scholarly journals Analysis of the Value of Information and Coordination in a Dyadic Closed Loop Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (20) ◽  
pp. 8398
Author(s):  
Juan Pedro Sepúlveda-Rojas ◽  
Rodrigo Ternero
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Value Of Information ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Local Optimization ◽  
Supply Chain Performance ◽  
Optimization Approach ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Impact

Purpose: This article analyzes the value of information and coordination in a closed loop supply chain (CLSC) and discusses the benefits of a global or local optimization approach and the impact of uncertainty. Methodology: A theoretical dyadic closed loop supply chain is analyzed where the manufacturer re-manufactures products returned by customers, producing “as good as new products” for the retailer. Twelve coordination scenarios were analyzed. For the definition of these scenarios, a framework based on two criteria was proposed: value of information and perimeter of decision making. Findings: Information on returns leads to lower costs than information on demand. In the presence of complete or partial coordination between the actors in the supply chain, it is preferable to have low product return rates. However, if we are in the complete absence of coordination, high rates of return are more convenient as they function as a buffer against uncertainties. The perimeter of decision making (global or local optimization) does not significantly improve the supply chain performance in relation to its costs. Only the exchange of information improves its performance. Therefore, companies should make efforts to exchange information, first, on their lot sizes, then on their returns and finally, on the customer demand. Originality: The novelty of our work relies on an analysis of the closed loop supply chain performance with the simultaneous presence of information, coordination, and uncertainty.

scholarly journals A Green Closed-Loop Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism Based on Third-Party Recycling

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (19) ◽  
pp. 5335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiafu Su ◽  
Chi Li ◽  
Qingjun Zeng ◽  
Jiaquan Yang ◽  
Jie Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
The Impact

Taking an environment-friendly green closed-loop supply chain as the research object, this work established a two-stage closed-loop supply chain game model. Considering the influence of the environmental protection input on the whole supply chain, there are different decisions among the participants in the supply chain, and the different choices will have impacts on the benefits of the whole supply chain when manufacturers select a closed-loop supply chain model of third-party recycling. Hence, this work compared and analyzed the impact of centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making on the returns and pricing strategies of each participant. Finally, an optimized cooperative mechanism decision model considering a cost profit sharing contract was further designed. The model is conducive to obtaining the maximum profit value in centralized decision-making and avoids the negative impact of a “double marginal effect” on supply chain income in decentralized decision-making, and finally, improves the overall coordination and profit of a green closed-loop supply chain. The numerical examples are conducted to verify the effectiveness and practicality of the proposed models. This work provides a helpful decision support and guidance for enterprises and the government on the used products recycling decisions to better manage the green closed-loop supply chain.

scholarly journals DfRem-Driven Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making: A Systematic Framework for Modeling Research

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (12) ◽  
pp. 3299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shuiye Niu ◽  
Honglong Zhuo ◽  
Kelei Xue
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Research Issues ◽  
Design Elements ◽  
Research Framework ◽  
Chain Operation ◽  
Supply Chain Operation ◽  
The Impact

With the prevalence of a circular economy, extended producer responsibility, and the maturity of intelligent manufacturing technology, Design for Remanufacture (DfRem) has become a new driving force for the profitability of the modern supply chain. DfRem activities occur at the stage of new product design but have a significant impact on subsequent remanufacturing operations. Based on the closed-loop supply chain operation systems with DfRem, we systematically explored the impact of DfRem on supply chain operation decisions through a case study and modeling analysis and built up a modeling research framework of DfRem-driven closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) operation decision-making. Our research identified DfRem-driven model design elements and discussed the modeling of DfRem-driven investment decision problems, involving different approaches to obtain DfRem investment (i.e., DfRem-driven horizontal or vertical supply chain cooperation) and the ownership of DfRem-level decision-making rights. Moreover, the DfRem-driven two-stage and multi-period modeling processes are elaborated in detail. The aim of this paper is to provide other scholars with a more comprehensive understanding of DfRem research issues, and to establish an integrated DfRem-driven research framework for subsequent scholars to better conduct modeling research on DfRem.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Competing Retailers under Government Reward-Penalty Mechanism and Asymmetric Information

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiao-qing Zhang ◽  
Xi-gang Yuan ◽  
Da-lin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Recovery Rate ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Weee Recycling ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Decentralized Model

In manufacturer-led closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with two competing retailers, the retailer-1 recycles WEEE whose fixed recycling cost is asymmetric information. Using dynamics game theory and principal-agent theory, three dynamic game models are built including (1) benchmark model without reward-penalty mechanism (RPM); (2) decentralized model with carbon emission RPM; (3) decentralized model with carbon emission RPM and recovery rate RPM. This paper discusses the influence of RPM and retailers competition on the CLSC and members benefits. The results show that (1) the carbon emission RPM increases retail price, but decreases the WEEE recycling motivation usually. On the contrary, the recovery rate RPM guides WEEE recycling and lowers the retail price effectively. (2) In any case, the retailer-1’s profit is higher than that of the retailer-2; apparently it suggests that the retailer recycling WEEE gains competitive advantages. Furthermore, both the recovery rate RPM and retailers competition are beneficial to improve the competitive advantage. The relationship between two retailers’ retail price is affected by many complicated factors. (3) The WEEE buyback price and WEEE recovery rate with high fixed recycling cost (H-type) are always higher than that of low fixed recycling cost (L-type), respectively, which means that the H-type fixed recycling cost has scale advantages; the greater the reward-penalty intensity and the fiercer the competition, the more obvious the scale advantages under certain condition. (4) The retailers’ competition can not only guide WEEE recycling but also improve retailers’ profits. Meanwhile, the impact of competition on the manufacturer is related to RPM, but the fierce competition decreases the manufacturer’s profit.

scholarly journals Warranty Period Decision and Coordination in Closed-Loop Supply Chains Considering Remanufacturing and Consumer Behavior

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (15) ◽  
pp. 4237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Lingfei Yu ◽  
Wei Li
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Warranty Period ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chains ◽  
Decision Making Model

The closed-loop supply chain management model is an effective way to promote sustainable economic development and environmental protection. Increasing the sales volume of remanufactured products to stimulate green growth is a key issue in the development of closed-loop supply chains. By designing an effective warranty strategy, customer’s perceived value can be enhanced and market demand can be stimulated. This study cuts through the warranty period of closed-loop supply chain products. Based on the perspective of consumer behavior, game theory is used to construct the optimal decision-making model for closed-loop supply chains. The optimal warranty decision making for new products and remanufactured products under centralized and decentralized decision-making models is discussed. Further, the impact of the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services and the design of contract coordination is also shown. We show that consumer preference has a positive impact on the sales of remanufactured products and the profits of enterprises; with the extension of the new product and remanufacturing warranty period, the profit of the supply chain system first increases and then decreases, and the value is maximized at the extreme point in the manufacturer-led decision-making model. Furthermore, the leader gains higher profits with bargaining power, but the profit of the supply chain system under decentralized decision model is less than that of the centralized decision model, reflecting the double marginalization effect. The revenue sharing contract and the two-charge contract designed in this study coordinate the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services, so that the member companies in the supply chain can achieve Pareto improvement.

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