Party institutionalization, authoritarian regime types and women’s political equality

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Lars Pelke
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-35
Author(s):  
Graeme Gill

This chapter outlines the established view of the way leadership in an authoritarian regime operates, emphasizing its arbitrary and violent dimensions. It criticizes this literature in terms of both its assumptions and its empirical accuracy. The chapter then discusses the key concepts used in the following analysis. It identifies five regime types: single party, electoral authoritarian, military, monarchy and personal dictatorship. It then discusses the nature of authoritarian leadership, conceived in terms of an oligarchy, including the bases upon which personal power can rest. The chapter discusses the nature of rules, introducing the three types of rules identified as central to the conduct of oligarch politics: operational, relational and constitutive rules. An explanation of the structure and a chapter summary of the book follows. An appendix to this chapter lists the twenty-nine rules identified as structuring leadership politics in authoritarian regimes.


2019 ◽  
Vol 37 (5) ◽  
pp. 559-579 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abel Escribà-Folch ◽  
Tobias Böhmelt ◽  
Ulrich Pilster

How do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types. Personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler. They thus have strong incentives to coup-proof and, as we contend, counterbalancing seems particularly attractive. Quantitative analyses of autocratic regimes’ counterbalancing efforts since the 1960s provide support for this expectation. By showing that institutional coup-proofing significantly varies across autocratic forms of government, we contribute to the literature on comparative authoritarianism and civil–military relations.


2013 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Wahman ◽  
Jan Teorell ◽  
Axel Hadenius

Author(s):  
Erica Frantz

How Do Authoritarian Regimes Differ from One Another? Authoritarian regimes sometimes can seem more different from one another than they are from democracies. As an extreme example, take two authoritarian regimes that have governed in southern Africa for the bulk of the last few decades...


2021 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 74-97
Author(s):  
Gerald M. Easter

As Russia’s post-communist regime descends deeper into authoritarianism, protest politics has become a regular feature of the political landscape. As such, President Putin increasingly faces the “dictator’s dilemma”: How much coercion to deploy against protesters without incurring a social backlash against the regime? That question more generally is now part of analytical consideration in comparative scholarship on social movements and contentious politics. This article contributes to the comparative discussion, first, through an elaboration of an original conceptual typology of protest-policing strategies, applicable to democratic and authoritarian regime types. Second, the article applies this conceptual scheme to Russia to illustrate the variant protest-policing strategies employed during the post-communist period. The research explains how Putin’s authoritarian regime responded to the challenge of the dictator’s dilemma by enacting protest-policing reforms. Inspired by policing trends in the Western democracies, these reforms entail a shift from confrontation-based to containment-based tactics. The article shows variation and adaptation in the way protesters were policed across Russia’s transition from unconsolidated democracy to consolidated authoritarianism. Finally, the article suggests the consequences of protest-policing reform for the ruling regime.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Enrico Arona

Five chapters constitute this essay: 1) In an international context of and transitional (in)justice in post-war and in post-authoritarian regime context, after presenting an overview of the relation between conflict and institutional evolution, firstly I will turn to the interdependence of justice and virtue. Secondly, the Kelsen’s ideas of the demise of sovereignty will be examined, along with these problems: how should citizens react to the fall of a non-democratic regime? How should they initiate reconstruction in a country where conflicts are coming to an end? 2) Even if Western societies today are marked by a broad liberal consensus in favour of toleration, here, starting from the “inegalitarian charge”, I will attack toleration as an egalitarian ideal, concluding by appealing to “right to interference” criterion. 3) How should non-liberal people be treated in liberal societies? To which extent can illiberal views be tolerated? Criticizing Rawls, I reject the use of mere reasonableness, arguing that is bound to fail. 4) Instead of asking whether or not the relevant sort of institutional coercion exists, I question whether this justice requires the supply of various global public goods; I suggest that these cannot be supplied without international coercion; fourthly, I sketch some theory of global distributive (in)justice. 5) Finally, I will distinguish some aspects of political equality, rebutting an objection from legitimacy minimalism or political libertarianism.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-31
Author(s):  
Yeşim Arat

Abstract This article examines the instrumentalization of women's rights and the transformation of the gender rights regime in the context of democratic backsliding in Turkey. I show how the Islamically rooted Justice and Development Party governments and their allies used women's rights in constructing authoritarian rule and promoting a conservative gender agenda. The governing elites had different needs at different political stages and instrumentalized women's rights to meet those needs. First, they needed to legitimize their rule in a secular context, so they expanded liberal laws on women's rights. Second, in the process of backsliding, they sought to construct and legitimize their conservative ideology, so they reinterpreted existing laws to promote conservative goals. Finally, they wanted to mobilize conservative women in support of the newly authoritarian regime, so they built new institutions and marginalized existing women's NGOs. The article contributes to the literature on regime types and gender rights by shifting the focus from regime type to regime change.


2020 ◽  
pp. 003232172091464
Author(s):  
Kristin Eichhorn ◽  
Eric Linhart

Electoral turnout as an indicator of political participation, political equality and, thus, democratic performance is one of the most important variables in the study of elections. While numerous studies have contributed to the explanation of electoral turnout, the picture is still incomplete. Notably, a variable which pertains to the core of elections, the competitiveness of electoral races, is not fully understood yet. We contribute to filling this gap by accounting for different effects of competitiveness in democracies and autocracies, as well as against the background of varying institutional settings. Our analyses suggest that vote margins are a suitable measure of competitiveness, but only in democracies with plurality or majority electoral systems. Ex ante measures of competitiveness capture the concept of competitiveness more comprehensively and are applicable across electoral systems and regime types.


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