Keeping Score: The Congressional Budget Office and the Politics of Institutional Durability

Polity ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 000-000
Author(s):  
Philip Rocco

1980 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 301-318
Author(s):  
Robert Goehlert ◽  
Elizabeth R. Hoffmeister


Author(s):  
Philip Joyce

The United States Congress, despite its poor reputation for policymaking, has substantial analytical capacity. While congressional committees possess some of this capability, most of the expertise resides in its three support agencies—the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Congressional Research Service (CRS). Within their relative portfolios each of these three agencies has provided the Congress with the ability to make policy, challenge policy proposals coming from the president, and hold the executive branch accountable. All of these agencies face the challenge of providing thorough and credible analyses within the confines of the legislative process and timetable. Further, they must maintain their credibility for nonpartisan analysis in the midst of a political environment that is only growing more polarized. These agencies supply a great deal of high quality information. The challenge for the Congress is how to make better use of this analysis in crafting more effective public policies.



Author(s):  
David L. Weimer

Four demands have driven the development of policy analysis in the U.S. First, reformers have sought evidence to support their efforts. Beginning with the municipal bureaus of the Progressive Era, advocacy groups have sought supportive policy analysis, resulting in the proliferation of ideologically differentiated think tanks that produce policy research. Second, politicians have recognized the need for specialized expertise to address pressing problems. Operations research grew out of efforts to solve problems facing the U.S. in World War II and led to subsequent efforts to improve bureaucratic decision-making capacity. Third, the growing scope and complexity of government have led to a demand for information to support routine decision processes. Fiscal offices support state budgeting and the Congressional Budget Office, Government Accountability Office, and Congressional Research Service support the routine business of Congress. Fourth, politicians have sought to discipline their own (and especially others’) future actions by mandating that analyses be applied to certain classes of decisions. Legislative requirements that the Army Corps of Engineers consider the benefits of investment projects were introduced at the beginning of the last century, legislative requirements for the completion of environmental impact statements were imposed in 1970, and beginning in 1981, executive orders have required cost-benefit analyses be completed for major agency rulemakings. Higher education has responded to these demands by supplying persons trained specifically in policy analysis.



2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zidong An ◽  
Joao Tovar Jalles

PurposeThis paper contributes to shed light on the quality and performance of US fiscal forecasts.Design/methodology/approachThe first part inspects the causes of official fiscal forecasts revisions by Congressional Budget Office (CBO) between 1984 and 2016 that are due to technical, economic or policy reasons.FindingsBoth individual and cumulative means of forecast errors are relatively close to zero, particularly in the case of expenditures. CBO averages indicate net average downward revenue and expenditure revisions and net average upward deficit revisions. Focusing on the causes of the technical component, the authors uncover that its revisions are quite unpredictable, which cast doubts on inferences about fiscal policy sustainability that rely on point estimates. Comparing official with private-sector (consensus) forecasts, despite the informational advantages CBO might have, one cannot unequivocally say that one or the other is more accurate. Evidence also seems to suggest that CBO forecasts are consistently heavily biased toward optimism while this is less the case for consensus forecasts. Not only is the extent of information rigidity is more prevalent in CBO forecasts but also evidence seems to indicate that consensus forecasts dominate CBO in terms of information content.Originality/valueThe authors provide a detailed analysis on US fiscal forecasts both using revenue and expenditure and decomposing forecast errors into several explanatory components. Moreover, the authors compare official with private-sector (consensus) forecasts and assess which one is better or preferred.



2007 ◽  
Vol 357 (18) ◽  
pp. 1793-1795 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter R. Orszag ◽  
Philip Ellis




2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (6) ◽  
pp. 1083-1106
Author(s):  
Ulrike Lepont

Abstract Context: In the late 2000s, the contention that quality improvements achieved by reforms in the delivery of care would slow the growth of costs throughout the US health care system became the predominant strategy for cost containment in the discourses and programs of all the 2008 presidential candidates. The question that this paper addresses is why, despite all of the critiques of this idea (especially those of the Congressional Budget Office), what the author terms the quality solution has remained credible enough to be a possible argument in policy makers' discourses and programs. To answer this question, the article explores the role of health policy experts—who are expected to provide credibility and legitimacy to proposals defended by policy makers—in supporting and diffusing this quality solution. Methods: The empirical research combines written sources with evidence from 78 interviews. Findings: This article highlights the political factors that explain the rise and growing prominence of the quality solution in the community of policy analysts: the political support for delivery reform–oriented research since the 1980s and also the importance of political calculations for prominent health policy experts. Conclusions: This policy history contributes to works that underscore the political dimension of policy analysis.



Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document