Mathematical Discovery in the Classroom

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Jon Barwise ◽  
John Etchemendy

Psychologists have long been interested in the relationship between visualization and the mechanisms of human reasoning. Mathematicians have been aware of the value of diagrams and other visual tools both for teaching and as heuristics for mathematical discovery. As the chapters in this volume show, such tools are gaining even greater value, thanks in large part to the graphical potential of modern computers. But despite the obvious importance of visual images in human cognitive activities, visual representation remains a second-class citizen in both the theory and practice of mathematics. In particular, we are all taught to look askance at proofs that make crucial use of diagrams, graphs, or other nonlinguistic forms of representation, and we pass on this disdain to our students. In this chapter, we claim that visual forms of representation can be important, not just as heuristic and pedagogic tools, but as legitimate elements of mathematical proofs. As logicians, we recognize that this is a heretical claim, running counter to centuries of logical and mathematical tradition. This tradition finds its roots in the use of diagrams in geometry. The modern attitude is that diagrams are at best a heuristic in aid of finding a real, formal proof of a theorem of geometry, and at worst a breeding ground for fallacious inferences. For example, in a recent article, the logician Neil Tennant endorses this standard view: . . . [The diagram] is only an heuristic to prompt certain trains of inference; . . . it is dispensable as a proof-theoretic device; indeed, . . . it has no proper place in the proof as such. For the proof is a syntactic object consisting only of sentences arranged in a finite and inspectable array (Tennant [1984]). . . . It is this dogma that we want to challenge. We are by no means the first to question, directly or indirectly, the logocentricity of mathematics arid logic. The mathematicians Euler and Venn are well known for their development of diagrammatic tools for solving mathematical problems, and the logician C. S. Peirce developed an extensive diagrammatic calculus, which he intended as a general reasoning tool.


1974 ◽  
Vol 67 (7) ◽  
pp. 598-599
Author(s):  
Raymond Dacey

An example of a mathematical discovery that leads to a significant generalization. It can be used to show students how to derive a surprising relation.


1974 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 210-214
Author(s):  
Larry M. Toschi

During the past few years it has become popular to explore Pascal's triangle by a discovery approach similar to that which George Polya presents in Mathematical Discovery (1960), especially pages 70-73 and 83-84. (The Bibliography at the end of this article will give other references indicating the rich variety of relationships found in this triangle.) The simple beauty of these relationships can be used to experience the joy of discovery and at the same time learn an ever more general method of problem solving. Some teachers have already begun incorporating such material into the high school curriculum, and I believe this practice should be increased because of its motivational value. Furthermore, the student who has derived enjoyment and profit from discovering the relationships of Pascal's triangle needs an opportunity to expand his work in this area. This article presents what I believe to be a natural extension suitable to the senior high school curriculum.


2020 ◽  
pp. 82-92
Author(s):  
Marcel Danesi

The number e, which is equal to 2.71828…, might seem like something trivial—a play on numbers by mathematicians. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is defined as the limit of the expression (1 + 1/n)n as n becomes large without bound. What possible connection does this number have with other areas of mathematics? As it turns out, it forms the base of natural logarithms; it appears in equations describing growth and change; it surfaces in formulas for curves; it crops up frequently in probability theory; and it appears in formulas for calculating compound interest. It is another example of how the ideas in mathematics are not isolated ones, but highly interrelated. The purpose of this chapter is, in fact, to link e to other great ideas, showing how mathematical discovery forms a chain—a chain constructed with a handful of fundamental ideas that appear across time and space, finding form and explanation in the writings and musings of individual mathematicians.


2019 ◽  
pp. 66-88
Author(s):  
Eli Alshanetsky

After rejecting deflationism, the central further question is whether our rejections and acceptances of words, in the articulation process, are based on reasons. Reasons-theorists say “yes” and look for some mental state that gives us a reason for accepting/rejecting a formulation. One kind of reasons-theorist argues that our reasons come from some knowledge we have of our thought. Another kind of reasons-theorist argues that our reasons come from feelings that result from sub-personally matching our thought with our words. Contra the reasons-theorists, this chapter maintains that we cannot make sense of the bulk of our responses in the articulation process by assimilating them into the reasons framework. Resolving the puzzle calls for an alternative model of rational control—one that may be implicated in learning and numerous other epistemologically central activities, ranging from basic perceptual categorization to sophisticated mathematical discovery.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document