Leader, Bridge-Builder or ‘Hobbled Giant’? Perceptions of the EU in Climate-Change Negotiations

Author(s):  
Ole Elgström
2015 ◽  
Vol 01 (03) ◽  
pp. 423-446
Author(s):  
Hongyuan Yu

Climate change has emerged as one of the top security challenges in the early 21st century. It is now widely acknowledged that international cooperation and collective action will be the key to addressing challenges caused by climate change. This article will give an explanation on the evolution of the global climate change governance system by linking history, governance, and diplomacy. The challenge of climate change involves not only international competition for new energy but also related adjustments in the global governance pattern. Specifically, the carbon emission reduction to be discussed at the 2015 UN Paris Climate Conference will still be problematic, and negotiations with regard to financing mechanisms between developed and developing countries will remain in doubt. Furthermore, the attitudes of the two sides toward common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and the intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) are disparate. In addition, negotiations among China, the UN, the U.S., and the EU are decisive in tackling this tricky matter. Finally, this article outlines some potential diplomatic options for China's future developmental trend.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-95
Author(s):  
Feiyue Li

Abstract The idea of ‘fairness’ may be viewed as fundamental to a nation’s participation in the development of the international legal system governing climate change. As the second-largest economy and the largest Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emitter in the world, China’s actions on climate change are critical to the global response. Indeed, international cooperation on climate change is unlikely to succeed without China’s active engagement. Therefore, China’s perception of the fairness of responsibility allocation will significantly influence its attitudes toward its international climate responsibilities. However, limited work has been done to date to concretely examine China’s perspective of the fairness of responsibility allocation and to understand its fairness discourses and practices of climate responsibility in a dynamically evolved process. This article aims to fill that gap in the literature by elucidating how China perceives the fair allocation of climate responsibility and how its fairness discourses and practices have evolved over the course of the three phases of international climate change negotiations. It will be shown that China has perceived the factors of historically accumulated emissions, per capita emissions and capability to lie at the very core of its understanding of fairness.


2021 ◽  
Vol 73 (05) ◽  
pp. 8-8
Author(s):  
Pam Boschee

Carbon credits, carbon taxes, and emissions trading systems are familiar terms in discussions about limiting global warming, the Paris Agreement, and net-zero emissions goals. A more recent addition to the glossary of climate policy is “carbon tariff.” While the concept is not new, it recently surfaced in nascent policymaking in the EU. In 2019, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed a “carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)” as part of a proposed green deal. In March, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on a World Trade Organization (WTO)-compatible CBAM. A carbon tariff, or the EU’s CBAM, is a tax applied to carbon-intensive imports. Countries that have pledged to be more ambitious in reducing emissions—and in some cases have implemented binding targets—may impose carbon costs on their own businesses. Being eyed now are cross-border or overseas businesses that make products in countries in which no costs are imposed for emissions, resulting in cheaper carbon-intensive goods. Those products are exported to the countries aiming for reduced emissions. The concern lies in the risk of locally made goods becoming unfairly disadvantaged against competitors that are not taking similar steps to deal with climate change. A carbon tariff is being considered to level the playing field: local businesses in countries applying a tariff can better compete as climate policies evolve and are adopted around the world. Complying with WTO rules to ensure fair treatment, the CBAM will be imposed only on high-emitting industries that compete directly with local industries paying a carbon price. In the short term, these are likely to be steel, chemicals, fertilizers, and cement. The Parliament’s statement introduced another term to the glossary of climate policy: carbon leakage. “To raise global climate ambition and prevent ‘carbon leakage,’ the EU must place a carbon price on imports from less climate-ambitious countries.” It refers to the situation that may occur if businesses were to transfer production to other countries with laxer emission constraints to avoid costs related to climate policies. This could lead to an increase in total emissions in the higher-emitting countries. “The resolution underlines that the EU’s increased ambition on climate change must not lead to carbon leakage as global climate efforts will not benefit if EU production is just moved to non-EU countries that have less ambitious emissions rules,” the Parliament said. It also emphasized the tariff “must not be misused to further protectionism.” A member of the environment committee, Yannick Jadot, said, “It is a major political and democratic test for the EU, which must stop being naïve and impose the same carbon price on products, whether they are produced in or outside the EU, to ensure the most polluting sectors also take part in fighting climate change and innovate towards zero carbon. This will give us the best chance of remaining below the 1.5°C warming limit, whilst also pushing our trading partners to be equally ambitious in order to enter the EU market.” The Commission is expected to present a legislative proposal on a CBAM in the second quarter of 2021 as part of the European Green Deal.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isabell Böhm

Climate change litigation is becoming increasingly important. This thesis deals with the question whether state liability claims against Germany or the EU can be justified, if commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are not met. For this purpose, the claim under public liability according to § 839 German Civil Code in connection with Art. 34 German Basic Law, the liability of the EU-Member States and the liability of the European Union according to Art. 340 II TFEU are discussed. At the end of the thesis, considerations on the practical perspectives of state liability are made in order to improve their prospects of success.


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