scholarly journals Who Should Pay the Cost: A Game-theoretic Model for Government Subsidized Investments to Improve National Cybersecurity

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xinrun Wang ◽  
Bo An ◽  
Hau Chan
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Allocation ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
General Setting ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Allocation Problem ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Government

Due to the recent cyber attacks, cybersecurity is becoming more critical in modern society. A single attack (e.g., WannaCry ransomware attack) can cause as much as $4 billion in damage. However, the cybersecurity investment by companies is far from satisfactory. Therefore, governments (e.g., in the UK) launch grants and subsidies to help companies to boost their cybersecurity to create a safer national cyber environment. The allocation problem is hard due to limited subsidies and the interdependence between self-interested companies and the presence of a strategic cyber attacker. To tackle the government's allocation problem, we introduce a Stackelberg game-theoretic model where the government first commits to an allocation and the companies/users and attacker simultaneously determine their protection and attack (pure or mixed) strategies, respectively. For the pure-strategy case, while there may not be a feasible allocation in general, we prove that computing an optimal allocation is NP-hard and propose a linear reverse convex program when the attacker can attack all users. For the mixed-strategy case, we show that there is a polynomial time algorithm to find an optimal allocation when the attacker has a single-attack capability. We then provide a heuristic algorithm, based on best-response-gradient dynamics, to find an effective allocation in the general setting. Experimentally, we show that our heuristic is effective and outperforms other baselines on synthetic and real data.

scholarly journals A Stackelberg game theoretic model for optimizing product family architecting with supply chain consideration

2016 ◽  
Vol 172 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danping Wang ◽  
Gang Du ◽  
Roger J. Jiao ◽  
Ray Wu ◽  
Jianping Yu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Product Family ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

scholarly journals Stackelberg game‐theoretic model for low carbon energy market scheduling

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weiqi Hua ◽  
Dan Li ◽  
Hongjian Sun ◽  
Peter Matthews
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Energy Market ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Low Carbon Energy

How to divide the costs of urban solid wastes collection among citizens?

2012 ◽  
pp. 51-64
Author(s):  
Vito Fragnelli
Keyword(s):  
Cost Allocation ◽  
Allocation Problem ◽  
Solid Wastes ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

In this paper we deal with a cost allocation problem arising in a consortium for urban solid wastes collection and disposal. In particular, we consider the question of allocating the costs directly to the citizens in a fair way. The approach proposed is based on a game theoretic model that is applied to data from the consortium Ovadese - Valle Scrivia.

scholarly journals In-queue priority purchase: a dynamic game approach

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhongbin Wang ◽  
Luyi Yang ◽  
Shiliang Cui ◽  
Jinting Wang
Keyword(s):  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Purchasing Behavior ◽  
Light Traffic ◽  
Sequential Rule ◽  
Classical Models ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Do So

AbstractPay-for-priority is a common practice in congestion-prone service systems. The extant literature on this topic restricts attention to the case where the only epoch for customers to purchase priority is upon arrival, and if customers choose not to upgrade when they arrive, they cannot do so later during their wait. A natural alternative is to let customers pay and upgrade to priority at any time during their stay in the queue, even if they choose not to do so initially. This paper builds a queueing-game-theoretic model that explicitly captures self-interested customers’ dynamic in-queue priority-purchasing behavior. When all customers (who have not upgraded yet) simultaneously decide whether to upgrade, we find in our model that pure-strategy equilibria do not exist under some intuitive criteria, contrasting the findings in classical models where customers can only purchase priority upon arrival. However, when customers sequentially decide whether to upgrade, threshold-type pure-strategy equilibria may exist. In particular, under sufficiently light traffic, if the number of ordinary customers accumulates to a certain threshold, then it is always the second last customer who upgrades, but in general, it could be a customer from another position, and the queue-length threshold that triggers an upgrade can also vary with the traffic intensity. Finally, we find that in-queue priority purchase subject to the sequential rule yields less revenue than upon-arrival priority purchase in systems with small buffers.

scholarly journals A Game Theoretic Model of Iranian Labor Market

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Younes Brumand ◽  
Masoomeh Salary
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Government Intervention ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Static Game ◽  
The Status ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Government

In this paper, we analyze the interactions among workers, employers, and the government in the Iranian labor market using game theory. For this purpose, different games among the factors affecting the labor market are analyzed in both static and dynamic situations. In each case, intervention and non-intervention of the government are also examined. Thus, four different types of games are studied, including a static game between worker and employer, without government intervention; a static game among workers, employers, and the government; a dynamic game between worker and employer, without government intervention; and a dynamic game among workers, employers, and the government. In the first three games, Nash equilibrium implies low productivity of worker, low employer’s profits, and high unemployment rate in which players want to maintain the status quo. However, in the dynamic game among workers, employers, and the government, the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game can provide some conditions in which the labor market gets away from the low productivity situation

Generalized Replicator Dynamics as a Model of Specialization and Diversity in Societies

1998 ◽  
Vol 01 (04) ◽  
pp. 325-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vivek S. Borkar ◽  
Sanjay Jain ◽  
Govindan Rangarajan
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Final States ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Pure Strategies

We consider a generalization of replicator dynamics as a non-cooperative evolutionary game-theoretic model of a community of N agents. All agents update their individual mixed strategy profiles to increase their total payoff from the rest of the community. The properties of attractors in this dynamics are studied. Evidence is presented that under certain conditions the typical attractors of the system are corners of state space where each agent has specialized to a pure strategy, and/or the community exhibits diversity, i.e., all strategies are represented in the final states. The model suggests that new pure strategies whose payoff matrix elements satisfy suitable inequalities with respect to the existing ones can destabilize existing attractors if N is sufficiently large, and be regarded as innovations that enhance the diversity of the community.

scholarly journals On Rational Delegations in Liquid Democracy

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 1796-1803 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daan Bloembergen ◽  
Davide Grossi ◽  
Martin Lackner
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Proxy Voting ◽  
Liquid Democracy ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretical Results ◽  
Voting Method

Liquid democracy is a proxy voting method where proxies are delegable. We propose and study a game-theoretic model of liquid democracy to address the following question: when is it rational for a voter to delegate her vote? We study the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this model, and how group accuracy is affected by them. We complement these theoretical results by means of agent-based simulations to study the effects of delegations on group’s accuracy on variously structured social networks.

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