Self-Defence, Just War, and a Reasonable Prospect of Success*

How We Fight ◽  
2014 ◽  
pp. 62-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suzanne Uniacke
Think ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 3 (8) ◽  
pp. 7-16
Author(s):  
Richard Norman
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  

Richard Norman examines justifications for war that are rooted in the right of self-defence.


Utilitas ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
CÉCILE FABRE

In his recent bookKilling in War, McMahan develops a powerful argument for the view that soldiers on opposite sides of a conflict are not morally on a par once the war has started: whether they have the right to kill depends on the justness of their war. In line with just war theory in general, McMahan scrutinizes the ethics of killing the enemy. In this article, I accept McMahan's account, but bring it to bear on the entirely neglected, but nevertheless interesting, issue of what the military call ‘blue-on-blue’ killings or, as I refer to such acts here, internecine war killings. I focus on the case of the soldier who is ordered by his officer, at gunpoint, to go into action or to kill innocent civilians, and who kills his officer in self-defence. I argue that, at the bar of McMahan's account of the right to kill in self-defence, the officer lacks a justification for attacking the soldier as a means of enforcing his order, and the soldier thus sometimes (but not always) has the right to kill his officer should the latter so act.


Victory ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 71-89
Author(s):  
Cian O'Driscoll

There is a school of thought which supposes that victory does not fit easily within the just war rubric because, despite what its name suggests, just war is not actually a form of warfare at all. On this view, just war is not so much a military contest between rival sovereigns as an extension into the international sphere of the punitive function that the judiciary discharges in the domestic realm. This conception of just war precludes any consideration of victory: in the same way a judge does not win when she sends a criminal to the gallows, nobody wins a just war. This chapter will draw upon David Rodin’s modern classic, War and Self-Defence, and the scholastic texts of Aquinas, Vitoria, and Suarez to investigate this way of thinking about just war. It will conclude that it discloses a tendency at the heart of just war thinking to sanitize war.


2019 ◽  
pp. 9-36
Author(s):  
Yitzhak Benbaji ◽  
Daniel Statman

The chapter presents the main ideas of traditional just war theory; the separation between the principles governing the resort to war (ad bellum) and those governing its conduct (in bello); the wide permission granted to combatants of both sides to target enemy combatants (‘moral equality of soldiers’); and the almost absolute prohibition on the intentional targeting of enemy civilians. It then introduces Individualism, which is the view that underlies the critique levelled by philosophers known as ‘revisionists’ against the traditional view, on both the ad bellum and the in bello levels. According to this critique, the attempt to anchor the morality of war in the principles of individual self-defence fails. The problem with the revisionist view is that it is unable to offer an alternative to traditional just war theory and to provide a satisfactory justification for the rules that govern the ethics (and law) of war, on both the ad bellum and the in bello levels.


Author(s):  
Henry Shue

Justified warfare requires far more than a just cause. The multiple necessary conditions to be satisfied before the inevitable deaths, wounds, and destruction of war, many inflicted wrongfully on combatants on both sides and on civilians, can be justified as a lesser evil also minimally include reasonable prospect of success, last resort, and proportionality of resort. Only a great evil to be resisted can constitute a just cause, and it must be empirically the case that military action has a reasonable prospect of stopping the resisted evil and is also necessary in being the least evil means of resistance, which is the meaning of last resort. Proportionality of resort, which is importantly different from proportionality in the conduct of war, can be assessed only by examining several questions concerning the evils created by the proposed war, including whose evils (only one’s own or predictable others) and which evils (which harms count).


Author(s):  
Randall Lesaffer

This chapter examines the evolution of the jus ad bellum from the use of war as a sanction to the sanctioning of war. It provides an overview of the doctrine of just war in the Middle Ages before turning to the concepts of just and legal war in the early modern period. It considers how, during that period and the 19th century, the argument of self-defence came to play a prominent role in the justification of war, leading to a contamination of the concepts of just and legal war. It explains why the concept of legal war was abolished by the international community of states and looks at major treaties and state practice relating to war and self-defence of the interwar years leading to the formation of an international customary rule against aggression. It analyses the transfer of the natural right of self-defence to the domain of positive international law.


Author(s):  
Elad Uzan

Abstract The problem of moral sunk costs pervades decision-making with respect to war. In the terms of just war theory, it may seem that incurring a large moral cost results in permissiveness: if a just goal may be reached at a small cost beyond that which was deemed proportionate at the outset of war, how can it be reasonable to require cessation? On this view, moral costs already expended could have major implications for the ethics of conflict termination. Discussion of sunk costs in moral theorizing about war has settled into four camps: Quota, Prospect, Addition, and Discount. In this paper, I offer a mathematical model that articulates each of these views. The purpose of the mathematisation is threefold. First, to unify the sunk costs problem. Second, to show that these views differ in the nature of their justifications: some are justified qualitatively and others quantitatively. Third, to clarify the differential force of qualitative and quantitative critiques of these four views.


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