Pro-government militias and civil war termination

Why do governments choose to fund pro-government militias (PGMs) if doing so could extend costly civil conflict? While PGMs are active in a majority of civil wars, their impact on conflict termination remains poorly understood. We argue that the choice to fund PGMs is a strategic one for states and part of their efforts to influence wartime dynamics and conflict termination. We hypothesize that PGMs’ impact on conflict termination is conditional on whether they are government funded. Government-funded PGMs help states to ward off costly negotiations and encourage the rebellion's gradual dissolution. Using competing risks analyses on civil wars ending between 1981 and 2007, we find robust evidence that PGM funding affects conflict outcomes.

Intrastate Armed Conflict Termination and Foreign Direct Investment

Does intrastate conflict termination increase foreign direct investment (FDI)? Why do some countries receive rapid FDI inflows after an internal armed conflict ends, while others do not? As a key explanation, we focus on the different types of conflict termination that send different signals to foreign investors. We argue that post-conflict countries receive more FDI when an intrastate conflict ends in a decisive manner because decisive termination lowers the risk of conflict resumption that creates precarious investment climates. Using the UCDP armed conflict termination data from 1970 to 2009, we empirically find that countries emerging from an intrastate conflict that ends in one side's victory, in particular government victory, and that ends in a peace agreement with major power involvement attract more FDI over the course of post-conflict years.

Peace agreements in armed conflicts: focusing on finding a solution to the conflict incompatibility

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) Peace Agreement Dataset was first published in 2006. Its main goal was to provide the research community with a dataset on peace agreements that was not linked to conflict termination, i. e. included both successful and failed agreements. The latest update of the dataset includes 355 peace agreements concluded in the 1975–2018 period. A number of studies have been based on the dataset over the years. The dataset is unique in its strict connection to the UCDP conflict data and in its focus on the conflict dyad, actors, and the conflict incompatibility. The dataset’s focus on only those agreements that involve the dyadic relationship between primary warring parties – between governments and rebel groups or between two governments – has direct policy implications, as it is exactly these parties who need to change their stances on incompatibilities in order to solve a conflict. Also, the Peace Agreement Dataset’s focus on agreements that address the key incompatibilities contested by the parties allow it to distinguish peace agreements on other negotiated deals, including ceasefires, and to differentiate between full, partial and peace process agreements. Finally, the analysis of key trends in peace agreements is presented. It shows that in contrast to the previous historical peak in the number of armed conflicts back in the early 1990s that corresponded to the peak in annual numbers of peace agreements, the new peak in annual numbers of armed conflicts in the late 2010s was not matched by a similar rise in peace agreements.

The Human Capital Peace Dividend

While the literature has documented negative effects of conflict on educational outcomes, there is little evidence on the effect of conflict termination. We show how the permanent ceasefire declared by FARC’s insurgency during peace negotiations with the Colombian government caused a differential improvement on several educational outcomes in the areas affected by FARC violence prior to the ceasefire. This effect is not explained by peacebuilding and post-war recovery investments, and they are only partially driven by wartime child soldiering. Instead, we find support for other mechanisms such as the post-ceasefire plummeting of victimization and new economic opportunities in treated areas.

Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and the Re-Escalation of Lethal Violence

To what extent does sexual violence influence the likelihood of re-escalating lethal violence after a period of inactivity? Despite a substantive body of research that explores conflict recurrence, the literature has largely neglected the role of rebel group dynamics. I address this gap arguing that reports of rebel sexual violence in periods deemed inactive because of low numbers of casualties are associated with greater risks of escalating lethal violence. Specifically, building on research that shows an association between recruitment and rape as a socialization method during civil war, I argue that reports of sexual violence indicate that rebels are maintaining and mobilizing fighters in inactive conflict years. I systematically test this argument on all inactive intrastate conflict years from 1989 to 2015 using the updated Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict dataset and Armed Conflict Termination dataset. The results provide robust support for the argument that a re-escalation of lethal violence following inactive periods is more likely when rebels are reported to perpetrate sexual violence in both active and subsequent inactive periods.

The Human Capital Peace Dividend

While the literature has documented negative effects of conflict on educational outcomes, there is little evidence on the effect of conflict termination. We show how the permanent ceasefire declared by FARC’s insurgency during peace negotiations with the Colombian government caused a differential improvement on several educational outcomes in the areas affected by FARC violence prior to the ceasefire. This effect is not explained by peacebuilding and post-war recovery investments, and they are only partially driven by wartime child soldiering. Instead, we find support for other mechanisms such as the post- ceasefire plummeting of victimization and new economic opportunities in treated areas.

Who Wants Peace? Predicting Civilian Preferences in Conflict Negotiations

Efforts to end civil wars via negotiations often generate sharp divisions in public opinion. A large, quantitative literature has found evidence for numerous variables serving as potential drivers of public support of and opposition to conflict negotiations. Yet the formation of policy preferences is a complex process, and while many factors might make small contributions to an individual’s conflict termination preferences, we lack a sense of which factors matter most or how to adjudicate among competing explanations. In this article, we leverage a large amount of nationally representative survey data from Colombia (2004–2015) and use machine learning tools to systematically explore which variables are the strongest predictors of public support for negotiations with Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). We find that certain aspects of conflict exposure, individual values bearing on justice and punishment, and belief in the efficacy of the state are among the strongest predictors of negotiation preferences, while many conventionally important variables in the literature have little predictive power. The results have implications for scholars seeking to understand broad drivers of (dis)satisfaction with negotiations and shed light on the polarising Colombian peace process.

Market Factors and PMSCs’ Effectiveness in Conflict Termination

This chapter presents the results of empirical analysis of local and global competition’s impact on PMSCs’ performance in civil wars from 1990 to 2008. Findings suggest that both market mechanisms contribute to conflict termination, but there is some limitation to the benefit. Mainly, local competition has a positive effect in major wars involving conventional tactics and some guerrilla warfare but is less significant in the most difficult conflict environments. Companies’ corporate structure, a factor linked to the global-competition dynamic, can affect military effectiveness in conflicts involving fewer casualties and more guerrilla warfare. The positive effect is also evident in hard-to-end conflicts but not the subset of the most complex environments, as publicly traded PMSCs may strategically avoid the most extreme conflict zones. Finally, results show that interventions by multiple PMSCs offer more benefits for conflict termination than interventions involving states or international organizations.

Private Militaries and the Security Industry in Civil Wars

Whether they train police forces in Afghanistan or provide military assistance to governments in Africa that are battling rebel groups, private military and security companies (PMSCs), or corporations that provide security and military services for profit, have been present in numerous conflicts around the globe. In 1984 only one international PMSC intervened in a civil war; in 1989 there were 15 international PMSCs present in conflict zones, while from 2003 to 2019 over 120 of such companies provided services during the Iraq war. Why do international PMSCs sometimes help with conflict termination while in other cases their intervention is associated with prolonged wars? And in what ways does market competition affect PMSCs’ military effectiveness? Relying on quantitative analysis of original data on international PMSCs’ involvement in civil wars from 1990 to 2008 and PMSCs’ human rights and fraud violations in Iraq from 2003 to 2019, the book investigates how local and global competition impacts accountability of these non-state actors and their contribution to the termination of major and minor wars.