The role of the dominance criterion on organizational decision-making

1995 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy E. Hurley ◽  
Laura O. Robinson
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk De Clercq ◽  
Yunita Sofyan ◽  
Yufan Shang ◽  
Luis Espinal Romani

Purpose This study aims to investigate an underexplored behavioral factor, knowledge hiding, that connects employees’ perceptions of organizational politics (POP) with their diminished promotability, while also considering the moderating role of employees’ harmony motives in this process. Design/methodology/approach The research hypotheses are tested with multisource, three-round data collected among employees and their supervisors. Findings Employees’ beliefs about self-serving organizational decision-making increase their propensity to hide knowledge, which, in turn, diminishes their promotability. This intermediate role of knowledge hiding is more prominent when their disintegration avoidance motive is strong but less prominent when their harmony enhancement motive is strong. Practical implications A refusal to share knowledge with organizational colleagues, as a covert response to POP, can create a negative cycle for employees. They are frustrated with decision-making practices that are predicated on favoritism, but by choosing seemingly subtle ways to respond, they compromise their own promotion prospects. To avoid this escalation, employees should adopt an active instead of passive approach toward maintaining harmony in their work relationships. Originality/value This research contributes to extant research by detailing a hitherto overlooked reason that employees’ frustrations with dysfunctional politics may escalate into an enhanced probability to miss out on promotion opportunities. They respond to this situation by engaging in knowledge hiding. As an additional contribution, this study details how the likelihood of this response depends on employees’ harmony motives.


Author(s):  
Nils Brunsson

Recent studies have questioned the empirical validity of the equating of decision and choice and pointed at another role that organizational decisions sometimes play — the role of mobilizing organizational action, a role that requires less rationality than choice. But choice and mobilization are not the only roles of decision-making and decisions in organizations. This chapter argues that two additional roles exist — decisions may allocate responsibility and legitimacy to decision-makers and organizations. The chapter also considers how the different roles can explain the design of decision processes, the use of information and the number of decisions in organizations. The discussion is based on empirical studies of decision processes in such organizations: in local governments, national governments, and company boards. The eight decision processes studied concern city budgets, investments and disinvestments, and governmental programmes.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Ganz ◽  
Daniel Schiff

Behavioral theories of organizational decision making emphasize that organizations are political coalitions. Despite considerable recent qualitative research in management and organizational theory on the role of politics in decision making and managing organizational change, quantitative research in this area has stalled. The reason for the lack of progress is not theoretical, but rather methodological; researchers lack empirical tools for understanding basic processes of coalition formation, evolution, and conflict in organizations. We introduce a novel method for modeling politics in organizations that builds on the model of intra-organizational conflict in March (1962), which we call “subcoalition cluster analysis” (sCCA). The main contribution of sCCA is that it identifies subcoalitions with consistent preferences that are in conflict without placing additional restrictions on the structure of individual preferences. We apply sCCA to two cases, Wikipedia and the Baseball Writers’ Association of America and show how leadership would benefit from conceiving of their membership as competing subcoalitions instead of individuals with idiosyncratic preference disagreement. Finally, we compare the performance of sCCA to Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and k-means clustering and demonstrate that sCCA does a better job identifying latent structure in the data when the organization consists of more subcoalitions, when individual preferences are not perfectly aligned with those of their subcoalition, and when observations are missing.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document