scholarly journals Two conceptions of consciousness and why only the neo-Aristotelian one enables us to construct evolutionary explanations

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Harry Smit ◽  
Peter Hacker
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Neural Activity ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Causal Relation ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Neural Processes ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Open Thermodynamic Systems ◽  
Evolutionary Explanations

Abstract Descartes separated the physical from the mental realm and presupposed a causal relation between conscious experience and neural processes. He denominated conscious experiences ‘thoughts’ and held them to be indubitable. However, the question of how we can bridge the gap between subjective experience and neural activity remained unanswered, and attempts to integrate the Cartesian conception with evolutionary theory has not resulted in explanations and testable hypotheses. It is argued that the alternative neo-Aristotelian conception of the mind as the capacities of intellect and will resolves these problems. We discuss how the neo-Aristotelian conception, extended with the notion that organisms are open thermodynamic systems that have acquired heredity, can be integrated with evolutionary theory, and elaborate how we can explain four different forms of consciousness in evolutionary terms.

Musical imagery and the temporality of consciousness

2019 ◽  
pp. 271-285 ◽  
Author(s):  
Freya Bailes
Keyword(s):  
Time Course ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Internal Representation ◽  
Musical Imagery ◽  
Temporal Aspects ◽  
New Ideas ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Mind

Musical imagery can be defined as the conscious experience of an internal representation of music—a form of inner hearing. This chapter adopts a psychological approach to considering temporal aspects of musical imagery, from the characteristics and frequency of episodes ranging in scale from seconds and minutes (e.g. the mental continuation of interrupted music), to the potential impact of circadian (24-hour) rhythms upon the subjective experience of musical imagery. The common ground between musical imagery and other forms of spontaneous cognition, combined with evidence of temporal fluctuations in our conscious awareness of inner music, suggests a new cyclical model of musical imagery. Exploring the music in our ‘mind’s ear’ has the potential to shed light on the time course of consciousness, with consequences not just for what it means to re-present music in the mind but also for how and when new ideas come to be experienced in our imaginations.

scholarly journals .The superdeterministic destiny, and its mathematical models within the neural network

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoyang Yu
Keyword(s):  
Neural Network ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
World Line ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Elementary Particles ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Center Stage ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Universe

The physical interactions among any number of elementary particles are governed by Schrodinger equation. The universe is a superdeterministic state machine which is formed by elementary particles. Mind’s “center stage”, which is a component of the mind, is imagined to exist as a real-time representation of all the elementary particles within the universe; the “center stage” only includes the physical objects perceived in the mind. A naïve cognitive researcher might incorrectly treat her mind’s “center stage” as the real world. It’s possible that the “center stage” doesn’t exist like “the ghost in the machine”. Otherwise, this “center stage” shouldn’t be able to impact the world line of any elementary particle. So, the human body is merely a fuzzy set of elementary particles, no matter the “center stage” really exist or not. The precondition of the “hard problem” of consciousness makes a mistake. Proving the precondition of the “hard problem”, is a “harder problem” of consciousness. The “harder problem” can’t be proved empirically. The conscious experience is actually the use of a mathematical model by a neural network within its low-level calculation. For example, when a neural network uses its 3D model of the reality, it feels like the subjective experience of being immersed within a topological structure.

scholarly journals Wandering minds, sleepy brains: lapses of attention and local sleep in wakefulness

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Andrillon ◽  
Angus Burns ◽  
Teigane MacKay ◽  
Jennifer Windt ◽  
Naotsugu Tsuchiya
Keyword(s):  
Neural Activity ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Mind Wandering ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Cognitive Profiles ◽  
Stream Of Consciousness ◽  
Impact Performance ◽  
Attentional Lapses ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Local Sleep

AbstractAttentional lapses are ubiquitous and can negatively impact performance. They correlate with mind wandering, or thoughts that are unrelated to ongoing tasks and environmental demands. In other cases, the stream of consciousness itself comes to a halt and the mind goes blank. What happens in the brain that leads to these mental states? To understand the neural mechanisms underlying attentional lapses, we cross-analyzed the behavior, subjective experience and neural activity of healthy participants performing a task. Random interruptions prompted participants to indicate whether they were task-focused, mind-wandering or mind-blanking. High-density electroencephalography revealed the occurrence of spatially and temporally localized sleep-like patterns of neural activity. This “local sleep” accompanied behavioral markers of lapses and preceded reports of mind wandering and mind blanking. Furthermore, the location of local sleep distinguished sluggish versus impulsive behaviors, mind wandering versus mind blanking. Despite contrasting cognitive profiles, attentional lapses could share a common physiological origin: the appearance of local islets of sleep within the awake brain.

scholarly journals Wandering minds, sleepy brains: lapses of attention and local sleep in wakefulness

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Andrillon ◽  
Angus Burns ◽  
Teigane Mackay ◽  
Jennifer Windt ◽  
Naotsugu Tsuchiya
Keyword(s):  
Neural Activity ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Mind Wandering ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Cognitive Profiles ◽  
Stream Of Consciousness ◽  
Impact Performance ◽  
Attentional Lapses ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Local Sleep

Abstract Attentional lapses are ubiquitous and can negatively impact performance. They correlate with mind wandering, or thoughts that are unrelated to ongoing tasks and environmental demands. In other cases, the stream of consciousness itself comes to a halt and the mind goes blank. What happens in the brain that leads to these mental states? To understand the neural mechanisms underlying attentional lapses, we cross-analyzed the behavior, subjective experience and neural activity of healthy participants performing a task. Random interruptions prompted participants to indicate whether they were task-focused, mind-wandering or mind-blanking. High-density electroencephalography revealed the occurrence of spatially and temporally localized sleep-like patterns of neural activity. This “local sleep” accompanied behavioral markers of lapses and preceded reports of mind wandering and mind blanking. Furthermore, the location of local sleep distinguished sluggish versus impulsive behaviors, mind wandering versus mind blanking. Despite contrasting cognitive profiles, attentional lapses could share a common physiological origin: the appearance of local islets of sleep within the awake brain.

Еnactivist Criticism of the Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness

2021 ◽  
pp. 76-80
Author(s):  
Anastasia O. Shabalina ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Science Methods ◽  
Neural Processes ◽  
Neural Substrate ◽  
Critical Revision ◽  
Concept Of Information ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Person Experience

The article considers the main arguments against the neurobiological theory of consciousness from the point of view of the enactivist approach within the philosophy of mind. The neurobiological theory of consciousness, which reduces consciousness to neural activity, is currently the dominant approach to the mind-body problem. The neurobiological theory emerged as a result of advances in research on the phenomena of consciousness and through the development of technologies for visualizing the internal processes of mind. However, at the very heart of this theory, there is a number of logical contradictions. The non-reductive enactivist approach to consciousness, introduced in this article, contributes to the existing argumentation against the reduction of consciousness to neural processes with remonstrations that take into account the modern neuroscientific data. The article analyzes the argumentation of the sensorimotor enactivism developed by A. Noe and offers the account of the teleosemantic approach to the concept of information provided by R. Cao. The key problems of the neurobiological theory of consciousness are highlighted, and the objections emerging within the framework of the enactivist approach are analyzed. Since the main concepts on which the neural theory is based are the concepts of neural substrate, cognition as representation, and information as a unit of cognition, the author of the article presents three key enactivist ideas that oppose them. First, the enactivist concept of cognition as action allows us to consider the first-person experience as a mode of action, and not as a state of the brain substrate. Second, the article deals with the “explanatory externalism” argument proposed by Noe, who refutes the image of cognition as a representation in the brain. Finally, in order to critically revise the concept of information as a unit of cognition, the author analyzes Cao’s idea, which represents a teleosemantic approach, but is in line with the general enactivist argumentation. Cao shows that the application of the concept “information” to neural processes is problematic: no naturalized information is found in the brain as a physical substrate. A critical revision of beliefs associated with the neural theory of consciousness leads us to recognize that there are not enough grounds for reducing consciousness to processes that take place in the brain. That is why Noe calls expectations that the visualization of processes taking place in the brain with the help of the modern equipment will be able to depict the experience of consciousness the “new phrenology”, thus indicating the naive character of neural reduction. The article concludes that natural science methods are insufficient for the study of consciousness.

The Causal Structure of Natural Selection

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles H. Pence
Keyword(s):  
Natural Selection ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
Genetic Drift ◽  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Causal Structure ◽  
Philosophy Of Biology ◽  
Philosophy Of Physics ◽  
Potential Value ◽  
Multi Level ◽  
Evolutionary Explanations

Recent arguments concerning the nature of causation in evolutionary theory, now often known as the debate between the 'causalist' and 'statisticalist' positions, have involved answers to a variety of independent questions – definitions of key evolutionary concepts like natural selection, fitness, and genetic drift; causation in multi-level systems; or the nature of evolutionary explanations, among others. This Element offers a way to disentangle one set of these questions surrounding the causal structure of natural selection. Doing so allows us to clearly reconstruct the approach that some of these major competing interpretations of evolutionary theory have to this causal structure, highlighting particular features of philosophical interest within each. Further, those features concern problems not exclusive to the philosophy of biology. Connections between them and, in two case studies, contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of physics demonstrate the potential value of broader collaboration in the understanding of evolution.

scholarly journals Double Vision, Phosphenes and Afterimages

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-32
Author(s):  
Işık Sarıhan
Keyword(s):  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Double Vision ◽  
Phenomenal Experience ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Mind

Pure representationalism or intentionalism for phenomenal experience is the theory that all introspectible qualitative aspects of a conscious experience can be analyzed as qualities that the experience non-conceptually represents the world to have. Some philosophers have argued that experiences such as afterimages, phosphenes and double vision are counterexamples to the representationalist theory, claiming that they are non- representational states or have non-representational aspects, and they are better explained in a qualia-theoretical framework. I argue that these states are fully representational states of a certain kind, which I call “automatically non-endorsed representations”, experiential states the veridicality of which we are almost never committed to, and which do not trigger explicit belief or disbelief in the mind of the subject. By investigating descriptive accounts of afterimages by two qualia theorists, I speculate that the mistaken claims of some anti-representationalists might be rooted in confusing two senses of the term “seeming”.

scholarly journals From Existential Graphs to Conceptual Graphs

2014 ◽  
pp. 439-472
Author(s):  
John F. Sowa
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Computational Linguistics ◽  
Formal Semantics ◽  
Semantic Networks ◽  
Conceptual Graphs ◽  
Computationally Efficient ◽  
Graphic Notation ◽  
Neural Processes ◽  
Existential Graphs ◽  
The Mind

Existential graphs (EGs) are a simple, readable, and expressive graphic notation for logic. Conceptual graphs (CGs) combine a logical foundation based on EGs with features of the semantic networks used in artificial intelligence and computational linguistics. CG design principles address logical, linguistic, and cognitive requirements: a formal semantics defined by the ISO standard for Common Logic; the flexibility to support the expressiveness, context dependencies, and metalevel commentary of natural language; and cognitively realistic operations for reasoning by induction, deduction, abduction, and analogy. To accommodate the vagueness and ambiguities of natural language, informal heuristics can supplement the formal semantics. With sufficient background knowledge and a clarifying dialog, informal graphs can be refined to any degree of precision. Peirce claimed that the rules for reasoning with EGs generate “a moving picture of the action of the mind in thought.” Some philosophers and psychologists agree: Peirce's diagrams and rules are a good candidate for a natural logic that reflects the neural processes that support thought and language. They are psychologically realistic and computationally efficient.

Remembering the Evolutionary Freud

2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allan Young
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Sigmund Freud ◽  
Psychotic Disorders ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Fundamental Difference ◽  
Evolutionary Origins ◽  
Point Of No Return ◽  
Evolutionary Narratives ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

ArgumentThroughout his career as a writer, Sigmund Freud maintained an interest in the evolutionary origins of the human mind and its neurotic and psychotic disorders. In common with many writers then and now, he believed that the evolutionary past is conserved in the mind and the brain. Today the “evolutionary Freud” is nearly forgotten. Even among Freudians, he is regarded to be a red herring, relevant only to the extent that he diverts attention from the enduring achievements of the authentic Freud. There are three ways to explain these attitudes. First, the evolutionary Freud's key work is the “Overview of the Transference Neurosis” (1915). But it was published at an inopportune moment, forty years after the author's death, during the so-called “Freud wars.” Second, Freud eventually lost interest in the “Overview” and the prospect of a comprehensive evolutionary theory of psychopathology. The publication of The Ego and the Id (1923), introducing Freud's structural theory of the psyche, marked the point of no return. Finally, Freud's evolutionary theory is simply not credible. It is based on just-so stories and a thoroughly discredited evolutionary mechanism, Lamarckian use-inheritance. Explanations one and two are probably correct but also uninteresting. Explanation number three assumes that there is a fundamental difference between Freud's evolutionary narratives (not credible) and the evolutionary accounts of psychopathology that currently circulate in psychiatry and mainstream journals (credible). The assumption is mistaken but worth investigating.

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