts of independence, regarding the chosen judiciary candidates.

Travauxto the EU Treaties: Preparatory Work as a Source of EU Law

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 145-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuli MIETTINEN ◽  
Merita KETTUNEN
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Dynamic Interpretation ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
Preparatory Work ◽  
The Eu

AbstractThe Court of Justice of the European Union has historically rejected references to preparatory work in the interpretation of EU Treaties. However, the preparatory work for the EURATOM, Maastricht, and Constitutional Treaties have played a role in recent judgments. The ‘explanations’ to the Charter of Fundamental Rights are expressly approved in the current Treaties. We examine the emerging case law on preparatory work. Reference to the drafters’ intent does not necessarily support dynamic interpretation, and may potentially even ossify historical interpretations. Even if the consequence of their introduction is a conservative interpretation, their use raises questions of transparency and democracy, and complicates the already difficult task of interpreting the EU constitution.

scholarly journals Social Rights between Hard Law and Soft Law. A case study from European Union

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 799-812
Author(s):  
Jacopo Paffarini
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Soft Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Treaty ◽  
Specific System ◽  
Legal Doctrine ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights

After the Lisbon Summit of 2009, the whole matter of fundamental rights in the European Union has taken a new connotation. Local economic interests and social protests – in opposition to the “neoliberal agenda” of EU institutions – have played an important role in stopping the enforcement of the “Constitutional Treaty” and boosted an anti-Euro mobilization. In the meanwhile, the European bodies and transnational corporations have continued to settle a new and alternative basis for the integration. A radical shift can be observed, from the research of synthetic set of principles – as those established on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – to a deeply technical and detailed normative production. The regulation on safety and healthy workplaces is one of the best point of view to study this change. Far from calling into question the unbalanced positions between the parties in contemporary labour relationships, the European strategy for workers’ protection move through procedural issues and voluntary obedience to the soft law instruments. In the past, the legal doctrine described the creation of a multilevel architecture of institutions, sometimes implemented in a top-down approach. Along with this, recently, it was implemented the establishment of common organizational standards associated to a specific system of corporate governance to pursue a better integration between business and fundamental rights.

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