scholarly journals Stackelberg game‐theoretic model for low carbon energy market scheduling

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weiqi Hua ◽  
Dan Li ◽  
Hongjian Sun ◽  
Peter Matthews
Author(s):  
Xinrun Wang ◽  
Bo An ◽  
Hau Chan

Due to the recent cyber attacks, cybersecurity is becoming more critical in modern society. A single attack (e.g., WannaCry ransomware attack) can cause as much as $4 billion in damage. However, the cybersecurity investment by companies is far from satisfactory. Therefore, governments (e.g., in the UK) launch grants and subsidies to help companies to boost their cybersecurity to create a safer national cyber environment. The allocation problem is hard due to limited subsidies and the interdependence between self-interested companies and the presence of a strategic cyber attacker. To tackle the government's allocation problem, we introduce a Stackelberg game-theoretic model where the government first commits to an allocation and the companies/users and attacker simultaneously determine their protection and attack (pure or mixed) strategies, respectively. For the pure-strategy case, while there may not be a feasible allocation in general, we prove that computing an optimal allocation is NP-hard and propose a linear reverse convex program when the attacker can attack all users. For the mixed-strategy case, we show that there is a polynomial time algorithm to find an optimal allocation when the attacker has a single-attack capability. We then provide a heuristic algorithm, based on best-response-gradient dynamics, to find an effective allocation in the general setting. Experimentally, we show that our heuristic is effective and outperforms other baselines on synthetic and real data.


2017 ◽  
Vol 185 ◽  
pp. 1832-1839 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruijie Tian ◽  
Qi Zhang ◽  
Ge Wang ◽  
Hailong Li ◽  
Siyuan Chen ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
pp. 39-69
Author(s):  
Navin A. Bapat

Using the logic of a game theoretic model, this chapter argues that the project to cement American dominance over the global energy market failed because the U.S. security guarantee created a series of perverse incentives. Host leaders recognized that they would only receive American support if the threat of terrorism persisted, and that they would receive relatively more economic and military aid if the threat of terrorism became significant. Therefore, these host states had no incentive to disarm their terrorists. As a result, terrorism escalated throughout the energy market in the 2000s, leading to spiraling costs to the U.S. and a political backlash. Pressure mounted on American leaders to begin scaling back the war. To forestall this possibility, and protect the lucrative petrodollar system, the U.S. needed to quickly develop a strategy to force the host states to proactively address the terrorist threats in their territories.


2017 ◽  
pp. 120-130
Author(s):  
A. Lyasko

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document