Blame and Moral Ignorance

2019 ◽  
pp. 84-108
Author(s):  
Brian Weatherson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Moral Belief ◽  
Moral Truth ◽  
Moral Ignorance ◽  
Wrong Thing ◽  
Popular View ◽  
The Right ◽  
Wrong Action

This chapter argues against the popular view that acting in accordance with one’s principles excuses moral wrongdoing. That is, if one is ignorant of the moral truth, and that ignorance explains one’s wrong actions in the right way, one shouldn’t be blamed for doing the wrong thing. One objection I raise is that there is no good way to make sense of the notion of the ignorance explaining the action in the right way. Another, linking back to the discussion of moral motivation, is that it is rare for moral ignorance to lead to wrong action in the absence of some other blameworthy moral failing. But the chapter ends on a concessive note; there are some rare cases where a false moral belief could excuse certain wrong actions.

On Knowing What’s Right and Being Responsible for It

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Philosophy Of Action ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Epistemic Condition ◽  
Moral Ignorance ◽  
Wrong Thing ◽  
The Right ◽  
Central Claim

The debate about whether moral responsibility has an epistemic condition has traditionally focused on whether and, if so, when moral ignorance can provide an excuse for wrong actions. This chapter takes up the question of moral responsibility for right actions. Its central claim is that whether an agent is morally responsible for her right action depends on whether she knows what the right thing is to do. The chapter’s argument for this appeals to considerations from the philosophy of action. It argues that moral knowledge matters to moral evaluations because it is a central ingredient in intentional action. Our knowledge of what the right and wrong thing is to do partly determines whether we do the right or wrong thing intentionally. Moral responsibility inherits its epistemic condition from the epistemic condition on intentional action.

Moral Obligation and Moral Motivation

1995 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 187-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Copp
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Truth ◽  
Arbitrary System ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Internal Connection ◽  
The Right ◽  
Do The Right Thing

'Internalism’ in ethics is a cluster of views according to which there is an ‘internal’ connection between moral obligations and either motivations or reasons to act morally; ‘externalism’ says that such connections are contingent. So described, the dispute between internalism and externalism may seem a technical debate of minor interest. However, the issues that motivate it include deep problems about moral truth, realism, normativity, and objectivity. Indeed, I think that some philosophers view externalism as undermining the ‘dignity’ of morality. They might say that if morality needs an ‘external sanction’ - if the belief that one has an obligation is not sufficient motive or reason to do the right thing- then morality is debased in status. Even an arbitrary system of etiquette could attract an external sanction under appropriate conditions.Although I believe that the more interesting internalist theses are false, there are important truths that internalism is attempting to capture. The most important of these is the fact that moral judgments are intrinsically ‘normative’ or ‘choice-guiding,’ that they are, very roughly, relevant to action or choice because of their content.

scholarly journals «The Right Thing» and «The Wrong Thing» as a Result of Discerning Signals

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-173
Author(s):  
Tatiana Muzychuk ◽  
Igor Anokhov
Keyword(s):  
External Noise ◽  
Wrong Thing ◽  
Physical Level ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Right

The article is dedicated to studying the process of information perception by an individual. A hypothesis is suggested that the environment that surrounds an individual is full of different signals, which have na­tural, social or technogenic origin. Separate signals can turn into information, if the recipient is able of discerning these signals and perceives them on the physical, intellectual, emotional and axiological levels of information perception. Whereas the complex of signals which are indiscernible for an individual are external noise. The authors state that interpretation of a signal by individuals begins on the physical level of perception which is necessary to synchronize their activity with that of the source of the signal. After that the individual has to move to the axiological level of information perception in order to coordinate the notions and meanings with the source of the signal. Furthermore, the authors substantiate the possibility of revealing two components in the structure of the discerned signal: «The Right Thing» and «The Wrong Thing» as an inherent beginning of any process of perceiving the outside world by an individual. The suggested hypothesis is illustrated in the article by the example of two kinds of information message: a painting by A. Deyneka and a poem by A. Blok which are studied in terms of the proposed hypothesis about the existence of levels of information perception and the possibility of discerning two basic elements in them: «The Right Thing» and «The Wrong Thing». The results of the research can be applied to improve the process of communicating and perceiving information.

The Enabling Model of Rights

1993 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 381-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lesley Jacobs
Keyword(s):  
State Action ◽  
Wrong Thing ◽  
State Welfare ◽  
The Right

The belief that state welfare programmes are justified because they enable many people to do what they could not otherwise have done is attractive. This article examines the claim that this belief flows logically from a particular account of what it means to have a right to do something. This enabling model of rights holds that rights can be violated in two ways: by interfering with people doing something they have a right to do and depriving the right-holders of the resources actually needed to do what they have a right to do. Having certain rights to do things can justify state action designed to provide people with the resources that enable them to do what they could not otherwise have done. However attractive this model of rights might be, it is unable to accommodate the possibility that an individual can have the right to do something which is the morally wrong thing to do.

scholarly journals Correction: Assigning the right credit to the wrong action: compulsivity in the general population is associated with augmented outcome-irrelevant value-based learning

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nitzan Shahar ◽  
Tobias U. Hauser ◽  
Rani Moran ◽  
Michael Moutoussis ◽  
Edward Bullmore ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
General Population ◽  
The Right ◽  
Wrong Action

When is Failure to Realize Something Exculpatory?

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Truth ◽  
Sufficient Evidence ◽  
Moral Ignorance ◽  
Is Failure

Sometimes one has sufficient evidence for p, but one simply does not realize that p is true. In some of these cases, the failure to realize is exculpatory. In other cases, it is not. In general, failures to realize the moral truth are not exculpatory. This chapter argues that the principle that gives the correct explanation of blameworthiness in certain moral ignorance cases cannot account for the blamelessness of agents who know their actions have features that suffice to make the actions wrong but who do not realize this. Though the author not think this puzzle should make us question the claims about blameworthiness that motivate it, the chapter argues that the view that moral ignorance is not exculpatory faces this important puzzle and that more work is needed to solve it.

Hijacking the Moral Imperative: How Financial Incentives Can Discourage Whistleblower Reporting

2017 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leslie Berger ◽  
Stephen Perreault ◽  
James Wainberg
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Financial Incentives ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Psychological Theory ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Incentive Programs ◽  
The Right ◽  
Do The Right Thing

SUMMARY Recently, policy makers have focused significant attention on the use of financial rewards as a means of encouraging whistleblower reporting, e.g., the Dodd-Frank Act (U.S. House of Representatives 2010). While such incentives are meant to increase the likelihood that fraud will be reported in a timely manner, the psychological theory of motivational crowding calls this proposition into question. Motivational crowding warns that the application of financial rewards (an extrinsic motivator) can unintentionally hijack a person's moral motivation to “do the right thing” (an intrinsic motivator). Applying this theory, we conducted an experiment and found that, in certain contexts, incentive programs can inhibit whistleblower reporting to a greater extent than had no incentives been offered at all. We discuss the implications of our results for auditors, audit committees, regulators, and others charged with corporate governance. Data Availability: Available from the authors upon request.

scholarly journals Mexico and the tobacco industry: doing the wrong thing for the right reason?

BMJ ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 332 (7537) ◽  
pp. 353-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Samet ◽  
Heather Wipfli ◽  
Rogelio Perez-Padilla ◽  
Derek Yach
Keyword(s):  
Tobacco Industry ◽  
Wrong Thing ◽  
Right Reason ◽  
The Right
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