This chapter demonstrates—using Nigeria, Ethiopia, and South Africa as comparative case studies—how federalism in Africa shares the forms, structures, and discursive practices of classic federal theory, while, at the same time, it also differs from classic federal theory in its normative articulations and institutional frameworks due to its syncretic configurations. To identify and illuminate the syncretic features of federalism in these countries, the chapter first presents the original logic, formation, and fundamental elements of federalism, as well as the reasons for its successes and failures, as developed in classic federal theory; explores how federalism takes new pathways—in both its original purpose and formation—in Nigeria, Ethiopia, and South Africa; and examines how the fundamental elements of federalism in these countries are a blend of syncretic convergences, adaptations, and innovations. And building on this, the chapter argues why it is necessary to rethink the classic standards for assessing the successes and failures of federalism and proceeds to discuss how this can help to improve the performance of federalism in fostering constitutional democracy in these countries. The chapter concludes by suggesting that if federalism is to ensure the practice of constitutional democracy in Africa, then democratic values, human rights, and constitutionalism should all animate its normative and institutional underpinnings of self-rule and shared rule, as they do in classic federal theory.
