The feeling of thinking: Sense of agency in delusions of thought insertion.

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Gerrans
Keyword(s):  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Thought Insertion

scholarly journals Too much or too little? Disorders of agency on a spectrum

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-99
Author(s):  
Valentina Petrolini
Keyword(s):  
Mental Disorders ◽  
Mind Wandering ◽  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
False Confessions ◽  
Sense Of Control ◽  
Thought Insertion ◽  
Auditory Verbal Hallucinations ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Frequency Intensity

Disorders of agency could be described as cases where people encounter difficulties in assessing their own degree of responsibility or involvement with respect to a relevant action or event. These disturbances in one’s sense of agency appear to be meaningfully connected with some mental disorders and with some symptoms in particular—i.e. auditory verbal hallucinations, thought insertion, pathological guilt. A deeper understanding of these experiences may thus contribute to better identification and possibly treatment of people affected by such disorders. In this paper I explore disorders of agency to flesh out their phenomenology in more detail as well as to introduce some theoretical distinctions between them. Specifically, I argue that we may better understand disorders of agency by characterizing them as dimensional. In §1 I explore the cases of Auditory Verbal Hallucinations (AVH) and pathological guilt and I show that they lie at opposite ends of the agency spectrum (i.e. hypoagency versus hyperagency). In §2 I focus on two intermediate cases of hypo- and hyper- agency. These are situations that, despite being very similar to pathological ones, may be successfully distinguished from them in virtue of quantitative factors (e.g. duration, frequency, intensity). I first explore the phenomenon of mind wandering as an example of hypoagency, and I then discuss the phenomenon of false confessions as an example of hyperagency. While cases of hypoagency exemplify situations where people experience their own thoughts, bodies, or actions as something beyond their control, experiences of hyperagency provide an illusory sense of control over actions or events.

Simulated thought insertion: Influencing the sense of agency using deception and magic

2016 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
pp. 11-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jay A. Olson ◽  
Mathieu Landry ◽  
Krystèle Appourchaux ◽  
Amir Raz
Keyword(s):  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Thought Insertion

scholarly journals Hypnotic Clever Hands: Agency and Automatic Responding

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vince Polito ◽  
Amanda Barnier ◽  
Michael Connors
Keyword(s):  
Executive Control ◽  
Original Study ◽  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Implicit Processes ◽  
Thought Insertion ◽  
Random Responding ◽  
Hypnotic Suggestions

The Clever Hands task (Wegner, Fuller, & Sparrow, 2003) is a behavioral illusion in which participants make responses to a trivia quiz for which they have no sense of agency. Sixty high hypnotizable participants completed two versions of the Clever Hands task. Quiz one was a replication of the original study. Quiz two was a hypnotic adaptation using three suggestions that were based on clinical disruptions to the sense of agency. The suggestions were for: Random Responding, Thought Insertion, and Alien Control. These suggestions led to differences in accuracy (action production) and estimates of accuracy (action projection). Specifically, whereas the Random Responding suggestion had little effect, the two clinically based suggestions had opposite impacts on action production: the Thought Insertion suggestion led to an increase in the rate of correct responses (although participants still believed they were responding randomly); while the Alien Control suggestion led to a reduction in the rate of correct answers and a pattern of results that more closely approximated randomness. Contrary to theoretical accounts that claim that hypnosis affects executive monitoring rather than executive control, this result indicates that specific hypnotic suggestions can also influence the implicit processes involved in action production.

Agency and Insanity

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen P. Garvey
Keyword(s):  
Agency Theory ◽  
Mental Disease ◽  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Traditional Theory ◽  
Alien Hand Syndrome ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
Alien Hand ◽  
Title Character

66 Buffalo Law Review 123 (2018)This Article offers an unorthodox theory of insanity. According to the traditional theory, insanity is a cognitive or volitional incapacity arising from a mental disease or defect. As an alternative to the traditional theory, some commentators have proposed that insanity is an especially debilitating form of irrationality. Each of these theories faces fair-minded objections. In contrast to these theories, this Article proposes that a person is insane if and because he lacks a sense of agency. The theory of insanity it defends might therefore be called the lost-agency theory.According to the lost-agency theory, a person lacks a sense of agency when he experiences his mind and body moving but doesn’t experience himself as the author or agent of those movements. The title character in the movie Dr. Strangelove suffered from what’s known as alien hand syndrome. People suffering from this syndrome experience the moving hand as their hand but don’t experience themselves as the author or agent of its movements. The lost-agency theory portrays insanity as alien hand syndrome writ large. The insane actor is like someone possessed by an alien self. He’s not in charge of his mind or body when he commits the crime.

Measuring Agency Change Across the Domain of Hypnosis

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vince Polito ◽  
Amanda Barnier ◽  
Erik Woody
Keyword(s):  
Rating Scale ◽  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Pass Rates ◽  
Current Experiment ◽  
Multidimensional Construct ◽  
Time Points ◽  
Hypnotic Induction ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Postexperimental Inquiry

Building on Hilgard’s (1965) classic work, the domain of hypnosis has been conceptualised by Barnier, Dienes, and Mitchell (2008) as comprising three levels: (1) classic hypnotic items, (2) responding between and within items, and (3) state and trait. The current experiment investigates sense of agency across each of these three levels. Forty-six high hypnotisable participants completed an ideomotor (arm levitation), a challenge (arm rigidity) and a cognitive (anosmia) item either following a hypnotic induction (hypnosis condition) or without a hypnotic induction (wake condition). In a postexperimental inquiry, participants rated their feelings of control at three time points for each item: during the suggestion, test and cancellation phases. They also completed the Sense of Agency Rating Scale (Polito, Barnier, & Woody, 2013) for each item. Pass rates, control ratings, and agency scores fluctuated across the different types of items and for the three phases of each item; also, control ratings and agency scores often differed across participants who passed versus failed each item. Interestingly, whereas a hypnotic induction influenced the likelihood of passing items, it had no direct effect on agentive experiences. These results suggest that altered sense of agency is not a unidimensional or static quality “switched on” by hypnotic induction, but a dynamic multidimensional construct that varies across items, over time and according to whether individuals pass or fail suggestions.

The Origins of Intentional Agency

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorijn Zaadnoordijk ◽  
Tim Bayne
Keyword(s):  
Developmental Theory ◽  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Intentional Agency ◽  
Human Adults ◽  
Intentional Agents

As human adults, we experience ourselves as intentional agents. Here, we address how intentional agency and the corresponding agentive experiences emerge in infancy. When formulating a developmental theory of intentional agency, we encounter a so-called paradox of agency: three plausible theses regarding intentional agency that in combination seem to make it impossible for the developing infant to acquire a sense of agency. By recognizing various types of intentions, we propose a framework in which the paradox can be resolved, allowing infants to bootstrap their way to becoming intentional agents and experiencing a sense of agency.

Case Series With Late-Onset Psychosis Hospitalized in a Geriatric Psychiatry Unit in Turkey: Experience in 9 Years

2003 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yesne Alici-Evcimen ◽  
Turan Ertan ◽  
Engin Eker
Keyword(s):  
Early Onset ◽  
Late Onset ◽  
Case Series ◽  
Geriatric Psychiatry ◽  
Delusional Disorder ◽  
Early Onset Schizophrenia ◽  
Treatment Results ◽  
Thought Insertion ◽  
Psychiatry Department ◽  
Paranoid Psychosis

In this article we report the first series of Turkish inpatients with late-onset psychosis, and describe our 9-year experience at the only inpatient geriatric psychiatry department in Turkey. Among 420 patients hospitalized between 1993 and 2002, 27 were psychotic. In this group, eight patients were diagnosed as having late-onset schizophrenia (LOS) and six very-late-onset schizophrenia-like psychosis (VLOSLP). Five patients had early-onset schizophrenia and eight had delusional disorder. Females were more frequently seen in the group with LOS and the group with VLOSLP. Except for one patient with LOS, all patients with VLOSLP and LOS had paranoid psychosis. Nihilistic delusions, delusions of poverty or guilt, thought withdrawal, thought insertion, and thought broadcasting were not seen in any of the patients. Additionally, none of the LOS or VLOSLP patients showed erotomanic delusions. Grandiose and mystic delusions were not seen in those with VLOSLP. Treatment results and antipsychotic dosages at discharge were similar to those in previous reports from other cultures.

scholarly journals How the Design of YouTube Influences User Sense of Agency

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Lukoff ◽  
Ulrik Lyngs ◽  
Himanshu Zade ◽  
J. Vera Liao ◽  
James Choi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Sense Of Agency

scholarly journals Altered sense of agency in Gilles de la Tourette syndrome: behavioural, clinical and functional magnetic resonance imaging findings

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Zapparoli ◽  
Silvia Seghezzi ◽  
Francantonio Devoto ◽  
Marika Mariano ◽  
Giuseppe Banfi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Magnetic Resonance Imaging ◽  
Magnetic Resonance ◽  
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging ◽  
Tourette Syndrome ◽  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Healthy Controls ◽  
Functional Magnetic Resonance ◽  
Resonance Imaging ◽  
Intentional Binding ◽  
Action Monitoring

Abstract Current neurocognitive models of motor control postulate that accurate action monitoring is crucial for a normal experience of agency—the ability to attribute the authorship of our actions and their consequences to ourselves. Recent studies demonstrated that action monitoring is impaired in Gilles de la Tourette syndrome, a movement disorder characterized by motor and vocal tics. It follows that Tourette syndrome patients may suffer from a perturbed sense of agency, the hypothesis tested in this study. To this end, we recruited 25 Tourette syndrome patients and 25 matched healthy controls in a case-control behavioural and functional magnetic resonance imaging study. As an implicit index of the sense of agency, we measured the intentional binding phenomenon, i.e., the perceived temporal compression between voluntary movements and their external consequences. We found evidence of an impaired sense of agency in Tourette syndrome patients who, as a group, did not show a significant intentional binding. The more reduced was the individual intentional binding, the more severe were the motor symptoms. Specific differences between the two groups were also observed in terms of brain activation patterns. In the healthy controls group, the magnitude of the intentional binding was associated with the activity of a premotor–parietal–cerebellar network. This relationship was not present in the Tourette syndrome group, suggesting an altered activation of the agency brain network for self-generated acts. We conclude that the less accurate action monitoring described in Tourette syndrome also involves the assessment of the consequences of actions in the outside world. We discuss that this may lead to difficulties in distinguishing external consequences produced by their own actions from the ones caused by others in Tourette syndrome patients.

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