Children as intentional agents: The contribution of sensitive caregiving on the way to the development of theory of mind

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sezin Oner
Author(s):  
Emma Borg

There is a sense in which it is trivial to say that one accepts intention- (or convention-)based semantics. For if what is meant by this claim is simply that there is an important respect in which words and sentences have meaning (either at all or the particular meanings that they have in any given natural language) due to the fact that they are used, in the way they are, by intentional agents (i.e. speakers), then it seems no one should disagree. For imagine a possible world where there are physical things which share the shape and form of words of English or Japanese, or the acoustic properties of sentences of Finnish or Arapaho, yet where there are no intentional agents (or where any remaining intentional agents don't use language). In such a world, it seems clear that these physical objects, which are only superficially language-like, will lack all meaning.


2001 ◽  
Vol 24 (6) ◽  
pp. 1142-1143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Lurz

Heyes's (1998) triangulation approach to distinguishing a “theory” of mind (ToM) from a “theory” of behavior (ToB) in chimpanzees fails. The ToB theorist can appeal to the explicit training sessions and analogical reasoning to explain/predict the chimpanzees' behaviors. An alternative triangulation experiment is sketched, demonstrating how the removal of such training sessions paves the way toward solving the distinguishability problem.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cody Kommers

We humans are not very good at understanding people who are different than ourselves. Academic psychology reflects this bias. Historically, most of our research has been on undergraduates at elite western universities. This bias has also influenced our concept of the “intuitive psychologist,” which is the way we typically describe how one person understands the mental life of another. However, if we want to understand how people make sense of those who are different than themselves, it is perhaps worth noting that the field which is most invested in understanding people from different backgrounds is not psychology. It is anthropology. In this paper, I present the idea of the Intuitive Anthropologist. I argue that what is important for understanding people with different worldviews isn't a bunch of fancy mental gymnastics for mentalizing, theory of mind, or “putting yourself in their shoes.” Rather, what matters is getting better data about other people’s milieu and their experience of it. While a willingness for deep thinking is necessary, what really matters for this process is the motivation to gather and evaluate these data. While empathy works fine between people of similar demographics with a mostly shared worldview, if we want to be better at understanding people from a range of backgrounds we need to develop a broader theory of what it means to make sense of those who are different.


2010 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 334-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Cova ◽  
Emmanuel Dupoux ◽  
Pierre Jacob

AbstractWe use psychological concepts (e.g., intention and desire) when we ascribe psychological states to others for purposes of describing, explaining, and predicting their actions. Does the evidence reported by Knobe show, as he thinks, that moral evaluation shapes our mastery of psychological concepts? We argue that the evidence so far shows instead that moral evaluation shapes the way we report, not the way we think about, others' psychological states.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marjaana Lindeman ◽  
Jari Lipsanen

Mentalizing (i.e., theory of mind) is a much studied construct, but the way different forms of mentalizing are related to each other is poorly understood. In this study (N = 369), we examined the dimensionality of mentalizing by addressing several forms of cognitive and affective empathy, practical mentalizing skills (i.e., understanding figurative language and social etiquette), and metacognition. The results of principal component analysis showed that sixteen mentalizing variables could be reduced to four principal components, namely affective empathy, social skills, self-insight, and views about the nature of beliefs. The components were unrelated, suggesting that they are independent aspects of mentalizing. No general mentalizing factor or overall empathy was found indicating that mentalizing is a non-hierarchical profile construct.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Karina Hess Zimmermann ◽  
Graciela Fernández Ruiz ◽  
Andrea Minerva Silva López

ES Para establecer las razones por las que un hablante elige un enunciado irónico por encima de uno literal es necesario evaluar la mente del hablante y su intención al emplear la ironía verbal en un contexto comunicativo específico. Con base en lo anterior, el objetivo de este estudio es analizar la manera en que adolescentes de 12 y 15 años reflexionan sobre las funciones de la ironía verbal en dos tipos de enunciados irónicos: agradecimiento y ofrecimiento. Treinta y dos adolescentes se enfrentaron a diferentes situaciones comunicativas que finalizaban con un enunciado irónico, y mediante un guion de preguntas se indagó sobre las funciones que los participantes atribuían a cada enunciado irónico y sobre el tipo de conocimientos en los que basaban sus reflexiones. Los resultados muestran diferencias debidas a la edad en la cantidad y calidad de las reflexiones presentadas por los participantes. Palabras clave: DESARROLLO LINGÜÍSTICO TARDÍO, IRONÍA VERBAL, REFLEXIÓN METALINGÜÍSTICA, FUNCIÓN DE LA IRONÍA, TEORÍA DE LA MENTE EN To establish the reasons behind a speaker’s choice to use an ironic expression over a literal one, it is necessary to evaluate the speaker’s mind and his/her intention to employ irony in a specific communicative context. Taking this into account, the purpose of this study is to analyse the way in which adolescents ages 12 and 15 reflect on the functions of verbal irony in two types of ironic expressions: ironic thanking and ironic offering. Thirty-two subjects were faced with different communicative situations ending with an ironic remark and were asked about the functions they attributed to each remark and on what sort of knowledge they based their responses. Results show age-based differences in the amount and quality of the reflections presented by the participants. Key words: LATER LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT, VERBAL IRONY, METALANGUAGE, FUNCTIONS OF IRONY, THEORY OF MIND IT Per stabilire i motivi che spingono un parlante a usare un enunciato ironico al posto di uno letterale, è necessario valutarne la mente e le intenzioni nell’usare l’ironia verbale in un determinato contesto comunicativo. Con queste premesse, il presente studio si propone di analizzare in che modo adolescenti di 12 e 15 anni riflettono sulle funzioni dell’ironia verbale in due tipi di enunciati ironici: ringraziamento e offerta. Dopo essere stati messi di fronte a diverse situazioni comunicative che si chiudevano con un enunciato ironico, a 32 adolescenti è stato chiesto di rispondere a una serie di domande sulla funzione che ciascuno/a di loro attribuiva a ogni enunciato e di dire in base a cosa avevano optato per quella funzione. I risultati mostrano differenze in base all’età nella quantità e nella qualità delle riflessioni fatte dai/dalle partecipanti. Parole chiave: SVILUPPO TARDIVO DEL LINGUAGGIO, IRONIA VERBALE, RIFLESSIONE METALINGUISTICA, FUNZIONE DELL’IRONIA, TEORIA DELLA MENTE


Author(s):  
Raphael Lyne

Abstract In this essay George Herbert’s representations of inward life are seen in the context of (i) the recommendations for self-examination made by theologians of his own time, and (ii) critical terms derived from modern psychological accounts of ‘Theory of Mind’. Lisa Zunshine’s emphasis on ‘embodied transparency’ and ‘metapresentation’ helps capture the way that Herbert exposes his readers to difficult but salutary self-analysis. This is not just a matter of trapping the unwary: the poems are designed for re-reading, re-voicing, and re-thinking, for considering especially the timing of discoveries about one’s own faith, and the origins of the voices that console and cajole the speakers of the poems. In Herbert’s hands, lyric form and the practice of self-scrutiny both respond dynamically to the pressures that resulted from the religious and cultural environment.


Reading Minds ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 139-151
Author(s):  
Henry M. Wellman

This chapter looks at theory of mind at work. Theory of mind is at work in ways big and small, in ways hidden and obvious. It is a foundation for people’s human way of looking at the world, so whether false or true, whether directed at themselves or at others, it colors their thinking, their institutions, and their basic beliefs. Societally, it shapes legal and moral codes, written and pictorial conventions, and screen media. Individually, it shapes people’s feelings, their gift giving, their teaching and learning, or their failures to learn. It is at work in adults and in children and in the way people can bring together their adult and childhood selves. Ultimately, it is a foundational piece of who we were, who we are, who we will become, and how those knit together.


Author(s):  
Kathrin Koslicki

A serviceable account of unity is needed which can capture the idea that matter–form compounds are more unified than other types of composite entities (e.g., heaps, collections, or mereological sums). This chapter develops a conception of unity according to which a structured whole derives its unity from the way its parts interact with other parts to allow the whole and its parts to manifest their “team-work”-requiring capacities. With this conception of unity in place, interesting differences emerge between paradigmatic matter–form compounds belonging to natural (e.g., physical, chemical, or biological) kinds and composite entities belonging to social kinds, in particular artifacts. In the latter case, the interactional dependencies that connect the components of a system can be traced to mind-dependent factors that are extrinsic or external to the system in question, viz., the mental states of intentional agents who invent, design, produce, or use an artifact.


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