scholarly journals Ocular pigmentation in humans, great apes, and gibbons is not suggestive of communicative functions

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai R. Caspar ◽  
Marco Biggemann ◽  
Thomas Geissmann ◽  
Sabine Begall
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Great Apes ◽  
Human Condition ◽  
Congeneric Species ◽  
Mediated Communication ◽  
Communicative Functions ◽  
Cryptic Coloration ◽  
Visible Part ◽  
Eye Pigmentation ◽  
Scleral Pigmentation

AbstractPigmentation patterns of the visible part of the eyeball, encompassing the iris and portions of the sclera, have been discussed to be linked to social cognition in primates. The cooperative eye hypothesis suggests the white sclera of humans to be a derived adaptive trait that enhances eye-mediated communication. Here, we provide a comparative analysis of ocular pigmentation patterns in 15 species of hominoids (humans, great apes & gibbons) that show marked differences in social cognition and quantify scleral exposure at the genus level. Our data reveals a continuum of eye pigmentation traits in hominoids which does not align with the complexity of gaze-mediated communication in the studied taxa. Gibbons display darker eyes than great apes and expose less sclera. Iridoscleral contrasts in orangutans and gorillas approach the human condition but differ between congeneric species. Contrary to recent discussions, we found chimpanzee eyes to exhibit a cryptic coloration scheme that resembles gibbons more than other apes. We reevaluate the evidence for links between social cognition and eye pigmentation in primates, concluding that the cooperative eye hypothesis cannot explain the patterns observed. Differences in scleral pigmentation between great apes and humans are gradual and might have arisen via genetic drift and sexual selection.

scholarly journals Ocular pigmentation in humans, great apes, and gibbons is not suggestive of communicative functions - having an eye on the ‘cooperative eye hypothesis’

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai R. Caspar ◽  
Marco Biggemann ◽  
Thomas Geissmann ◽  
Sabine Begall
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Social Communication ◽  
Great Apes ◽  
Human Condition ◽  
Gaze Following ◽  
Communicative Functions ◽  
Cryptic Coloration ◽  
Visible Part ◽  
Eye Pigmentation ◽  
Scleral Pigmentation

AbstractPigmentation patterns of the visible part of the eyeball, encompassing the iris and portions of the sclera, have been discussed to be linked to social cognition in primates. In the context of the cooperative eye hypothesis, the white sclera of humans has been viewed as a derived adaptive trait, enhancing communication via glance cueing. Here, we provide a comparative analysis of ocular pigmentation patterns in 15 species of hominoids (humans, great apes & gibbons) representing all extant ape genera, based on photographs and literature data. Additionally, we quantify hominoid scleral exposure on the genus level during different glancing situations. Our data reveals a continuum of eye pigmentation traits among the studied taxa. Gibbons display darker, more uniformly colored eyes than great apes and expose less sclera, particularly during averted glancing. Iridoscleral contrasts in orangutans and gorillas approach the human condition but differ between congeneric species. Contrary to recent discussions, we found chimpanzee eyes to exhibit a cryptic coloration scheme that resembles gibbons more than other great apes and that does not enhance glance cueing or gaze following. We critically evaluate the evidence for links between social cognition and eye pigmentation in primates, concluding that the cooperative eye hypothesis cannot convincingly explain the patterns observed. Although the human eye exhibits unique traits that are likely linked to social communication, high iridoscleral contrast is not one of them. Differences in scleral pigmentation between great apes and humans are gradual and might have arisen via genetic drift and sexual selection.

scholarly journals Can young children learn words from a robot?

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yusuke Moriguchi ◽  
Takayuki Kanda ◽  
Hiroshi Ishiguro ◽  
Yoko Shimada ◽  
Shoji Itakura
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Preschool Children ◽  
Cognitive Development ◽  
Young Children ◽  
Word Learning ◽  
Human Condition ◽  
Chance Level ◽  
Developmental Difference ◽  
Novel Objects ◽  
Better Than

Young children generally learn words from other people. Recent research has shown that children can learn new actions and skills from nonhuman agents. This study examines whether young children could learn words from a robot. Preschool children were shown a video in which either a woman (human condition) or a mechanical robot (robot condition) labeled novel objects. Then the children were asked to select the objects according to the names used in the video. The results revealed that children in the human condition were more likely to select the correct objects than those in the robot condition. Nevertheless, the five-year-old children in the robot condition performed significantly better than chance level, while the four-year olds did not. Thus there is a developmental difference in children’s potential to learn words from a robot. The results contribute to our understanding of how children interact with non-human agents. Keywords: developmental cybernetics; word learning; social cognition; cognitive development

scholarly journals Scleral pigmentation leads to conspicuous, not cryptic, eye morphology in chimpanzees

2019 ◽  
Vol 116 (39) ◽  
pp. 19248-19250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Olvido Perea-García ◽  
Mariska E. Kret ◽  
Antónia Monteiro ◽  
Catherine Hobaiter
Keyword(s):  
Great Apes ◽  
Gaze Following ◽  
Eye Morphology ◽  
Social Cue ◽  
Relative Contrast ◽  
Perceptual Mechanism ◽  
Scleral Pigmentation ◽  
Human Specific

Gaze following has been argued to be uniquely human, facilitated by our depigmented, white sclera [M. Tomasello, B. Hare, H. Lehmann, J. Call, J. Hum. Evol. 52, 314–320 (2007)]—the pale area around the colored iris—and to underpin human-specific behaviors such as language. Today, we know that great apes show diverse patterns of scleral coloration [J. A. Mayhew, J. C. Gómez, Am. J. Primatol. 77, 869–877 (2015); J. O. Perea García, T. Grenzner, G. Hešková, P. Mitkidis, Commun. Integr. Biol. 10, e1264545 (2016)]. We compare scleral coloration and its relative contrast with the iris in bonobos, chimpanzees, and humans. Like humans, bonobos’ sclerae are lighter relative to the color of their irises; chimpanzee sclerae are darker than their irises. The relative contrast between the sclera and iris in all 3 species is comparable, suggesting a perceptual mechanism to explain recent evidence that nonhuman great apes also rely on gaze as a social cue.

scholarly journals Genetic Differences Between Humans and Great Apes –Implications for the Evolution of Humans

2004 ◽  
Vol 213 ◽  
pp. 343-348
Author(s):  
Ajit Varki
Keyword(s):  
Common Ancestor ◽  
Great Apes ◽  
Human Condition ◽  
Microbial Pathogens ◽  
Mammalian Brain ◽  
Gene Products ◽  
Social Origin ◽  
Surface Molecules ◽  
Oncofetal Antigens ◽  
Human Brain Development

At the level of individual protein sequences, humans are 97–100% identical to the great apes, our closest evolutionary relatives. The evolution of humans (and of human intelligence) from a common ancestor with the chimpanzee and bonobo involved many steps, influenced by interactions amongst factors of genetic, developmental, ecological, microbial, climatic, behavioral, cultural and social origin. The genetic factors can be approached by direct comparisons of human and great ape genomes, genes and gene products, and by elucidating biochemical and biological consequences of any differences found. We have discovered multiple genetic and biochemical differences between humans and great apes, particularly with respect to a family of cell surface molecules called sialic acids, as well as in the metabolism of thyroid hormones. The hormone differences have potential consequences for human brain development. The differences in sialic acid biology have multiple implications for the human condition, ranging from susceptibility or resistance to microbial pathogens, effects on endogenous receptors in the immune system, and potential effects on placental signaling, expression of oncofetal antigens in cancers, consequences of dietary intake of animal foods, and development of the mammalian brain.

scholarly journals Social robotics and the modulation of social perception and bias

2019 ◽  
Vol 374 (1771) ◽  
pp. 20180037 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Skewes ◽  
David M. Amodio ◽  
Johanna Seibt
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Impression Formation ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Social Robotics ◽  
Social Robots ◽  
Human Robot Interaction ◽  
Mediated Communication ◽  
Robot Interaction ◽  
The Social ◽  
Identity Based

The field of social robotics offers an unprecedented opportunity to probe the process of impression formation and the effects of identity-based stereotypes (e.g. about gender or race) on social judgements and interactions. We present the concept of fair proxy communication—a form of robot-mediated communication that proceeds in the absence of potentially biasing identity cues—and describe how this application of social robotics may be used to illuminate implicit bias in social cognition and inform novel interventions to reduce bias. We discuss key questions and challenges for the use of robots in research on the social cognition of bias and offer some practical recommendations. We conclude by discussing boundary conditions of this new form of interaction and by raising some ethical concerns about the inclusion of social robots in psychological research and interventions. This article is part of the theme issue ‘From social brains to social robots: applying neurocognitive insights to human–robot interaction’.

Theology and Psychological Theory: Psychological Implications of Some Modern Theologies

1989 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 342-349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barnard Spilka ◽  
Robert A. Bridges
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
Social Cognition ◽  
Psychological Theory ◽  
Self Esteem ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Human Condition ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Human Condition

In a sense, theologies are psychologies. They discuss the human condition, largely in terms of motivation and cognition, and suggest ways of organizing our thinking about human aspirations and goals. These considerations are nowhere more evident than in contemporary process, liberation, and feminist theologies. This article shows parallels among these perspectives relative to modern psychological research and theory, primarily in social psychology and more particularly relative to social cognition theory. The importance of the role of the self and needs for meaning, control, and self-esteem are stressed, indicating that theology can serve as psychological theory and that both psychology and theology might benefit from increased interaction between the disciplines.

To move or not to move

2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katja Liebal ◽  
Josep Call ◽  
Michael Tomasello ◽  
Simone Pika
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Observational Study ◽  
Species Differences ◽  
Great Apes ◽  
The Body ◽  
Body Orientation ◽  
The Subject

A previous observational study suggested that when faced with a partner with its back turned, chimpanzees tend to move around to the front of a non-attending partner and then gesture — rather than gesturing once to attract attention and then again to convey a specific intent. We investigated this preference experimentally by presenting six orangutans, five gorillas, nine chimpanzees, and four bonobos with a food begging situation in which we varied the body orientation of an experimenter (E) with respect to the subject (front vs. back) and the location of the food (in front or behind E). These manipulations allowed us to measure whether subjects preferred to move around to face E or to use signals to attract her attention before they begged for food. Results showed that all species moved around to face E and then produced visual gestures, instead of using tactile/ auditory gestures behind E to call her attention. Species differences were apparent particularly when the food and E were in different locations. Unlike gorillas and orangutans, chimpanzees and bonobos (from genus Pan) produced their gestures in front of E in all conditions, including that in which subjects had to leave the food behind to communicate with her. Implications of these results are discussed in the context of the evolution of social cognition in great apes.

scholarly journals Orangutan pantomime: elaborating the message

2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 627-630 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Russon ◽  
Kristin Andrews
Keyword(s):  
Exploratory Study ◽  
Great Apes ◽  
Great Ape ◽  
Multiple Functions ◽  
Communicative Functions ◽  
Ape Communication ◽  
Free Ranging

We present an exploratory study of forest-living orangutan pantomiming, i.e. gesturing in which they act out their meaning, focusing on its occurrence, communicative functions, and complexities. Studies show that captive great apes may elaborate messages if communication fails, and isolated reports suggest that great apes occasionally pantomime. We predicted forest-living orangutans would pantomime spontaneously to communicate, especially to elaborate after communication failures. Mining existing databases on free-ranging rehabilitant orangutans' behaviour identified 18 salient pantomimes. These pantomimes most often functioned as elaborations of failed requests, but also as deceptions and declaratives. Complexities identified include multimodality, re-enactments of past events and several features of language (productivity, compositionality, systematicity). These findings confirm that free-ranging rehabilitant orangutans pantomime and use pantomime to elaborate on their messages. Further, they use pantomime for multiple functions and create complex pantomimes that can express propositionally structured content. Thus, orangutan pantomime serves as a medium for communication, not a particular function. Mining cases of complex great ape communication originally reported in functional terms may then yield more evidence of pantomime.

scholarly journals Naïve Normativity: The Social Foundation of Moral Cognition

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
KRISTIN ANDREWS
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Social Learning ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Great Apes ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Group Differences ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
The Social

AbstractTo answer tantalizing questions such as whether animals are moral or how morality evolved, I propose starting with a somewhat less fraught question: do animals have normative cognition? Recent psychological research suggests that normative thinking, or ought-thought, begins early in human development. Recent philosophical research suggests that folk psychology is grounded in normative thought. Recent primatology research finds evidence of sophisticated cultural and social learning capacities in great apes. Drawing on these three literatures, I argue that the human variety of social cognition and moral cognition encompass the same cognitive capacities and that the nonhuman great apes may also be normative beings. To make this argument, I develop an account of animal social norms that shares key properties with Cristina Bicchieri's account of social norms but which lowers the cognitive requirements for having a social norm. I propose a set of four early developing prerequisites implicated in social cognition that make up what I call naïve normativity: (1) the ability to identify agents, (2) sensitivity to in-group/out-group differences, (3) the capacity for social learning of group traditions, and (4) responsiveness to appropriateness. I review the ape cognition literature and present preliminary empirical evidence supporting the existence of social norms and naïve normativity in great apes. While there is more empirical work to be done, I hope to have offered a framework for studying normativity in other species, and I conclude that we should be open to the possibility that normative cognition is yet another ancient cognitive endowment that is not human-unique.

Refining our understanding of the “elephant in the room”

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Whiten
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Cultural Evolution ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Critical Factors ◽  
Technological Culture

Abstract The authors do the field of cultural evolution a service by exploring the role of non-social cognition in human cumulative technological culture, truly neglected in comparison with socio-cognitive abilities frequently assumed to be the primary drivers. Some specifics of their delineation of the critical factors are problematic, however. I highlight recent chimpanzee–human comparative findings that should help refine such analyses.

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