Interview: Diane Randall, director general of the Friends Committee on National Legislation, discusses restraining the US defense budget

2021 ◽  
Vol 77 (5) ◽  
pp. 244-248
Author(s):  
John Mecklin
2000 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Micky Tripathi

This paper examines the political activity of US defense contractors over the years 1980–1994. Using econometric techniques to account for both fixed-effects and selection, I examine the industry determinants and distribution patterns of political action committee (PAC) contributions to the US House of Representatives. The analysis finds that the size of the defense budget is a primary factor explaining political activity across the industry as well as within individual firms; firm size, dependency on defense, and defense contract awards explain much less. I also find that firms appeared to change their political strategies in the face of large exogenous shifts in the US defense budget. While defense expenditures were on the rise, defense firms spread their contributions relatively broadly over the defense committee system; when the budget fell, however, the firms switched strategies and targeted committee leaders. An incidental contribution of the paper is an empirical application of the trimmed least absolute deviations estimator for fixed-effects models with selection.


2013 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-317
Author(s):  
James Grymes

In the years following World War II, Ernő Dohnányi was falsely accused of being a war criminal. Although scholars have assumed that this smear campaign was the result of a conspiracy by the entire Hungarian musical community, this widely accepted belief overlooks a number of prominent Hungarian musicians who consistently came to Dohnányi’s defense. In 1945, Zoltán Kodály led a delegation of musicians from the Franz Liszt Academy of Music who convinced the Hungarian Minister of Justice to remove Dohnányi’s name from an unofficial list of war criminals. In the following year, Kodály and Ede Zathureczky, who had succeeded Dohnányi as the Director General of the Liszt Academy, wrote letters to the US military government in support of Dohnányi’s rehabilitation. Finally, in 1949, Zathureczky obtained confirmation from the Ministry of Justice that the investigation of Dohnányi had been terminated—a message that Kodály himself communicated to Dohnányi. Drawing on documents from the Liszt Academy archives and the Dohnányi estate, this article chronicles the previously unknown Hungarian defense of Ernő Dohnányi.


Author(s):  
Yoneyuki Sugita

This chapter analyzes what made it possible for Japan to implement “constrained rearmament” despite strong pressure domestically and from the United States to carry out rapid rearmament. There are two important factors that led to Japan's establishing firm ground for constrained rearmament from the late 1950s onward. The first of these is the US strategic preference for securing military bases in Japan instead of Japan's rearmament. The second is the implementation of tight-money policies precipitated by the Dodge Line of 1949, which culminated in a one-trillion-yen budget for Japan in 1954. The level and scope of rearmament hinged upon the defense budget or, more generally, Japan's fiscal policy.


Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig

This chapter analyzes the cost of the US nuclear arsenal. Many analysts have argued that a robust nuclear arsenal is unaffordable, but this chapter shows that this view is incorrect. It reviews the arguments made by those in favor of reducing spending on US nuclear weapons and moves on to present the counterargument about why the US nuclear force is affordable. It shows that nuclear weapons represent a small percentage of overall US defense spending and that roughly five percent of the US defense budget is not too much to spend for a strategic deterrent. The United States can afford to maintain and modernize its nuclear forces and, indeed, they come at a good value.


Author(s):  
Christopher S. Bajwa ◽  
Earl P. Easton ◽  
Nancy L. Osgood ◽  
Ronald B. Pope

The US regulations for certification of Type B packages are based in large part on those of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); however, the US has chosen to differ (or deviate) in some respects, from the IAEA regulations based on its national legislation, its technical experience, and efforts to minimize burden on shippers of radioactive materials in the US. This paper will provide a brief overview of some of the differences between 10 CFR Part 71 “Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material”, as implemented January 2008, and IAEA TS-R-1 “Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material”, 2005 edition, discuss some of the differences between the two sets of regulations, and the reasons for those differences.


2021 ◽  
pp. 44-84
Author(s):  
Michael E. O’Hanlon

This chapter dissects the US defense budget, as well as various matters in the broader field of defense economics. It provides methodologies for understanding how different defense strategies and military force postures affect that budget. The chapter also explores various ways the defense budget can be categorized, broken down, and defined. It examines issues like military readiness — how the Department of Defense ensures that its forces are ready-to-go for crises that may emerge quickly. The chapter then looks into the economics of military bases, at home and abroad. It discusses military acquisition, modernization, and innovation. The chapter then shifts to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) figures, and analyses how they provide the backbone of the cost estimates. It highlights the core of this section — understanding the costs of US Department of Defense's (DoD) force structure by type of unit. This is probably the core of defense budgeting methodology for those seeking to understand the fiscal implications of a given defense strategy and force structure. Ultimately, the chapter investigates how two different concepts of grand strategy and/or military policy might be translated into force structure, weapons acquisition, and budget plans.


2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-184
Author(s):  
Amy Garrigues

On September 15, 2003, the US. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that agreements between pharmaceutical and generic companies not to compete are not per se unlawful if these agreements do not expand the existing exclusionary right of a patent. The Valley DrugCo.v.Geneva Pharmaceuticals decision emphasizes that the nature of a patent gives the patent holder exclusive rights, and if an agreement merely confirms that exclusivity, then it is not per se unlawful. With this holding, the appeals court reversed the decision of the trial court, which held that agreements under which competitors are paid to stay out of the market are per se violations of the antitrust laws. An examination of the Valley Drugtrial and appeals court decisions sheds light on the two sides of an emerging legal debate concerning the validity of pay-not-to-compete agreements, and more broadly, on the appropriate balance between the seemingly competing interests of patent and antitrust laws.


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