Moral Obligation and Moral Motivation

1995 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 187-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Copp

'Internalism’ in ethics is a cluster of views according to which there is an ‘internal’ connection between moral obligations and either motivations or reasons to act morally; ‘externalism’ says that such connections are contingent. So described, the dispute between internalism and externalism may seem a technical debate of minor interest. However, the issues that motivate it include deep problems about moral truth, realism, normativity, and objectivity. Indeed, I think that some philosophers view externalism as undermining the ‘dignity’ of morality. They might say that if morality needs an ‘external sanction’ - if the belief that one has an obligation is not sufficient motive or reason to do the right thing- then morality is debased in status. Even an arbitrary system of etiquette could attract an external sanction under appropriate conditions.Although I believe that the more interesting internalist theses are false, there are important truths that internalism is attempting to capture. The most important of these is the fact that moral judgments are intrinsically ‘normative’ or ‘choice-guiding,’ that they are, very roughly, relevant to action or choice because of their content.

Acta Humana ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-136
Author(s):  
Valéria Horváth

Although the issue of climate change mitigation and adaptation is fortunately evermore widely discussed, the problems facing ‘climate refugees’ only appears sporadically in the discussions adding to the current confusion. Taking recent and forecasted trends into account, the UN declares that states have serious moral obligations to provide humanitarian protection to all those displaced. The question which the international community and international lawyers face is whether states have more than just a moral obligation to provide protection. In this paper I will assess whether or not there are any roots in the various sources of international law – such as conventional law, customary international law, or the fundamental principles of international law – for the legal definition of ‘climate refugees’.


2017 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leslie Berger ◽  
Stephen Perreault ◽  
James Wainberg

SUMMARY Recently, policy makers have focused significant attention on the use of financial rewards as a means of encouraging whistleblower reporting, e.g., the Dodd-Frank Act (U.S. House of Representatives 2010). While such incentives are meant to increase the likelihood that fraud will be reported in a timely manner, the psychological theory of motivational crowding calls this proposition into question. Motivational crowding warns that the application of financial rewards (an extrinsic motivator) can unintentionally hijack a person's moral motivation to “do the right thing” (an intrinsic motivator). Applying this theory, we conducted an experiment and found that, in certain contexts, incentive programs can inhibit whistleblower reporting to a greater extent than had no incentives been offered at all. We discuss the implications of our results for auditors, audit committees, regulators, and others charged with corporate governance. Data Availability: Available from the authors upon request.


SATS ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Sinclair

AbstractThis essay examines the largely forgotten debate from 1949 between Dewey and White over the status of value judgments. It argues that White does not criticize Dewey’s moral philosophy as a misguided attempt to derive an “ought” from “is”, rather he maintains that Dewey’s ethical naturalism cannot provide an empirical definition of moral judgments that preserves their status as moral obligations. Although White is mistaken in presenting Dewey’s view as a failed theory of moral obligation, Dewey’s reply suggests that White is correct in understanding the connections between scientific and moral inquiry in normative terms. This further reveals that value judgments concerning what we should do, what Dewey calls “practical judgments”, are not moral obligations as White suggests, but are fallible directives for addressing problems disruptive of human activity. By presenting Dewey’s view as a failed attempt to reduce moral terms to an acceptable empirical vocabulary, White assumes a logical separation between the descriptive and that normative that is untenable from the perspective of Dewey’s account of human inquiry.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melanie Killen ◽  
Audun Dahl

Abstract Morality has two key features: (1) moral judgments are not solely determined by what your group thinks, and (2) moral judgments are often applied to members of other groups as well as your own group. Cooperative motives do not explain how young children reject unfairness, and assert moral obligations, both inside and outside their groups. Resistance and experience with conflicts, alongside cooperation, is key to the emergence and development of moral obligation.


2019 ◽  
pp. 84-108
Author(s):  
Brian Weatherson

This chapter argues against the popular view that acting in accordance with one’s principles excuses moral wrongdoing. That is, if one is ignorant of the moral truth, and that ignorance explains one’s wrong actions in the right way, one shouldn’t be blamed for doing the wrong thing. One objection I raise is that there is no good way to make sense of the notion of the ignorance explaining the action in the right way. Another, linking back to the discussion of moral motivation, is that it is rare for moral ignorance to lead to wrong action in the absence of some other blameworthy moral failing. But the chapter ends on a concessive note; there are some rare cases where a false moral belief could excuse certain wrong actions.


1989 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 35-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Doherty

CFA Magazine ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 13-14
Author(s):  
Crystal Detamore
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Janne Rothmar Herrmann

This chapter discusses the right to avoid procreation and the regulation of pregnancy from a European perspective. The legal basis for a right to avoid procreation can be said to fall within the scope of several provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), an instrument that is binding for all European countries. Here, Article 12 of the ECHR gives men and women of marriageable age the right to marry and found a family in accordance with the national laws governing this right. However, Article 12 protects some elements of the right not to procreate, but for couples only. The lack of common European consensus in this area highlights how matters relating to the right to decide on the number and spacing of children touch on aspects that differ from country to country even in what could appear to be a homogenous region. In fact, the cultural, moral, and historical milieus that surround these rights differ considerably with diverse national perceptions of the role of the family, gender equality, religious and moral obligations, and so on.


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