“An Entirely New War”

This chapter shows how the Korean War meaningfully altered the course of the United States’ early Cold War grand strategy: in 1950, amidst the burgeoning superpower rivalry, the United States had embraced a version of containment that relied primarily on political and economic tools, enabling the United States to continue unwinding its wartime posture through demobilization, limited national security spending, and reliance on a small nuclear arsenal to deter attacks on its core interests in Western Europe and Japan. The Korean War called each of these premises into question, recasting American assessments of the Cold War balance of power, as well as the requirements for deterrence and defense of overseas commitments. By the mid-1950s, the United States had massively and durably increased its military power; expanded its overseas commitments to include security guarantees to the North American Trade Organization (NATO), South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Taiwan; and accepted the necessity of forward deployment as well as a large nuclear arsenal to maintain this extended deterrent.

Nuclear warfare beyond counterforce

A counterforce attack intends to disable an opponent's nuclear arsenal to limit potential damage from that adversary. We postulate a future when hardening and deeply burying fixed sites, transition to mobile strategic systems, and improved defences make executing a counterforce strategy against an adversary's nuclear forces extremely difficult. Additionally, our postulated future has multiple nations possessing nuclear weapons. Consequently, each country needs to consider multiple actors when addressing the question of how to deter a potential adversary's nuclear attack. We examine six nuclear targeting alternatives and consider how to deter them. These strategies include nuclear demonstration, conventional military targets, and attacks consisting of communications/electronics, economic, infrastructure, and population centers that a nation might consider striking with nuclear weapons. Since these alternative strikes require only a few nuclear weapons, executing one of them would not significantly shift the balance of nuclear forces. The attacking country's remaining nuclear forces may inhibit the attacked country or its allies from responding. How can nations deter these limited nuclear attacks? Potentially, threatening economic counter-strikes seems to be the best alternative. How might escalation be controlled in the event of a limited attack? Other instruments of power, such as political or economic, might be employed to bolster deterrence against these types of nuclear strikes.

Dwight Eisenhower

Assessments of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s performance as the Supreme Allied Commander during World War II and the nation’s thirty-fourth president have evolved across the more than seventy-five years from the conclusion of World War II in 1945 to the dedication in 2020 of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial in Washington, DC. Historians have sought to explain Eisenhower’s unlikely rise from his modest upbringing in Abilene, Kansas, to his ascendance to command of western allies in the European theater. Selected over several senior officers in 1942 to command the invasion of North Africa (Operation Torch), Eisenhower initially experienced a series of setbacks and controversies resulting from inexperienced troops, incompetent subordinate leaders, a formidable enemy, and political deals with leaders of Vichy France. Although historians continue to debate his decisions regarding command and strategy in the European theater, they generally praise Eisenhower’s ability to maintain the western alliance amid national rivalries, professional jealousies, strong personalities, and competing political ambitions. Assessments of Eisenhower’s performance as president have undergone a remarkable transformation. Initially ranked in 1961 near the bottom in assessments of presidential leadership, he currently appears within the top tier. Initial accounts in the 1960s portrayed Eisenhower as a bumbling, docile president who appeared to be out of touch with the basic policies and operations of his administration. He appeared unwilling to address the major issues confronting American society, and to defer to his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, on matters of foreign policy and national security. For his critics, Eisenhower perilously, inflexibly, and imprudently relied upon the superiority of the nation’s nuclear arsenal to contain communist expansion, then allowed the Soviet Union to beat the United States into space and create a missile gap. Scholars collectively labeled “Eisenhower Revisionists” assessing declassified documents beginning in the mid-1970s forged a revised consensus that Eisenhower was clearly thoughtful, informed, and firmly in command of his administration. Moreover, the nation’s nuclear arsenal retained and even strengthened its predominance of power. “Postrevisionist” analysts generally concur that Eisenhower was clearly the dominant decision-maker and developed an effective policy development process, but they question the efficacy of some of his decisions and policies, including his management of crises in this dangerous period of the Cold War, his increased use of covert operations and propaganda, his approach to decolonization, and his efforts to ease tensions and slow the nuclear arms race.

ALWAYS AT WAR: AN ANALYSIS OF FEAR IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICS

A culture always at war, America’s political discourse has become saturated with hatred and fear. The establishment media, which once thrived on gathering information, exists solely for anxiety promotion. Confirmation of our greatest fears, from economic collapse to nuclear annihilation, is projected unfiltered on every platform, tailored to match what scares us most. As we like and we share, our fears grow exponentially, leaving us stuck in a frozen state of paranoia. Fear is everywhere. We are afraid Trump will start a war with North Korea, relying on Kim Jong-Un to be a rational actor. We’re also afraid Kim will unleash his nuclear arsenal on America and rely on Trump’s rational diplomacy to keep international security in check. We’re afraid Trump is a Russian puppet and hope the Mueller probe will save us from the death of our democracy. We fear the political goals of Democrats, who hope to overturn a legitimate election using a fake Russia investigation. We’re worried the fascist government will suppress free speech and we’re worried the government isn’t doing enough to suppress free speech to stop hate. There are too many guns for children to be safe, and not enough guns for teachers to protect us. We want to elect more women, people of color, LGBTQ individuals, and Muslims to preserve their rights. We fear women, people of color, LGBTQ individuals, and Muslims as we want to preserve our rights. We are afraid of migrants leaping into our borders and we are terrified of the government cracking down on innocent refugees on the border. As we hyperventilate over an infinite amount of threats, we lash out and grasp whatever form of defense lies closest.

Triangularity of nuclear arms control: Possible implications of China's involvement in nuclear arms talks

Beijing explains its firm unwillingness to join the United States and Russia in nuclear arms control talks by the fact that China’s nuclear arsenal is incomparable with respective potentials of the world’s two leading nuclear powers. China urges Russia and the U.S. to go ahead with the nuclear disarmament process on a bilateral basis, and promises it will be prepared to consider the possibility of its participation in the negotiations only when its counterparts have downgraded their arsenals approximately to China’s level. Washington finds this totally unacceptable and demands that China either join the existing Russian-U.S. strategic New START treaty right away or agree to enter into a trilateral nuclear arms control format. This article studies the prospects of China’s involvement in nuclear arms talks and analyzes the true reasons behind Beijing’s desire to avoid any nuclear disarmament deals at this point. The working hypothesis of this paper is that China’s stance on the above issue is by no means far-fetched or propagandistic, and that it is driven by fundamental political, military and strategic considerations. Disregard for this factor and further forceful efforts to bring China to the negotiating table to discuss nuclear arms control will lead to failure.

MAD and Taboo: US Expert Views on Nuclear Deterrence, Coercion, and Non-Use Norms

This research note reports views on nuclear deterrence, coercion, and non-use norms from surveys of 320 current and former US national security officials and 1,303 US-based international relations scholars. It finds that both groups hold relatively optimistic views on these key issues. Majorities express confidence that nuclear weapons are useful for deterrence, but are skeptical that a nuclear arsenal can translate into coercive foreign policy success. Respondents are also confident that the nuclear taboo constrains countries from using nuclear weapons in a first strike, but the intensity varies by the country in question. Although limited, the results demonstrate overlap between academics and policymakers on key nuclear concepts. To the extent that experts hold these topline nuclear views that can influence their decision-making, teaching, and research. The results also point to a common tension in thinking about deterrence against conventional attack and norms constraining nuclear first use.

Pyongyang will become poorer but better armed

Significance Supreme leader Kim Jong-un’s nine-hour Party speech was unyielding on all fronts. A new Five-Year Plan is to be achieved by increasing state control and self-reliance. The United States remains the “biggest enemy”. Kim pledged to expand Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal further. Impacts Much of Kim’s new weapons wish-list appears hypothetical; January’s parade, unlike one in October, revealed little that was new. Economic renewal using old, failed methods will not work; North Korea will grow yet more dependent on China, uncomfortably. Seoul’s hopes of renewing ties are wishful thinking; Kim will await a new South Korean president, to be elected in March 2022.

Rola broni nuklearnej w izraelskiej strategii odstraszania militarnego

The aim of the article is to answer the question: What role does nuclear weapon play in Israeli strategy of deterrence? The main hypothesis of the paper is based on the assumption, that the deterrence potential of the Israeli nuclear arsenal is strictly determined by deliberate ambiguity (so-called amimut). The author also assumes that nuclear deterrence plays a significant role in the general Israeli deterrence strategy. However, due to the changing nature of threats, it is not its core element. The author used the following theoretical research methods: critical analysis and comparative analysis of sources, scientific studies, strategic documents as well as selected speeches of the Israeli authorities. This article can be seen as an attempt to capture the specifics of the Israeli nuclear deterrence strategy and the features that distinguish it from deterrence of other nuclear states.