Heretics, Infidels, and Iconoclasts

Author(s):  
Joseph Locke

This chapter recreates the freewheeling religious world of the late nineteenth century by exploring the institutional weaknesses, theological wrangling, and lack of numerical strength that plagued evangelical denominations in Texas in the years after Reconstruction. Spiritualists and other heterodox faiths attracted numerous followers, denominations such as the Southern Baptists lacked robust organizational authority, and theological controversies embroiled churches across the state. Rather than building up united denominations, religious leaders such as Benajah Harvey Carroll busied themselves expelling heretics and suppressing spiritual dissent. And while freethinkers such as William Cowper Brann and James Dickson Shaw established themselves as a presence in the state, evangelical churches still struggled to fill pews.

1980 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 437-444 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Jones

The facts are by now sufficiently clear for it to be common ground in any discussion of late nineteenth-century imperialism that the British State was disinclined to interfere on behalf of British capitalists with Latin American interests when these were threatened by local firms or States. Equally it is clear that British capitalists did not invest in Argentina in the belief that, by so doing, they were actively assisting the foreign policy of the British State. The State provided no grounds for this belief and no inducement to invest, and had it done so it is unlikely that the capitalists concerned – a pretty liberal bunch by and large – would have responded to any greater extent than they felt was consistent with their economic advantage. Again, there were not, in Britain, territorially ambitious militarists and aristocrats with their sights set on the South American republics. This element was quite adequately catered for in the Empire. In short, the models of imperialism favoured by Hobson, Schumpeter, and other conspiracy theorists, however appropriate they may be in particular cases, cannot be generalized and have very little relevance to Argentina.


Author(s):  
Jim Tomlinson

This chapter falls into two unequal parts. The first charts, broadly chronologically, the shifting understandings, historical and historiographical, of the role of the state in economic life. The second focuses on debates about the performance of the economy, especially notions of ‘decline’ which have been central to those debates since the late nineteenth century. Variegated but overlapping senses of ‘decline’, originating in very specific historical circumstances, have overshadowed much writing on the modern British economy, with, it will be argued, often detrimental effects on our understanding. Such notions need to be historicized—placed firmly in the intellectual, ideological, and above all political contexts within which they arose.


1995 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thongchai Winichakul

Historical studies in Thailand have been closely related to the formation of the nation since the late nineteenth century, and until recently the pattern of the past in this elitist craft changed but little. It presented a royal/national chronicle, a historiography modern in character but based upon traditional perceptions of the past and traditional materials. It was a collection of stories by and for the national elite celebrating their successful mission of building and protecting the country despite great difficulties, and promising a prosperous future. The plot and meaning of this melodramatic past have become a paradigm of historical discourse, making history an ideological weapon and a source of legitimation of the state.


2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Postel

In the 1880s and ‘90s, Waco, Texas, served as a trading center for the cotton districts of central Texas whose farmers gave rise to the Farmers’ Alliance and turned the region into a Populist hotbed. Waco was also known as the “City of Churches,” as it was the site of Baylor University and other efforts of evangelical churches to build up their institutions. What is less well known is that Waco and its rural environs were also hotbeds of religious heterodoxy. Waco's Iconoclast magazine became a lightning rod of conflict between the Baptists and their skeptical and liberal critics, a conflict that played out to a murderous conclusion. Historians have taken due note of the evangelical environment in which the Populist movement emerged in late nineteenth-century rural America. But in the process the notion of evangelical belief has been too often rendered static and total. The Baptist-Iconoclast conflict in Waco provides an entry point for a better understanding of the dynamic and conflicted nature of the religious context, and the influence of liberal and heterodox ideas within the communities that sustained the Populist cause.


2021 ◽  
pp. 273-298
Author(s):  
Jon D. Wisman

Following the rise of the state, religion served to legitimate societies’ institutions, practices, and unequal distributions of income, wealth, and privilege. However, emerging capitalism and its expanding bourgeoisie in Western Europe challenged the Catholic Church’s monopoly on truth and meaning, opening space for secular legitimation. The science of political economy increasingly evolved as a principal body of social thought legitimating inequality. This transfer from religion to political economy begins with the mercantilists and is mostly complete by the end of the nineteenth century. Political economy’s principal inequality-legitimating doctrines include the utility of poverty, the justice of the invisible hand, the Malthusian population doctrine, the wages-fund doctrine, and the trickle-down thesis. Most of these doctrines take on more of a patina of “natural” science in the late nineteenth century when the neoclassical revolution in economics attempted to sever economic science from morality and politics and express itself technically with calculus.


Author(s):  
Thomas K. Rudel

Fishers for lobsters in coastal Maine cluster in groups or “gangs” around the harbors where they fish and moor their boats. The State of Maine began regulating the capture of lobsters in the late nineteenth century with the passage of laws limiting the capture of both very large and small lobsters, but fishers rarely complied with the laws, so they had little effect. A lobster bust occurred in the 1920s and 1930s when both the size of the catch and the price of lobster declined. After the bust, compliance with the laws increased and, with active support from the fishers, the state established local management of the fishery with limits on the number of fishers and traps within each management zone. Focusing events played a less prominent role in the environmental reforms in this smaller political arena than they did in the larger political arenas in the Great Plains, United Kingdom, and Cuba.


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