scholarly journals Fictional entities as artifacts: some problems for Amie Thomasson’s theory

2016 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-18
Author(s):  
Andrej Jandric
Keyword(s):  
Abstract Objects ◽  
Fictional Characters ◽  
Singular Terms ◽  
Study Evaluation ◽  
Fictional Entities ◽  
The Common ◽  
Hybrid Account ◽  
Literary Practices ◽  
Intentional Acts ◽  
Amie Thomasson

Amie Thomasson has developed a theory of fictional entities, according to which they exist as contingent abstract objects. In her view, fictional characters are cultural artifacts just as the works of fiction they feature in. They are doubly dependent objects: for their becoming they depend on creative intentional acts of their author, and for maintaining their existence they depend on preservation of a copy of any fictional work they appear in. Thomasson claims that her theory has the advantage of vindicating the common beliefs about fictional entities embodied in the study, evaluation and interpretation of literature. However, I argue that, under this theory of fictional entities, no account of reference of fictional singular terms ? neither the descriptive, nor the causal, nor Thomasson?s preferred hybrid account ? can accommodate all the aspects of our literary practices.

scholarly journals Actualism and Fictional Characters

2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
André Leclerc
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
Dimensional Space ◽  
Fictional Characters ◽  
Moore’S Paradox ◽  
Material Basis ◽  
Fictional Entities ◽  
Moore's Paradox ◽  
Amie Thomasson

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n1p61In what follows, I present only part of a program that consists in developing a version of actualism as an adequate framework for the metaphysics of intentionality. I will try to accommodate in that framework suggestions found in Kripke’s works and some positions developed by Amie Thomasson. What should we change if we accept “fictional entities” in the domain of the actual world? Actualism is the thesis that everything that exists belongs to the domain of the actual world and that there are no possibilia. I shall defend that there are abstract artefacts, like fictional characters, and institutions. My argument could be seen as a version of Moore’s paradox: it is paradoxical to say: “I made (created) it, but I do not believe it exists”. Moreover, there are true sentences about them. I will examine what it means to include abstract artefacts in the domain of the actual world. I favour a use of “exist” that includes beings with no concrete occupation of tri-dimensional space; to exist, it is enough to have been introduced at some moment in history. Abstract artefacts, like fictional characters, exist in that sense. I argue that it is important to distinguish two perspectives (internal and external) in order to clarify the kind of knowledge we have of fictional characters. However, their existence presupposes a relation of dependence to a material basis and the mental activities of many people.

Singular Terms, Identity, and the Creation of Fictional Characters

Disputatio ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (54) ◽  
pp. 207-229
Author(s):  
Matthieu Fontaine
Keyword(s):  
Original Work ◽  
Proper Names ◽  
Fictional Characters ◽  
Inference Rules ◽  
Singular Terms ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Abstract Artifacts

Abstract How to interpret singular terms in fiction? In this paper, we address this semantic question from the perspective of the Artifactual Theory of Fiction (ATF). According to the ATF, fictional characters exist as abstract artifacts created by their author, and preserved through the existence of copies of an original work and a competent readership. We pretend that a well-suited semantics for the ATF can be defined with respect to a modal framework by means of Hintikka’s world lines semantics. The question of the interpretation of proper names is asked in relation to two inference rules, problematic when applied in intensional contexts: the Substitution of Identicals and Existential Generalization. The former fails because identity is contingent. The latter because proper names are not necessarily linked to well-identified individuals. This motivates a non-rigid interpretation of proper names in fiction, although cross-fictional reference (e.g. to real entities) is made possible by the interpretative efforts of the reader.

How Things Are

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Siderits
Keyword(s):  
Prior Knowledge ◽  
Indian Philosophy ◽  
Causal Relation ◽  
Abstract Objects ◽  
Buddhist Tradition ◽  
Common Strategy ◽  
Classical Indian Philosophy ◽  
Recent Debate ◽  
Specialist Knowledge ◽  
The Common

This work is designed to introduce some of the more important fruits of Indian Buddhist metaphysical theorizing to philosophers with little or no prior knowledge of classical Indian philosophy. It is widely known among non-specialists that Buddhists deny the existence of a self. Less widely appreciated among philosophers currently working in metaphysics is the fact that the Indian Buddhist tradition contains a wealth of material on a broad assortment of other issues that have also been foci of recent debate. Indian Buddhist philosophers have argued for a variety of interesting claims about the nature of the causal relation, about persistence, about abstract objects, about the consequences of presentism, about the prospects for a viable ontological emergentism. They engaged in a spirited debate over illusionism in the philosophy of consciousness. Some espoused global anti-realism while others called its coherence into question. And so on. This work is meant to introduce the views of such major Buddhist philosophers as Vasubandhu, Dharmakīrti, and Nāgārjuna on these and other issues. And it presents their arguments and analyses in a manner meant to make them accessible to students of philosophy who lack specialist knowledge of the Indian tradition. Analytic metaphysicians who are interested in moving beyond the common strategy of appealing to the intuitions of “the folk” should find much of interest here.

scholarly journals Truth and the Quest for Definition

Phronimon ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick O Aleke
Keyword(s):  
Linguistic Analysis ◽  
Truth Predicate ◽  
Philosophical Investigation ◽  
Semantic Conception ◽  
The Common ◽  
Self Transcendence ◽  
Intentional Acts ◽  
Logical Semantic

The controversies in contemporary truth discourses can be traced directly or indirectly to the Fregean choice of “thought” as the truth bearer, Ramsey’s redundancy thesis, Tarskian semantic conception, and Davidson’s defence of the indefinability of truth. The common feature of these four positions is an inadequate treatment of the “what is” question. Because of the neglect of this kind of question, the consequence is that truth has been reduced to a thin concept (that is a reduction of truth to logical, semantic or linguistic analysis of the truth predicate, or analysis of intentional signs at the expense of intentional acts) and subsequent quest for the deflation of truth. I argue that such an approach to the philosophical investigation of truth is at best inadequate and at worst bound to fail. Hence, I propose that an adequate exploration of truth must first address the “what is” question, rather than just assuming it. Further, I argue that to realise this, it is vital to take into consideration the wider context in which the truth question arises, that is, the human quest for knowledge and self-transcendence; and it is the conception of truth as critical correspondence that is capable of sufficiently answering the question.

scholarly journals Making the Lightness of Being Bearable: Arithmetical Platonism, Fictional Realism and Cognitive Command

2008 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 453-487
Author(s):  
Bill Wringe
Keyword(s):  
Singular Term ◽  
Fictional Characters ◽  
Singular Terms

In this paper I wish to defend a minimalist version of arithmetical Platonism — which I shall refer to as ‘minimal Platonism’ — from an objection which alleges that an advocate of this view is committed to an unduly capacious ontology. The objection, which I shall call the ‘Lightness of Being’ objection, runs as follows. The minimal Platonist is committed to the claim that arithmetical objects, such as numbers, exist provided that two conditions are met. The first is that terms for numerals are singular terms — where something's being a singular term is judged on the basis of purely syntactic criteria. The second is that some sentences in which these singular terms feature are non-trivially true. However, the names of fictional characters are also singular terms (when judged by the metaphysically lightweight criteria used by advocates of minimal Platonism).

scholarly journals Artefactualism as an Ontology of Art

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Alistair Hamel
Keyword(s):  
Fictional Characters ◽  
Works Of Art ◽  
Ontology Of Art ◽  
Amie Thomasson

<p>This thesis argues for artefactualism about works of art, which is the claim that works of art are artefacts. It does this by considering the cases of works of music, and works of fiction, and arguing that each of these are artefacts, or existent, created, individual entities. To do this, it argues against anti-realist, eternalist, and type theories in these domains. The thesis draws on arguments made by philosophers such as Amie Thomasson regarding fictional characters and Guy Rohrbaugh regarding repeatable works of art.</p>

scholarly journals The Trickster in Appalachian and Hutsulian Tales

2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 45-49
Author(s):  
Olga Derkachova ◽  
Solomia Ushnevych
Keyword(s):  
Fictional Characters ◽  
Mountainous Region ◽  
Objective Reality ◽  
The Carpathians ◽  
Sacred Objects ◽  
The World ◽  
Special Places ◽  
The Common

The fairytales of Hutsuls and Appalachians are analyzed in the article. Mountainousdwellers have an indissoluble connection with the nature and metaphysics of mountains that iswhy there are so many sacred objects and special places there. Megaliths and sanctuaries, lifegiving places, miraculous springs, natural metaphysics of the mountains and tales which aregrasped like true stories about creation and objective reality of the world, - all these attract not onlytourists but also scientists and researchers to the mountainous region. The tale is one of thepermanent attributes of people`s life. It gives the opportunity to make the process of emotional andmoral development more controlled and determined. The common feature of the tale is identified:it is the presence of a hero-trickster - Jack (the Appalachians) and Ivan (the Carpathians). In tales,most of the fictional characters can be described by the term “duality”. It is a certain state ofconsciousness when the hero-character reproduces his double that lives an imaginary life andperforms an intended role. It is a hero who is often hidden behind the mask of a jester and a foolishman. He does not live according to the rules. He breaks both laws and rules, but achieves positiveresults. The common and different features of the Trickster in the fairytales of Indians and Hutsulsare defined.

Fiction and Fictional Objects

2019 ◽  
pp. 239-266
Author(s):  
Francesco Berto ◽  
Mark Jago ◽  
Christopher Badura
Keyword(s):  
Impossible Worlds ◽  
Main Topic ◽  
Fictional Characters ◽  
Truth In Fiction ◽  
Fictional Objects ◽  
Fictional Entities

This chapter begins with the problem of what counts as true in a given fiction, beyond what’s explicitly given in that fiction. It then considers the problem of inconsistent fictions, which are naturally handled using impossible worlds. An account of truth in fiction is presented, which develops one of Lewis’s analyses into an approach which can handle inconsistent fictions with ease. The chapter then turns to the second main topic: how we should think about fictional entities. Realism and fictionalism about fictional characters are contrasted. A third option is then considered, which takes the Meinongian line that fictional characters are non-existent objects. Several versions of this idea and their various issues are discussed.

Fictional Entities

Fiction ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 120-149
Author(s):  
Catharine Abell
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Fictional Entities ◽  
Metaphysical Dependence ◽  
Amie Thomasson

This chapter addresses the existence and nature of fictional entities. It identifies two distinct conditions sufficient for the existence of fictional entities, each of which is grounded by a reference-fixing rule of fiction institutions. One of these rules describes conditions sufficient for the existence of fictional entities that are not constituted by anything, while the other describes conditions sufficient for the existence of fictional entities that are constituted by other things. It identifies the metaphysical dependence base for the existence of fictional entities and argues that this does not include anything metaphysically mysterious. It then describes the nature of fictional entities and their identity and individuation conditions. Finally, it compares the account fictional entities provided with that of Amie Thomasson and argues that, despite obvious similarities, there are fundamental differences between the accounts.

Sexual Consent and Having Sex Together

2020 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 619-644
Author(s):  
Karamvir Chadha
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Sexual Consent ◽  
Moral Rights ◽  
Law Reform ◽  
Common Sense View ◽  
The Common ◽  
Hybrid Account

Abstract Some influential theorists have recently argued that if sex is in some sense ideal, then each partner’s consent is unnecessary: even absent each partner’s consent, neither partner infringes the other’s moral rights. I challenge a key premise in their argument for this alarming conclusion. I instead defend the Common-sense View: if you have sex with someone without their consent, you thereby infringe that person’s moral rights. In the course of defending the Common-sense View, I develop what I call the Hybrid Account of Consent. The Hybrid Account retains the benefits of two existing accounts of consent while avoiding their shortcomings. I close by suggesting some benefits of my alternative picture and some implications for law reform.

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