scholarly journals Can Institutional Investor Clique Play a Governance Role? Based on the Perspective of Insider Reduction

2021 ◽  
Vol 235 ◽  
pp. 01066
Author(s):  
Yuxiang Peng ◽  
Bingxiang Li
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Social Network ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Significant Positive Correlation ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Financial Industry ◽  
Interactive Behavior ◽  
The Social ◽  
Role Based ◽  
Grouping Behavior

This article takes China’s A-share non-financial industry listed companies from 2007 to 2015 as a sample, starting from the social network algorithm, to study whether the grouping behavior of institutional investors in the network can affect the degree of executive reduction in the future. The study found that there is a significant positive correlation between the shareholding ratio of institutional investors in group holdings and the degree of future reduction of executives. This article explores the interactive behavior of Chinese institutional investors in the network, and expands the research of institutional investors on corporate governance and executives’ future reduction behaviors.

scholarly journals Corporate governance and corporate investment: an exploratory research in the Brazilian publicly traded companies listed in Bovespa

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 545-557
Author(s):  
Nádia Sousa ◽  
Flávia Zóboli Dalmácio
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Capital Cost ◽  
Exploratory Research ◽  
Statistical Relation ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Publicly Traded Companies ◽  
Governance Practices

This paper aims to study the influence of Corporate Governance practices in the institutional decision to invest. It was developed a Governance Index (iGov), a descending rank was prepared and a test was applied to check if the companies in the first 25% of this rank have the highest number of institutional investors among their biggest investors than the companies of the last 25%. For the validation of IGov it was tested if the companies with the best marks present highest Returns, lowest Capital Cost, highest Market Value, and highest Competiveness within the sector, lowest Beta, highest EVA® and lowest Share concentration. It has been proved that the best Corporate Governance practices do not have any statistical relation with the presence of more Institutional Investor.

Changes in ownership forms and role of institutional investors in governing public companies in Malaysia

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hairul Azlan Annuar
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Investment Companies ◽  
Corporate Governance System ◽  
Different Types

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to ascertain whether different types of institutional investor in Malaysia are involved in the corporate governance of their investee companies, and, if yes, to what extent is the level of the involvement. Design/methodology/approach – A qualitative approach, consisting of a series of interviews with 18 senior investment managers of different types of institutional investor, was chosen. Findings – The findings suggest that lessons learnt from the fallout of the Asian crisis has made Malaysian institutional investors not only to be more prudent in managing their total funds and in making equities investment decisions, but has resulted in a more active participation in their “core” investee companies apart from merely discharging their voting rights. Interview analysis revealed that government-linked investment companies are championing the cause and could possibly affect the overall level of institutional investors’ involvement, which bode well for the future of the corporate governance system of the country. Research limitations/implications – Generalisations may be an issue when interviews are used as the method of inquiry. Also, the sample is not random, as access to many managers depended on recommendations. In addition, respondents were consciously selected to obtain different types of institutional investors that included government and non-government linked. Originality/value – There is a lack of work on studying the involvement of institutional investors in developing countries, whereby previous work and literature review were predominantly based upon the experience of Western economies.

scholarly journals A study of interlocking directorships among mainland Chinese companies listed on the SGX

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 210-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Tan ◽  
Chu Keong Lee ◽  
Wai Chong Chan ◽  
Su Haw Koh ◽  
Sugihardjo Sugihardjo
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Social Network ◽  
Social Networking ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Chinese Culture ◽  
Mainland Chinese ◽  
Chinese Companies ◽  
Social Network Structure ◽  
The Social ◽  
High Standards

The objective of this paper is to understand the extent of inter-locking directorates among mainland Chinese companies listed on the Singapore Exchange (SGX). This study also seeks to understand if these mainland Chinese companies were different from those Chinese companies in Singapore in terms of the social network structure of its board of directors. It has been well known and indeed as part of the Chinese culture, the concept of quanxi or social networking is important. However, in the context of corporate governance, the concern is if too many directors are interlocked, will the concept of quanxi be counterproductive in the practice of attaining high standards of governance of the listed companies.

Institutional Investor Voting Behaviour

2021 ◽  
pp. 227-262
Author(s):  
Luca Enriques ◽  
Alessandro Romano
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Geographical Proximity ◽  
Voting Behaviour ◽  
Current Policy ◽  
Policy Issues ◽  
Common Ownership ◽  
Asset Managers ◽  
Shed Light

This chapter shows how network theory can improve our understanding of institutional investors’ voting behaviour and, more generally, their role in corporate governance. The standard idea is that institutional investors compete against each other on relative performance and hence might not cast informed votes, due to rational apathy and rational reticence. In other words, institutional investors have incentives to free-ride instead of ‘cooperating’ and casting informed votes. We show that connections of various kinds among institutional investors, whether from formal networks, geographical proximity, or common ownership, and among institutional investors and other agents, such as proxy advisors, contribute to shaping institutional investors’ incentives to vote ‘actively’. They also create intricate competition dynamics: competition takes place not only among institutional investors (and their asset managers) but also at the level of their employees and among ‘cliques’ of institutional investors. Employees, who strive for better jobs, are motivated to obtain more information on portfolio companies than may be strictly justified from their employer institution’s perspective, and to circulate it within their network. Cliques of institutional investors compete against each other. Because there are good reasons to believe that cliques of cooperators outperform cliques of non-cooperators, the network-level competition might increase the incentives of institutional investors to collect information. These dynamics can enhance institutional investors’ engagement in portfolio companies and also shed light on some current policy issues such as the antitrust effects of common ownership and mandatory disclosures of institutional investors’ voting.

Interactive and Cognitive Models in the Social Network Environment for Designing

2012 ◽  
pp. 42-63
Author(s):  
Hung-Pin Hsu
Keyword(s):  
Social Network ◽  
Collaborative Design ◽  
Network Environment ◽  
Face To Face ◽  
Interactive Behavior ◽  
Depth Interview ◽  
The Social ◽  
Design Activities ◽  
New Type ◽  
Three Stages

In recent years, Metaverse has become a new type of social network. It provides an integrated platform and interactive environment for users to design artifacts and cooperate with each other. Facing this new type of social network, this chapter focuses on the cognitive and interactive behavior of users in the collaborative design activities. The chapter consists of three stages. In stage one the chapter introduces related theories and previous studies in order to present the Metaverse features. In stage two, the author chooses two different design and interactive environments to compare with Metaverse, which are, a normal face to face environment and a regular distance environment. Then the author executes three experiments in these different environments. In stage three, the author analyzes the retrospective data of three experiments with qualitative analysis by undertaking contextual inquiries in order to structure cognitive and interactive models of three environments. Furthermore, the author also executes an in-depth interview to get the qualitative data of subjects’ opinion. Finally, the affinity diagrams could be established with these models and the interview to provide knowledge of Metaverse for readers who research or develop social network environment.

scholarly journals Corporate governance in Italy after the 1998 reform: What role for institutional investors?

2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 11-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcello Bianchi ◽  
Luca Enriques
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Mutual Fund ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Legal Environment ◽  
Investor Activism

his paper tries to answer two questions: first, whether the changes in the law resulting from the 1998 reform are able to positively affect the attitude to activism of institutional investors in Italy; and second, whether, legal rules aside, it is reasonable to expect significant institutional investor activism in Italy. We provide both an empirical analysis of the factors affecting institutional investor activism in Italy and a legal analysis of the most relevant changes in the Italian mutual funds and corporate laws, following the 1998 reform. The empirical analysis shows that institutional shareholdings and investment strategies are compatible with the hypothesis that institutional investors can play a significant role in the corporate governance of Italian listed companies. However, a curb to their playing such an active role may derive from the predominance of mutual fund management companies belonging to banking groups (giving rise to conflicts of interest) and from the prevailing ownership structure of listed companies, which are still dominated by controlling shareholders holding stakes higher than, or close to, the majority of the capital (implying a weaker bargaining power of institutions vis-à-vis controllers). The analysis of the legal changes prompted by the 1998 financial markets and corporate law reform indicates that the legal environment is now definitely more favorable to institutional investor activism than before. However, the Italian legal environment proves still to be little favorable to institutional investor activism, when compared to that of the U.S. or the U.K.

The evolution and alignment of institutional shareholder engagement through the King and CRISA reports

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-153
Author(s):  
Richard Foster
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Shareholder Activism ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Historical Narrative ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Shareholder Engagement ◽  
On The Road ◽  
High Level

Purpose The purpose of this study is to provide a high-level review of the evolution of shareholder activism and institutional investor engagement in the corporate governance ecosystem in South Africa. Furthermore, it specifically seeks to explain the incorporation of such aspects into the various key codes and reports on corporate governance in South Africa since 1994. Design/methodology/approach Historical narrative and analysis. Findings This study highlights how shareholder activism and institutional investor engagement in the corporate governance ecosystem have been considered and addressed in South Africa since the publication of the First King Report in 1994. The progress that has been made specifically with regard to the introduction of a code for institutional investors is highlighted. The study ultimately acknowledges that this evolution is a continuing journey on the road to stakeholder inclusivity and engagement, and then concludes that the specific role and impact of institutional investors, particularly given some of the recent corporate governance failures, will require further consideration going forward. This should ensure the continued alignment of all stakeholders and assist in making the necessary improvements to the overarching governance framework and attendant culture. Originality/value This study is a part of a special issue that looks at the contribution of the King reports to governance globally.

Monitoring the Monitor: Distracted Institutional Investors and Board Governance

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (10) ◽  
pp. 4489-4531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claire Liu ◽  
Angie Low ◽  
Ronald W Masulis ◽  
Le Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Adverse Effects ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Shareholder Wealth ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Board Governance ◽  
Exogenous Shocks ◽  
Board Performance

Abstract Boards are crucial to shareholder wealth. Yet little is known about how shareholder oversight affects director incentives. Using exogenous shocks to institutional investor portfolios, we find that institutional investor distraction weakens board oversight. Distracted institutions are less likely to discipline ineffective directors with negative votes. Consequently, independent directors face weaker monitoring incentives and exhibit poor board performance; ineffective independent directors are also more frequently appointed. Moreover, we find that the adverse effects of investor distraction on various corporate governance outcomes are stronger among firms with problematic directors. Our findings suggest that institutional investor monitoring creates important director incentives to monitor.

Governance by Institutional Investors in a Stakeholder World

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerard Hertig
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Pension Funds ◽  
Societal Impact ◽  
Investment Strategies ◽  
Stakeholder Interests

This chapter examines the increased attention paid to stakeholder interests and its economic or, at least, societal impact, and whether giving a new or stronger voice to stakeholders is justified. It first provides an overview of recent stakeholder-oriented reforms and their impact before assessing the merits of giving stakeholders a new or reinforced voice in terms of corporate governance. It then turns to the hypothesis of having institutional investors act as stakeholder representatives as well as the extent to which their ultimate beneficiaries can contribute to institutional investor governance. It also explores whether the ultimate beneficiaries of pension funds can have the option to choose between shareholder and stakeholder-oriented investment strategies.

scholarly journals Novel Influence Maximization Algorithm for Social Network Behavior Management

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-68
Author(s):  
Sivaganesan D
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
Social Network ◽  
Social Behavior ◽  
Social Action ◽  
Behavior Management ◽  
Network Size ◽  
Influence Maximization ◽  
Interactive Behavior ◽  
Social Network Size ◽  
The Social

The users largely contributing towards product adoption or information utilization in social networks are identified by the process of influence maximization. The exponential growth in social networks imposes several challenges in the analyses of these networks. Important has been given to modeling structural properties while the relationship between users and their social behavior has being ignored in the existing literature. With respect to the social behavior, the influence maximization task has been parallelized in this paper. In order to maximize the influence in social networks, an interest based algorithm with parallel social action has been proposed. This is algorithm enables identifying influential users in social network. The interactive behavior of the user is weighted dynamically as social actions along with the interests of the users. These two semantic metrics are used in the proposed algorithm. An optimal influential nodes set is computed by implementing the machines with CPU architecture with perfect parallelism through community structure. This helps in reducing the execution time and overcoming the real-word social network size challenges. When compared to the existing schemes, the proposed algorithm offers improved efficiency in the calculation speed on real world networks.

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