Experiencing Mandates: Towards A Hybrid Account

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Jonathan Mitchell
Keyword(s):  
Hybrid Account

Imagining

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel D. Hutto ◽  
Erik Myin
Keyword(s):  
States Of Mind ◽  
Material Engagement Theory ◽  
Standard Assumption ◽  
Daily Lives ◽  
Specific Content ◽  
Engagement Theory ◽  
Cognitive Work ◽  
Hybrid Account ◽  
The Many ◽  
The Right

Chapter 8 challenges the standard assumption that all imagination must be representational by showing that it is easier to understand the most fundamental kind of imaginings in terms of perceptual re-enactments that are wholly interactive and non-contentful in character. Combining REC with Material Engagement Theory, MET, it is revealed how basic, non-contentful imaginings might acquire their anticipatory and interactional profiles through embodied engagements with worldly offerings. Building on Langland-Hassan’s analysis of imaginative attitudes, the chapter goes on to develop a REC friendly hybrid account of nonbasic imaginings. Accordingly, the specific content and correctness conditions of nonbasic, hybrid imaginative attitudes arise from a combination of contentless sensory imaginings and the surrounding contentful attitudes of imaginers. It is argued that such hybrid states of mind have the right properties for explaining the many and varied kinds of cognitive work that imaginings do for us in our daily lives.

Effectiveness and Medicalization

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob Stegenga
Keyword(s):  
Medical Science ◽  
Medical Intervention ◽  
Medical Interventions ◽  
Disease Mongering ◽  
Hybrid Account ◽  
What Matters

This chapter further articulates the hybrid account of effectiveness presented in Chapter 2 and applies it to several pressing problems with disease attribution. A medical intervention can act at several physical scales or levels; it is at least pragmatically useful to think of some of our most effective medical interventions (‘magic bullets’) operating at microphysiological levels. A medical intervention can be effective to varying degrees of generality, though ultimately what matters for the typical patient is whether or not an intervention will be effective for that patient. The hybrid account of disease affords a critical stance on several troubling phenomena in medical science, including medicalization or ‘disease-mongering’ and overdiagnosis and overtreatment. The chapter ends by addressing several objections that might be raised against the hybrid account of effectiveness presented in Chapter 2 and its further articulation and application here.

Group Intentions and Oppression

Philosophy ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 88 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Moltchanova
Keyword(s):  
Political Power ◽  
Group Actions ◽  
Institutional Structure ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
The Other ◽  
Collective Intentionality ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Hybrid Account ◽  
Reductive Theory ◽  
Joint Group

AbstractA reductive theory of collective intentionality would imply that the ‘official’ intentions of an oppressive political authority cannot be constructed from the intentions of individuals when they follow the authority's rules. This makes it difficult to explain the unraveling of official group plans through time in a seemingly consistent fashion, and the corresponding source of coercion. A non-reductive theory, on the other hand, cannot capture whether the actions of individuals in an oppressive society are free or coerced, so long as a manifest institutional structure and rules are in place. I put forward a hybrid account of group intentionality that is capable of articulating why oppressive political power is illegitimate, which comes down to the official and individual intentions in joint group actions diverging in such a way that individuals are not governed on the basis of dependent reasons.

scholarly journals Compatibilism and Incompatibilism in Social Cogntiion

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Positive Outcomes ◽  
Social Judgments ◽  
Moral Accountability ◽  
Opposite View ◽  
Hybrid Account

Compatibilism is the view that determinism is compatible with acting freely and being morally responsible. Incompatibilism is the opposite view. It is often claimed that compatibilism or incompatibilism is a natural part of ordinary social cognition. That is, it is often claimed that patterns in our everyday social judgments reveal an implicit commitment to either compatibilism or incompatibilism. This paper reports five experiments designed to identify such patterns. The results support a nuanced hybrid account: The central tendencies in ordinary social cognition are compatibilism about moral responsibility, compatibilism about positive moral accountability, neither compatibilism nor incompatibilism about negative moral accountability, compatibilism about choice for actions with positive outcomes, and incompatibilism about choice for actions with negative or neutral outcomes.

scholarly journals Fictional entities as artifacts: some problems for Amie Thomasson’s theory

2016 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-18
Author(s):  
Andrej Jandric
Keyword(s):  
Abstract Objects ◽  
Fictional Characters ◽  
Singular Terms ◽  
Study Evaluation ◽  
Fictional Entities ◽  
The Common ◽  
Hybrid Account ◽  
Literary Practices ◽  
Intentional Acts ◽  
Amie Thomasson

Amie Thomasson has developed a theory of fictional entities, according to which they exist as contingent abstract objects. In her view, fictional characters are cultural artifacts just as the works of fiction they feature in. They are doubly dependent objects: for their becoming they depend on creative intentional acts of their author, and for maintaining their existence they depend on preservation of a copy of any fictional work they appear in. Thomasson claims that her theory has the advantage of vindicating the common beliefs about fictional entities embodied in the study, evaluation and interpretation of literature. However, I argue that, under this theory of fictional entities, no account of reference of fictional singular terms ? neither the descriptive, nor the causal, nor Thomasson?s preferred hybrid account ? can accommodate all the aspects of our literary practices.

Effectiveness of Medical Interventions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob Stegenga
Keyword(s):  
Medical Treatment ◽  
Medical Intervention ◽  
Concept Of Disease ◽  
Theoretical Underpinning ◽  
Medical Interventions ◽  
Hybrid Account

To be effective a medical intervention must improve one’s health by targeting a disease. The concept of disease, though, is controversial. Among the leading accounts of disease—naturalism, normativism, hybridism, and eliminativism—I defend a version of hybridism. This hybrid account of disease holds that for a state to be a disease that state must both have a constitutive causal basis and cause harm. The two requirements of hybridism entail that a medical intervention, to be deemed effective, must target either the constitutive causal basis of a disease or the harms caused by the disease (or ideally both). This provides a theoretical underpinning to the two principal aims of medical treatment: care and cure.

Exploitation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben Ferguson ◽  
Hillel Steiner
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Unfair Advantage ◽  
Hybrid Account ◽  
Pareto Improving ◽  
Distributive Injustice

Exploitation is commonly understood as taking unfair advantage. This article discusses the various prominent accounts that have been offered of how an exchange, despite being Pareto improving and consensual, can nevertheless count as unfair or unjust and, hence, as presumptively impermissible. Does the wrongness of an exploitative transaction consist in its compounding a prior distributive injustice, or in its deliberately profiting from someone’s vulnerability, or in its commodification of that which should not be commodified? How should responsibility for exploitation be assigned, and can this avoid generating moral hazard? The accounts of exploitation analysed here are classified along two dimensions—historical vs. ahistorical and intentional vs. non-intentional—in their conceptions of unfairness, and the possibility of a hybrid account is explored.

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