Comments: Carbon Tariffs - Fair Incentives for Change?

2021 ◽  
Vol 73 (05) ◽  
pp. 8-8
Author(s):  
Pam Boschee

Carbon credits, carbon taxes, and emissions trading systems are familiar terms in discussions about limiting global warming, the Paris Agreement, and net-zero emissions goals. A more recent addition to the glossary of climate policy is “carbon tariff.” While the concept is not new, it recently surfaced in nascent policymaking in the EU. In 2019, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed a “carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)” as part of a proposed green deal. In March, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on a World Trade Organization (WTO)-compatible CBAM. A carbon tariff, or the EU’s CBAM, is a tax applied to carbon-intensive imports. Countries that have pledged to be more ambitious in reducing emissions—and in some cases have implemented binding targets—may impose carbon costs on their own businesses. Being eyed now are cross-border or overseas businesses that make products in countries in which no costs are imposed for emissions, resulting in cheaper carbon-intensive goods. Those products are exported to the countries aiming for reduced emissions. The concern lies in the risk of locally made goods becoming unfairly disadvantaged against competitors that are not taking similar steps to deal with climate change. A carbon tariff is being considered to level the playing field: local businesses in countries applying a tariff can better compete as climate policies evolve and are adopted around the world. Complying with WTO rules to ensure fair treatment, the CBAM will be imposed only on high-emitting industries that compete directly with local industries paying a carbon price. In the short term, these are likely to be steel, chemicals, fertilizers, and cement. The Parliament’s statement introduced another term to the glossary of climate policy: carbon leakage. “To raise global climate ambition and prevent ‘carbon leakage,’ the EU must place a carbon price on imports from less climate-ambitious countries.” It refers to the situation that may occur if businesses were to transfer production to other countries with laxer emission constraints to avoid costs related to climate policies. This could lead to an increase in total emissions in the higher-emitting countries. “The resolution underlines that the EU’s increased ambition on climate change must not lead to carbon leakage as global climate efforts will not benefit if EU production is just moved to non-EU countries that have less ambitious emissions rules,” the Parliament said. It also emphasized the tariff “must not be misused to further protectionism.” A member of the environment committee, Yannick Jadot, said, “It is a major political and democratic test for the EU, which must stop being naïve and impose the same carbon price on products, whether they are produced in or outside the EU, to ensure the most polluting sectors also take part in fighting climate change and innovate towards zero carbon. This will give us the best chance of remaining below the 1.5°C warming limit, whilst also pushing our trading partners to be equally ambitious in order to enter the EU market.” The Commission is expected to present a legislative proposal on a CBAM in the second quarter of 2021 as part of the European Green Deal.

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-78
Author(s):  
Yuri Yurievich Kovalev ◽  
Olga Sergeevna Porshneva

The article presents an analysis of the BRICS countries climate policies at the global and national levels. The authors consider the positions of these states within the framework of both international climate conferences (Conference of the Parties) held under the auspices of the UN since 1992, and the summits of BRICS member states in the years 2011-2020. The paper covers strategies and results of national climate policies implemented in these countries. Using structural, comparative, and content analysis methods, the authors emphasize that BRICS countries play a key role in stabilizing the climate of our planet today. It is impossible to achieve the main aim of the Paris Agreement without a comprehensive transformation of environmental practices in these societies. BRICS adheres to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities in its position towards international climate policy; the BRICS countries stand for sustainable economic growth through the introduction of new environmental technologies, and against restrictive measures that impede their economic development. At the same time, the Russian economys dependence on the extraction and export of fuel resources complicates environmental transformation. Russia is dominated by a negative narrative of climate change, where the urgent ecological modernization of the economy is seen as a threat to key sectors (oil and gas) of the economy. The implementation of international agreements to reduce the carbon intensity of the Russian economy, the creation of conditions for the transition to climate-neutral technologies, would contribute not only to the fight against global climate change, but would become a powerful incentive for the modernization of the economy, accelerating innovation and increasing its competitiveness.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 9-28
Author(s):  
Markus Lederer

The idea of a green deal transforming industrialized societies’ climate policies in a sustainable manner has become highly popular in various countries. The study takes up this notion focusing on climate policy initiatives in Canada and the EU, raising three interrelated issues: (i) on a descriptive level, the study asks where we stand and what has so far been achieved regarding climate policy; (ii) analytically, the study provides a theoretical explanation of why progress has been slow in the EU and hardly visible in Canada, making use of the concept of carbon democracy; (iii) on a prescriptive level, the study explores what will be needed to make a green deal successful, arguing that one has to accept that a green deal is a deeply political project that will create winners and losers and that not all losers can be compensated under the label of a “just transition”. The argument advanced is that the EU and Canada represent a form of carbon democracy in which the extensive use of carbon laid the foundation for establishing democratic institutions and strongly shaped them. The paper shows that the extensive influence of carbon-related activities not only empowers specific non-state agents but is rather deeply enmeshed in the societal and political genome of both regions’ polities. The claim that follows is that climate politics in Canada and the EU will have to be deeply transformative and therefore disruptive in order to be successful.  


Daedalus ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 141 (2) ◽  
pp. 45-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph E. Aldy ◽  
Robert N. Stavins

Emissions of greenhouse gases linked with global climate change are affected by diverse aspects of economic activity, including individual consumption, business investment, and government spending. An effective climate policy will have to modify the decision calculus for these activities in the direction of more efficient generation and use of energy, lower carbon-intensity of energy, and a more carbon-lean economy. The only technically feasible and cost-effective approach to achieving this goal on a meaningful scale is carbon pricing: that is, market-based climate policies that place a shadow-price on carbon dioxide emissions. We examine alternative designs of three such instruments: carbon taxes, cap and trade, and clean energy standards. We note that the U.S. political response to possible market-based approaches to climate policy has been, and will continue to be, largely a function of issues and structural factors that transcend the scope of environmental and climate policy.


Energies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 236
Author(s):  
Panagiotis Fragkos ◽  
Kostas Fragkiadakis ◽  
Leonidas Paroussos

Carbon leakage features prominently in the climate policy debate in economies implementing climate policies, especially in the EU. The imposition of carbon pricing impacts negatively the competitiveness of energy-intensive industries, inducing their relocation to countries with weaker environmental regulation. Unilateral climate policy may complement domestic emissions pricing with border carbon adjustment to reduce leakage and protect the competitiveness of domestic manufacturing. Here, we use an enhanced version of GEM-E3-FIT model to assess the macro-economic impacts when the EU unilaterally implements the EU Green Deal goals, leading to a leakage of 25% over 2020–2050. The size and composition, in terms of GHG and energy intensities, of the countries undertaking emission reductions matter for carbon leakage, which is significantly reduced when China joins the mitigation effort, as a result of its large market size and the high carbon intensity of its production. Chemicals and metals face the stronger risks for relocation to non-abating countries. The Border Carbon Adjustment can largely reduce leakage and the negative activity impacts on energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries of regulating countries, by shifting the emission reduction to non-abating countries through implicit changes in product prices.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (5) ◽  
pp. 11-28
Author(s):  
Igor A. Yakovlev ◽  
◽  
Lyudmila S. Kabir ◽  
Svetlana I. Nikulina ◽  
◽  
...  

The relevance of the research topic is determined by the need to respond to increased climate risks, which makes countries develop climate policies that can effectively meet sustainable development challenges and protect national economic interests. The transformation of climate policy causes the need to shift capital flows from “brown” economy sectors to “green” ones and integrate environmental factors into the process of making financial and investment decisions. At present, the EU is actively developing a climate finance system which will have an impact on the Russian economy. The article is aimed at outlining the changes in climate policies and financial strategies in the EU and Russia, influenced by the global climate agenda. It analyses the volumes and sources of climate finance mobilized by the EU, as well as regional support instruments in the transition period. The article determines the current changes in the Russian Federation’s climate policy. As a result of the research, the authors have come to the following conclusions. The EU is a vivid example of the fact that countries have long moved from climate change debates to the implementation of specific measures. The Russian Federation lags far behind the EU in terms of both mobilizing financial resources to ensure the transition to a low-carbon economy, and developing proven emission control instruments which help to stimulate the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and fulfill the obligations under the Paris Agreement.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-31
Author(s):  
Kai Schulze

Domestic policies are the cornerstone of the new global climate governance architecture. However, what motivates vote-seeking politicians to pursue climate policies remains remarkably unclear, as the climate politics literature suggests that climate policies are usually not perceived as a vote winner. The present article revisits this issue and argues that a better understanding of the relationship between electoral competition and climate policy making requires taking into account differences both in party ideologies and in policy characteristics. Studying twenty-nine democracies between 1990 and 2016, the analysis finds that climate policy production overall tends to increase as the election approaches due to increases in “soft” policies, such as subsidies, research grants, and information instruments, and relatively stable production rates of “hard” policies like taxes and regulations over the electoral term. Regarding partisan politics, left governments are found to produce more hard, but not more soft, climate policies than center and right governments, especially before elections. This suggests that partisan and electoral incentives are important reference points in the fight against climate change.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 105-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Torbjørg Jevnaker ◽  
Jørgen Wettestad

The EU’s emissions trading system (ETS) covers almost half of its greenhouse gas emissions and has been hailed as the cornerstone and flagship of EU climate policy. In spring 2013, however, the ETS was in severe crisis, with a huge surplus of allowances and a sagging carbon price. Even a formally simple measure to change the timing of auctioning was initially rejected by the European Parliament. Two years later, a much more important, quantity-focused “market thermostat” (the market stability reserve) was adopted, and proposals for a complete ETS overhaul were put on the table. This article examines how it was possible to turn the flagship around so quickly, providing insights into the mechanisms for gradually rendering emissions trading systems more effective. Crucial changes at the EU and national levels are identified, chief among them changes in Germany and in the European Parliament. Furthermore, the quantity-based tightening mechanism discussed could be of relevance for carbon markets outside Europe.


2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 205-210
Author(s):  
Simone Borghesi

AbstractThe present article describes the main insights deriving from the papers collected in this special issue which jointly provide a ‘room with a view’ on some of the most relevant issues in climate policy such as: the role of uncertainty, the distributional implications of climate change, the drivers and applications of decarbonizing innovation, the role of emissions trading and its interactions with companion policies. While looking at different issues and from different angles, all papers share a similar attention to policy aspects and implications, especially in developing countries. This is particularly important to evaluate whether and to what extent the climate policies adopted thus far in developed countries can be replicated in emerging economies.


2013 ◽  
Vol 01 (01) ◽  
pp. 1350008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mou WANG

Drawing on the idea that countries are eligible to implement differentiated emission reduction policies based on their respective capabilities, some parties of UNFCCC attempt to weaken the principle of “Common but differentiated responsibilities(CBDR)” and impose carbon tariff on international trade. This initiative is in fact another camouflage to burden developing countries with emission cut obligation, which has no doubt undermined the development rights of developing countries. This paper defines Carbon Tariff as border measures that target import goods with embodied carbon emission. It can be import tariffs or other domestic tax measures that adjust border tax, which includes plain import tariffs and export rebates, border tax adjustment, emission quota and permit etc. For some developed countries, carbon tariffs mean to sever trade protectionism and to build trade barriers. Its theoretical arguments like “loss of comparative advantage”, “carbon leakage decreases environmental effectiveness” and “theoretical model bases” are pseudo-propositions without international consensus. Carbon tariff has become an intensively debated issue due to its duality of climate change and trade, but neither UNFCCC nor WTO has clarified this issue or has indicated a clear statement in this regard. As a result, it allows some parties to take advantage of this loophole and escape its international climate change obligation. Carbon tariff is an issue arising from global climate governance. To promote the cooperation of global climate governance and safeguard the social and economic development of developing countries, a fair and justified climate change regime and international trade institution should be established, and the settlement of the carbon tariff issue should be addressed within these frameworks. This paper argues that the international governance of carbon tariff should in cooperation with other international agreements; however, principles and guidelines regarding this issue should be developed under the UNFCCC. Based on these principles and guidelines, WTO can develop related technical operation provisions.


2015 ◽  
Vol 01 (03) ◽  
pp. 423-446
Author(s):  
Hongyuan Yu

Climate change has emerged as one of the top security challenges in the early 21st century. It is now widely acknowledged that international cooperation and collective action will be the key to addressing challenges caused by climate change. This article will give an explanation on the evolution of the global climate change governance system by linking history, governance, and diplomacy. The challenge of climate change involves not only international competition for new energy but also related adjustments in the global governance pattern. Specifically, the carbon emission reduction to be discussed at the 2015 UN Paris Climate Conference will still be problematic, and negotiations with regard to financing mechanisms between developed and developing countries will remain in doubt. Furthermore, the attitudes of the two sides toward common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and the intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) are disparate. In addition, negotiations among China, the UN, the U.S., and the EU are decisive in tackling this tricky matter. Finally, this article outlines some potential diplomatic options for China's future developmental trend.


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