A profit-based scoring system in consumer credit: making acquisition decisions for credit cards

2011 ◽  
Vol 62 (9) ◽  
pp. 1719-1725 ◽  
Author(s):  
R T Stewart
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (008) ◽  
pp. 1-55
Author(s):  
Akos Horvath ◽  
◽  
Benjamin Kay ◽  
Carlo Wix ◽  
◽  
...  

We use credit card data from the Federal Reserve Board's FR Y-14M reports to study the impact of the COVID-19 shock on the use and availability of consumer credit across borrower types from March through August 2020. We document an initial sharp decrease in credit card transactions and outstanding balances in March and April. While spending starts to recover by May, especially for risky borrowers, balances remain depressed overall. We find a strong negative impact of local pandemic severity on credit use, which becomes smaller over time, consistent with pandemic fatigue. Restrictive public health interventions also negatively affect credit use, but the pandemic itself is the main driver. We further document a large reduction in credit card originations, especially to risky borrowers. Consistent with a tightening of credit supply and a flight-to-safety response of banks, we find an increase in interest rates of newly issued credit cards to less creditworthy borrowers.


Author(s):  
Sarit Markovich ◽  
Nilima Achwal

This case asks students to step into the role of Adalberto Flores, co-founder and CEO of Kueski, one of the first companies to develop a proprietary algorithm for online loan approval in Mexico. Mexico lacks a standardized credit scoring system, making it difficult for many Mexicans to get approved for a loan or credit card. This, together with the fact that Mexicans generally do not trust traditional banks, makes Mexico an attractive opportunity for fintech companies. Growth, however, could require fintech companies to partner with traditional banks. Students assume the role of Flores to think about the benefits and risks associated with a partnership between Kueski and traditional banks. Students are also challenged to compare the structure of U.S. financial services markets with the Mexican structure and consider the implications on the sustainability of fintech companies in the two markets. The teaching note analyzes the Mexican financial market and the benefits and threats it holds for fintech companies, and outlines a framework for evaluating the risk associated with partnerships.


2011 ◽  
Vol 85 (3) ◽  
pp. 551-575 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Zumello

First National City Bank (FNCB) of New York launched the Everything Card in the summer of 1967. A latecomer in the field of credit cards, FNCB nonetheless correctly recognized a promising business model for retail banking. FNCB attempted not only to ride the wave of mass consumption but also to capitalize on the profit-generating potential of buying on credit. Although the venture soon failed, brought down by the losses that plagued the bank due to fraud, consumer discontent, and legislative action, this final attempt by a major single commercial bank to launch its own plan did not signify the end of credit cards. On the contrary, the Everything Card was a harbinger of the era of the universal credit card.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sudheer Chava ◽  
Rohan Ganduri ◽  
Nikhil Paradkar ◽  
Linghang Zeng

2014 ◽  
Vol 130 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sumit Agarwal ◽  
Souphala Chomsisengphet ◽  
Neale Mahoney ◽  
Johannes Stroebel

Abstract We analyze the effectiveness of consumer financial regulation by considering the 2009 Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act. We use a panel data set covering 160 million credit card accounts and a difference-in-differences research design that compares changes in outcomes over time for consumer credit cards, which were subject to the regulations, to changes for small business credit cards, which the law did not cover. We estimate that regulatory limits on credit card fees reduced overall borrowing costs by an annualized 1.6% of average daily balances, with a decline of more than 5.3% for consumers with FICO scores below 660. We find no evidence of an offsetting increase in interest charges or a reduction in the volume of credit. Taken together, we estimate that the CARD Act saved consumers $11.9 billion a year. We also analyze a nudge that disclosed the interest savings from paying off balances in 36 months rather than making minimum payments. We detect a small increase in the share of accounts making the 36-month payment value but no evidence of a change in overall payments.


Author(s):  
Kathleen W. Johnson

Abstract I argue that the measure of credit card debt used by researchers has grown rapidly in part because it captures debt arising from transactions in which a credit card is used because of its advantages over other payment instruments. Increases in debt stemming from such use may not signal greater household financial vulnerability if households are willing and able to repay this short-term debt. However, it may suggest that the cost of using credit cards to pay for purchases has declined relative to other payment instruments. I conclude that had transactions demand remained at its real 1992 levels, rather than growing almost 15 percent per year, measured credit card debt would have grown a bit less than 1 percentage point slower per year between 1992 and 2001. Moreover, I show that removing transactions demand from aggregate consumer credit can alter conclusions about the relationship between credit and consumption.


Author(s):  
Stuart Aveyard ◽  
Paul Corthorn ◽  
Sean O’Connell

Competition and Credit Control contributed to the abandonment of hire purchase terms control, but officials continued to search for another mechanism that could target consumer expenditure. Their quest became more pressing after 1973, as tremendous economic difficulties strengthened the desire to control the growth of the money supply. Competition and Credit Control failed to restrict credit expansion and was modified by the introduction of the ‘credit corset’. Hire purchase terms controls returned, alongside the voluntary system for other forms of consumer credit. The failure was dramatic enough for Labour’s front bench to advocate a return to ceilings on bank advances and the withdrawal of credit cards. In office, however, Labour accepted the status quo and relaxed some controls following pressure from the consumer durables sector. The general thrust of the experience in the 1970s led officials and ministers to lose faith in the capacity of the state to effect change.


2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-76
Author(s):  
Jasper Kim

Two years following the 1997-98 Korean financial crisis, the Korean government attempted to bolster consumer spending and re-invigorate the national economy by pursuing a series of policies that directly promoted the use of consumer credit cards. Subsequently, consumer credit card spiked upward, which led to a dramatic surge in individual debtor defaults. The government in response mode again thereafter initiated a three-pronged legislative effort to counter the post-1997 individual debtor polemic: (i) the Individual Debtor Rehabilitation Act (“IDRA” or the “Act”); (ii)) the Korea Asset Management Company’s Bad Bank (KAMCO or “Bad Bank”); and (iii) the Credit Counseling and Recovery Service (CCRS) (collectively, the “Legal Acts”). This paper surveys and analyzes the Legal Acts approach to resolving South Korea’s post-1997 consumer credit card spending polemic.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document