Natural languages, numerals, formal languages, maps, diagrams, graphs, and pictures are all representations. Traditionally, philosophical discussion has divided these representations into two groups: imagistic and linguistic. Just as there are many natural and formal languages that fit on the linguistic side of this divide, there are many kinds of images. In what follows, then, “image” is meant to refer to the broad class of nonlinguistic representations that all seem to have much in common. There might be representations that are neither imagistic nor linguistic, and many representations are hybrids that partake of more than one kind. Focusing on images is not the same thing as focusing on pictures. (See the separate Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy entry on “Depiction.”) Pictures are images, but so are maps, graphs, radar images, and the like. So an account of pictures can be consistent with many accounts of images, just as an account of images can be consistent with more than one theory of pictures. There are very few accounts of images in this general sense, so the following does not include a section devoted to that topic. Instead, this entry traces the evolving interest in images and looks at the most prominent topics that have occupied philosophers over the last half century or so. One topic not covered here is the use of images in science. For that topic, see the separate Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy entry on “Scientific Representation.”
Similarity and Scientific Representation
