scholarly journals Some Aspects of the Quality of Corporate Governance in Digital Economy

2019 ◽  
Vol 62 ◽  
pp. 04002 ◽  
Author(s):  
A.A. Polidi ◽  
Z.O. Goukasyan ◽  
I.A. Maslova ◽  
R.V. Fedorenko

The relevance of this article is due to technological changes that are constantly introducing new characteristics, both in the global economic system and in the economy of individual fields of activity. The newest digital economy is significantly different from the traditional economy. A modern business environment requires constant adaptation of an entrepreneur to dynamically changing conditions at a strategic and tactical level. The purpose of the article is to study aspects of the quality of corporate governance, taking into account the challenges of the digital economy. The objectives of the study are: to identify the key elements of corporate governance and environmental factors affecting them; to determine the conditions and factors of the formation of economic interests in the corporate governance system for the purpose of improving the quality of corporate governance in the digital economy.

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 19-33
Author(s):  
Slobodan Marin ◽  
Rade Tešić ◽  
Milan Šušić

A quality corporate governance system is a basic prerequisite for a sustainable growth economy, more easily increasing the efficiency of the economic system and guaranteeing access to external sources of capital. The level of quality of corporate governance can be defined as the degree of fulfillment of set standards of corporate governance defined at the international and national institutional level. In the new, modern business conditions, with strong dynamic changes in the social and business environment, modern corporate companies, ie their management bodies, are taking on new characteristics, adapting to new requirements and challenges. In this sense, the new demanding business conditions require continuous improvement of corporate governance potential. Based on previous theoretical and empirical knowledge, Bosnia and Herzegovina has the characteristics of a closed corporate governance system in both entities, so, as a basis for developing models for measuring the level of corporate governance, selected models that measure corporate governance in countries with typical closed corporate governance systems. A significant number of studies show that corporations that achieve higher standards and better corporate governance practices also have better business performance results and thus greater value in the capital market. This means that corporations with a higher level of corporate governance also have better financial operating results, easier access to financial capital, and greater value in the capital market. The main purpose of the research is to determine the level of influence of the quality of corporate governance on business performance, ie to determine whether corporations that had good corporate governance had higher business liquidity and vice versa. The main goal of the research is to establish the link and relationship between quality and corporate performance management indicators of the corporation's business.


2018 ◽  
Vol 59 (5) ◽  
pp. 956-994 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franklin Nakpodia ◽  
Philip J. Shrives ◽  
M. Karim Sorour

This article examines whether the degree of religiosity in an institutional environment can stimulate the emergence of a robust corporate governance system. This study utilizes the Nigerian business environment as its context and embraces a qualitative interpretivist research approach. This approach permitted the engagement of a qualitative content analysis (QCA) methodology to generate insights from interviewees. Findings from the study indicate that despite the high religiosity among Nigerians, religion has not stimulated the desired corporate governance system in Nigeria. The primary explanation for this outcome is the presence of rational ordering over religious preferences thus highlighting the fact that religion, as presently understood and practiced by stakeholders, is inconsistent with the principles underpinning good corporate governance.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 120-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vicente Lima Crisóstomo ◽  
Isac de Freitas Brandão

Purpose High ownership concentration makes controlling blockholders powerful enough to use private benefits of control and able to shape the corporate governance system to favor their own interests. This paper aims to examine the effect of the nature of the ultimate firm owner on the quality of corporate governance in Brazil. Design/methodology/approach Econometric models are estimated to assess whether the nature of the ultimate controlling shareholder affects the quality of the corporate governance system. Models are estimated using panel data methodology with coefficients estimated by the generalized method of moments system estimator. Findings The results show that the absence of a controlling shareholder has a positive effect on corporate governance, whereas the presence of a controlling blockholder, or a shareholder agreement among a few large shareholders, has a negative effect. This adverse effect holds when the controlling blockholder is a family or another firm. The findings are in line with the expropriation effect given that weaker corporate governance system facilitates controlling shareholders’ ability to extract private benefits of control. The findings also give support to the substitution effect as powerful blockholders take on the management monitoring function by weakening the board. Originality value Following important previous literature, the study investigates the effect of the nature of large controlling shareholders on the adoption of good corporate governance practices. The work provides additional evidence on the effect of the nature of large controlling shareholders on the quality of the corporate governance system in Brazil, taking into account the main kinds of controlling blockholders present in that market. The findings give support to both the expropriation and substitution hypotheses highlighting the presence of the principal-principal agency model in an important emerging market, Brazil.


2020 ◽  
pp. 557-567
Author(s):  
K. Mamikonyan

Over the past decade, dividend policy has become a fundamental element of the financial strategy of joint-stock companies, as it has a direct impact primarily on the corporate governance of the company. It can be considered that dividend payments are most often connected not with financial indicators, but with a significant improvement of the quality of corporate governance in the company, i.e. dividend payments are more likely an element of corporate governance. In essence, the high quality of corporate governance somewhat reduces the likelihood of making the wrong decision. To the qualitative indicators, showing the status of the company the quality corporate governance can be added for the assessment of the bankruptcy of economic entities. If the quality of corporate governance is considered as a new one, added to the composition of qualitative indicators, then in general a number of signs indicating the pre-bankrupt state of the economic entity and not reflected in the financial statements can be offered. Timely disclosure of information is accepted as the most important factor in improving corporate governance, which allows investors to reliably assess investment risks and compare practice with these results. Certain features are directly related to the structural elements of the company’s dividend policy, since contributing to the realization of the rights and interests of shareholders, the dividend policy occupies a major place in the corporate governance system of companies.


2014 ◽  
Vol 602-605 ◽  
pp. 2391-2394
Author(s):  
Lu Lu Yu

In this study, the theory of factor analysis is used to establish a model for measuring and assessing corporate governance and identify major factors affecting corporate governance. The findings of this study can provide theoretical basis for comprehensive evaluation of corporate governance.


2013 ◽  
Vol 21 (04) ◽  
pp. 421-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
KISHITA TETSUHIRO

After the Second World War, manufacturing establishments in Japan experienced vigorous growth from the 1960s through 1970s, and they achieved international success in the 1980s, during which they developed their own way of running firms, called Japanese style management, and a unique corporate governance system called the insider-type of corporate governance. Under this system, the main banks monitor and check the behaviors of corporate executives, who have usually had a long career in the companies. The Japanese style of management and the insider-type of corporate governance system stopped working well in the 1990s, however, when Japanese businesses experienced the collapse of the asset-inflated economy in the domestic market, began to receive a large number of foreign investors in their stock market, and found that they had to be involved in global competition. The country, therefore, from the late 1990s, shifted its strategies, restructured organizations, and tried to change its management style and corporate governance system to ones better fitted to the new business environment. A key to the Japanese manufacturers' resurgence is an entrepreneurial challenge to promote innovation in modular-technology-core industries, as well as maintenance and strengthening of their traditional competitive advantage in integral-technology-core industries. The challenge imperatively requires a more transparent and nimble governance system for global financing and agile decision making. However, despite efforts to restructure, the core structure of the traditional governance system still remains intact, as was demonstrated by the Olympus scandal of 2011. The reason that large Japanese firms cannot change their creaky governance system is not because it still shows efficiency or effectiveness, but because Japanese business society still holds to orthodox views regarding the large, established companies. As long as the people concerned hold to orthodox views of large traditional firms, big banks, and bureaucracy, the traditional insider-type of corporate governance will survive, and another corporate scandal is liable to happen in the near future.


Author(s):  
N. Glinkov

The factors influencing the market value of the bank are stated. The importance of such a factor in the formation of the bank’s value as the corporate governance system is reflected. The relationship between the level of corporate governance of the bank and its market value is shown. In the context of the corporate governance system, its elements are identified that contribute to increasing the market value of the bank. An approach is proposedfor calculating the premium / discount for the level of efficiency of the corporate governance system when assessing the value of the bank.


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