Legislative committees in the Turkish Parliament: performing procedural minimum or effective scrutiny?

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-36
Author(s):  
Eda Bektas
Keyword(s):  
Legislative Committees

Institutional Hindrances to Epistemic Success

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert E. Goodin ◽  
Kai Spiekermann
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Design ◽  
The Third ◽  
Legislative Committees

The chapter explores features of institutional design that hamper epistemic performance, especially ‘epistemic bottlenecks’. The first section looks at the influence of strong leaders. The epistemic losses can be severe, especially if the leaders are influential and their number small. The second section shows how legislative committees and smaller upper chambers can act as bottlenecks. Quality deliberation may mitigate the effect. The third section analyses the epistemic outcome when party whips or small pivotal parties are in control. Finally, bottlenecks can also be created by supermajority rules, presidential vetoes, or by ‘cooling-off periods’.

Legislative Governing Coalitions in Parliamentary Democracies

1989 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
MILDRED SCHLESINGER
Keyword(s):  
Correlation Analysis ◽  
Third Republic ◽  
Parliamentary Democracy ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Institutional Rules ◽  
Multiparty Systems ◽  
Leadership Group ◽  
Two Measures ◽  
Legislative Committees

A neglected aspect of parliamentary democracies that do not conform to the British model is the relation between executive and legislative leadership. In multiparty systems with strong legislative committees, committee chairmen constitute a governing coalition comparable to the cabinet. Given the coalitional nature of each leadership group, their partisan composition may not be identical; nor need they be equally stable. These are matters of importance for the operation of government. This article examines the relations between the two coalitions in the primordial parliamentary democracy, the French Third Republic. Using correlation analysis, I found a weak partisan relation between the two coalitions during the five legislatures of the interwar years. Using two measures of stability, durability and the continuity of coalitions beyond formal tenure, I found the legislative coalition always more stable. Institutional rules and the multiparty system helped account for these differences. Nevertheless, there was enough variation from legislature to legislature to show that electoral rules and results had an impact. Variations resembled those in the American republic. Periods of greater similarity in partisan composition coincided with greater effectiveness or stability for the executive; periods of divided control coincided with lesser executive stability. This was of consequence for the making of policy.

Comparing Intelligence Accountability

2021 ◽  
pp. 22-43
Author(s):  
Christian Leuprecht
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Intelligence Community ◽  
The Public ◽  
Different Types ◽  
The Media ◽  
Legislative Committees ◽  
Institutional Architecture ◽  
Key Terms

This chapter reviews the literature of intelligence accountability, reviews different theories, and introduces readers to key terms such as oversight, review, control, and governance. This book complements the process of intelligence oversight—the practice of holding ISAs to account, whereby ISAs have to justify their activities—with other types and levels of accountability. Typologically, accountability bodies differ by ways and methods they use to hold ISAs accountable: they can review, oversee, or control Intelligence and Security Agencies (ISA), and/or accept and address complaints concerning actions or activities of an ISA. Although conventionally they assessed compliance within an intelligence community, as of late they have been performing additional functions, such as promoting innovation. The different types of accountability are complemented by various layers in which Intelligence and Security Agencies are held accountable: internal, managerial, and external. The chapter introduces readers to the institutional architecture of intelligence accountability: legislative committees, judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, bureaucratic and administrative bodies, and executive oversight. It goes on to review intelligence accountability frameworks: laws, legislatures, the executive, the judiciary, the media, the public, civil society, and the democratic interest. The chapter closes on developments in international and supranational accountability cooperation.

Barenblatt, Uphaus, and the Court in Retreat

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert M. Lichtman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New Hampshire ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Opposite Result ◽  
Chief Justice ◽  
Legislative Committees ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Constitutional Issue

This chapter discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions during its October 1958 and 1959 terms. The most important decisions were Barenblatt v. United States and Uphaus v. Wyman, in which the Court decided in the government’s favor a constitutional issue it had nibbled at, but avoided deciding, for years: whether legislative committees may, consistent with the First Amendment, compel witnesses to disclose “Communist” associations. Barenblatt was another House Un-American Activities Committee contempt-of-Congress case, and, as in earlier cases, nonconstitutional issues were also presented. But this time the Court chose to decide on constitutional grounds. Uphaus seemed indistinguishable from Sweezy (it involved a New Hampshire adult-camp director’s refusal to provide information to Louis Wyman’s one-man committee). But Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone, who in Sweezy joined Felix Frankfurter in a concurring opinion that sustained the witness’ refusal to answer on First Amendment grounds, wrote for the Court in Uphaus reaching the opposite result.

From ‘Opening Up’ to Democratic Renewal: Deepening Public Engagement in Legislative Committees

2017 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carolyn M. Hendriks ◽  
Adrian Kay
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Deliberative Democracy ◽  
Public Engagement ◽  
Public Involvement ◽  
The Public ◽  
Central Task ◽  
Committee Work ◽  
The World ◽  
Legislative Committees ◽  
Opening Up

Many legislatures around the world are undergoing a ‘participatory makeover’. Parliaments are hosting open days and communicating the latest parliamentary updates via websites and social media. Public activities such as these may make parliaments more informative and accessible, but much more could be done to foster meaningful democratic renewal. In particular, participatory efforts ought to be engaging citizens in a central task of legislatures – to deliberate and make decisions on collective issues. In this article, the potential of parliamentary committees to bring the public closer to legislative deliberations is considered. Drawing on insights from the practice and theory of deliberative democracy, the article discusses why and how deeper and more inclusive forms of public engagement can strengthen the epistemic, representative and deliberative capacities of parliamentary committees. Practical examples are considered to illustrate the possibilities and challenges of broadening public involvement in committee work.

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