The impact of supply chain disruption on the closed-loop supply chain configuration profit: a study of sourcing policies

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

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Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Competing Retailers under Government Reward-Penalty Mechanism and Asymmetric Information

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society ◽

10.1155/2020/7587453 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 2020 ◽

pp. 1-20 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Xiao-qing Zhang ◽

Xi-gang Yuan ◽

Da-lin Zhang

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Asymmetric Information ◽

Recovery Rate ◽

Carbon Emission ◽

Closed Loop ◽

Retail Price ◽

Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽

Weee Recycling ◽

The Impact ◽

Decentralized Model

In manufacturer-led closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with two competing retailers, the retailer-1 recycles WEEE whose fixed recycling cost is asymmetric information. Using dynamics game theory and principal-agent theory, three dynamic game models are built including (1) benchmark model without reward-penalty mechanism (RPM); (2) decentralized model with carbon emission RPM; (3) decentralized model with carbon emission RPM and recovery rate RPM. This paper discusses the influence of RPM and retailers competition on the CLSC and members benefits. The results show that (1) the carbon emission RPM increases retail price, but decreases the WEEE recycling motivation usually. On the contrary, the recovery rate RPM guides WEEE recycling and lowers the retail price effectively. (2) In any case, the retailer-1’s profit is higher than that of the retailer-2; apparently it suggests that the retailer recycling WEEE gains competitive advantages. Furthermore, both the recovery rate RPM and retailers competition are beneficial to improve the competitive advantage. The relationship between two retailers’ retail price is affected by many complicated factors. (3) The WEEE buyback price and WEEE recovery rate with high fixed recycling cost (H-type) are always higher than that of low fixed recycling cost (L-type), respectively, which means that the H-type fixed recycling cost has scale advantages; the greater the reward-penalty intensity and the fiercer the competition, the more obvious the scale advantages under certain condition. (4) The retailers’ competition can not only guide WEEE recycling but also improve retailers’ profits. Meanwhile, the impact of competition on the manufacturer is related to RPM, but the fierce competition decreases the manufacturer’s profit.

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Analysis of the Value of Information and Coordination in a Dyadic Closed Loop Supply Chain

Sustainability ◽

10.3390/su12208398 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 12 (20) ◽

pp. 8398

Author(s):

Juan Pedro Sepúlveda-Rojas ◽

Rodrigo Ternero

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Supply Chain ◽

Value Of Information ◽

Closed Loop ◽

Local Optimization ◽

Supply Chain Performance ◽

Optimization Approach ◽

Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽

Definition Of ◽

The Impact

Purpose: This article analyzes the value of information and coordination in a closed loop supply chain (CLSC) and discusses the benefits of a global or local optimization approach and the impact of uncertainty. Methodology: A theoretical dyadic closed loop supply chain is analyzed where the manufacturer re-manufactures products returned by customers, producing “as good as new products” for the retailer. Twelve coordination scenarios were analyzed. For the definition of these scenarios, a framework based on two criteria was proposed: value of information and perimeter of decision making. Findings: Information on returns leads to lower costs than information on demand. In the presence of complete or partial coordination between the actors in the supply chain, it is preferable to have low product return rates. However, if we are in the complete absence of coordination, high rates of return are more convenient as they function as a buffer against uncertainties. The perimeter of decision making (global or local optimization) does not significantly improve the supply chain performance in relation to its costs. Only the exchange of information improves its performance. Therefore, companies should make efforts to exchange information, first, on their lot sizes, then on their returns and finally, on the customer demand. Originality: The novelty of our work relies on an analysis of the closed loop supply chain performance with the simultaneous presence of information, coordination, and uncertainty.

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Study on the impact of value density on profits of closed-loop supply chain with nonlinear demand

2011 International Conference on E-Business and E-Government (ICEE) ◽

10.1109/icebeg.2011.5881838 ◽

2011 ◽

Author(s):

Wang Duihua ◽

Song Guofang

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Closed Loop ◽

Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽

The Impact

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