Authoritarian regime types revisited: updated data in comparative perspective

2013 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Wahman ◽  
Jan Teorell ◽  
Axel Hadenius
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-35
Author(s):  
Graeme Gill

This chapter outlines the established view of the way leadership in an authoritarian regime operates, emphasizing its arbitrary and violent dimensions. It criticizes this literature in terms of both its assumptions and its empirical accuracy. The chapter then discusses the key concepts used in the following analysis. It identifies five regime types: single party, electoral authoritarian, military, monarchy and personal dictatorship. It then discusses the nature of authoritarian leadership, conceived in terms of an oligarchy, including the bases upon which personal power can rest. The chapter discusses the nature of rules, introducing the three types of rules identified as central to the conduct of oligarch politics: operational, relational and constitutive rules. An explanation of the structure and a chapter summary of the book follows. An appendix to this chapter lists the twenty-nine rules identified as structuring leadership politics in authoritarian regimes.


2019 ◽  
Vol 37 (5) ◽  
pp. 559-579 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abel Escribà-Folch ◽  
Tobias Böhmelt ◽  
Ulrich Pilster

How do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types. Personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler. They thus have strong incentives to coup-proof and, as we contend, counterbalancing seems particularly attractive. Quantitative analyses of autocratic regimes’ counterbalancing efforts since the 1960s provide support for this expectation. By showing that institutional coup-proofing significantly varies across autocratic forms of government, we contribute to the literature on comparative authoritarianism and civil–military relations.


2021 ◽  
pp. 189-204
Author(s):  
MARTA MITROVIĆ ◽  
TATJANA VULIĆ

The Internet is a space that, contrary to its primary efforts, has not managed to escape regulation. Also, the question Can the Internet be controlled? has been replaced by the question In what way is the Internet governed?, because the possibility of control has already been confirmed. Contrary to popular belief that only authoritarian regimes use control mechanisms, even the restrictive ones, liberal countries also have the same possibilities of control and often apply them, although in a more sophisticated way. The aim of this paper is to compare internet governance in Russia, as the representative of the authoritarian regime, to the United States of America, as the representative of the liberal system, and answer the question: What are the differences in internet governance between authoritarian and liberal regimes?


2005 ◽  
Vol 70 (2) ◽  
pp. 288-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dylan Riley

What is the relationship between civic associations and authoritarian regimes? While Tocquevillian theories have concentrated mostly on the connection between civic associationism and democracy, this article develops a Gramscian approach, suggesting that a strong associational sphere can facilitate the development of authoritarian parties and hegemonic authoritarian regimes. Two countries are used for comparison, Italy from 1870 to 1926 and Spain from 1876 to 1926. The argument here is that the strength of the associational sphere in north-central Italy provided organizational resources to the fascist movement and then party. In turn, the formation of the party was a key reason why the Italian regime developed as a hegemonic authoritarian regime. The absence of a strong associational sphere in Spain explains why that regime developed as an economic corporate dictatorship, despite many similarities between the two cases.


Author(s):  
Erica Frantz

How Do Authoritarian Regimes Differ from One Another? Authoritarian regimes sometimes can seem more different from one another than they are from democracies. As an extreme example, take two authoritarian regimes that have governed in southern Africa for the bulk of the last few decades...


2021 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 74-97
Author(s):  
Gerald M. Easter

As Russia’s post-communist regime descends deeper into authoritarianism, protest politics has become a regular feature of the political landscape. As such, President Putin increasingly faces the “dictator’s dilemma”: How much coercion to deploy against protesters without incurring a social backlash against the regime? That question more generally is now part of analytical consideration in comparative scholarship on social movements and contentious politics. This article contributes to the comparative discussion, first, through an elaboration of an original conceptual typology of protest-policing strategies, applicable to democratic and authoritarian regime types. Second, the article applies this conceptual scheme to Russia to illustrate the variant protest-policing strategies employed during the post-communist period. The research explains how Putin’s authoritarian regime responded to the challenge of the dictator’s dilemma by enacting protest-policing reforms. Inspired by policing trends in the Western democracies, these reforms entail a shift from confrontation-based to containment-based tactics. The article shows variation and adaptation in the way protesters were policed across Russia’s transition from unconsolidated democracy to consolidated authoritarianism. Finally, the article suggests the consequences of protest-policing reform for the ruling regime.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-31
Author(s):  
Yeşim Arat

Abstract This article examines the instrumentalization of women's rights and the transformation of the gender rights regime in the context of democratic backsliding in Turkey. I show how the Islamically rooted Justice and Development Party governments and their allies used women's rights in constructing authoritarian rule and promoting a conservative gender agenda. The governing elites had different needs at different political stages and instrumentalized women's rights to meet those needs. First, they needed to legitimize their rule in a secular context, so they expanded liberal laws on women's rights. Second, in the process of backsliding, they sought to construct and legitimize their conservative ideology, so they reinterpreted existing laws to promote conservative goals. Finally, they wanted to mobilize conservative women in support of the newly authoritarian regime, so they built new institutions and marginalized existing women's NGOs. The article contributes to the literature on regime types and gender rights by shifting the focus from regime type to regime change.


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