Internecine War Killings

Utilitas ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
CÉCILE FABRE

In his recent bookKilling in War, McMahan develops a powerful argument for the view that soldiers on opposite sides of a conflict are not morally on a par once the war has started: whether they have the right to kill depends on the justness of their war. In line with just war theory in general, McMahan scrutinizes the ethics of killing the enemy. In this article, I accept McMahan's account, but bring it to bear on the entirely neglected, but nevertheless interesting, issue of what the military call ‘blue-on-blue’ killings or, as I refer to such acts here, internecine war killings. I focus on the case of the soldier who is ordered by his officer, at gunpoint, to go into action or to kill innocent civilians, and who kills his officer in self-defence. I argue that, at the bar of McMahan's account of the right to kill in self-defence, the officer lacks a justification for attacking the soldier as a means of enforcing his order, and the soldier thus sometimes (but not always) has the right to kill his officer should the latter so act.

Author(s):  
Paola Pugliatti

This chapter recounts how developments in the technology of battle had by Shakespeare’s time caught up with even the relatively resistant, cavalry-oriented English nobility. Outlining these technical advances, it discovers numerous moments in Shakespeare indicative of popular responsiveness to war and its new face. Alone among English writers, it was Shakespeare who (repeatedly) termed cannon-fire ‘devilish’; and the chapter demonstrates how different characters in 1Henry IV are on the turn in the long evolution from (equestrian) medieval chivalry, through (treacherous, infantry-deployed) gunpowder weapons, to the perfumed post-militarist courtier. It notes Shakespeare’s staged presentation of conscription as farcically at odds with the official theory of a voluntarism for able-bodied adults. Two soldiers miserably questioning the ethics of war the night before Agincourt prove well apprised of the Christian just war theory—yet Williams shrewdly contests its exculpation of royal leaders from responsibility for their subjects’ deaths.


Think ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 3 (8) ◽  
pp. 7-16
Author(s):  
Richard Norman
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  

Richard Norman examines justifications for war that are rooted in the right of self-defence.


Author(s):  
Alec D. Walen

This chapter argues for the extension of an idea from the previous chapter, that of a right of non-sacrifice. It argues that this right exists in certain cases of intervening agency: when the intervening agent presents the primary agent with a choice either to submit to suffering a harm or to resist, knowing that the intervening agent will then harm others. The argument proceeds in four parts. First, the chapter explains why such a case is puzzling; second, it dismisses two unsuccessful attempts to resolve the puzzle; third, it explains why intervening agency sometimes has the effect of changing the nature of the causal structure in which an agent acts, though noting as well that intervening agency is not unique in having that effect; and finally, it explores how these ideas might be relevant to just war theory and eliminative killing in that context.


Antichthon ◽  
1978 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 28-35
Author(s):  
J. R. Ellis
Keyword(s):  

Posterity has on the whole judged Thucydides not ungenerously over his failure to save Amphipolis in the winter of 424. Although some of those who have attempted to analyse the military circumstances of the loss, almost wholly from the historian’s own account, have found him culpable in some way, most scholars have preferred not to add their condemnation to that of the Athenian demos. Rather the majority have tended towards the non-committal or have celebrated what they have seen to be the author’s resolute determination, in his failure to present a palpable self-defence, not to be diverted from the primary aims of his work. Gomme even suggested reasons why Thucydides may actually have been in the right and why, by consequence, his exile may have been a perversion of justice. But in the end, of course, as Gomme and many others have realized, we simply do not have the evidence to judge with any certainty.


Daedalus ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 146 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seth Lazar

Modern analytical just war theory starts with Michael Walzer's defense of key tenets of the laws of war in his Just and Unjust Wars. Walzer advocates noncombatant immunity, proportionality, and combatant equality: combatants in war must target only combatants; unintentional harms that they inflict on noncombatants must be proportionate to the military objective secured; and combatants who abide by these principles fight permissibly, regardless of their aims. In recent years, the revisionist school of just war theory, led by Jeff McMahan, has radically undermined Walzer's defense of these principles. This essay situates Walzer's and the revisionists’ arguments, before illustrating the disturbing vision of the morality of war that results from revisionist premises. It concludes by showing how broadly Walzerian conclusions can be defended using more reliable foundations.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Łukasz Kułaga

The Use of Drones in Combating International Terrorism from the Perspective of ‘ius ad bellum’Summary The increasing practice of using armed unmanned aerial vehicles (military UAVs, commonly known as drones) by some countries to eliminate suspected terrorists raises a number of controversies from the perspective of international law. These controversies are also related to the specific features of military UAVs, which make it possible to kill targeted individuals without risk to the military personnel of the country concerned, and thereby may encourage the abusive interpretation of the applicable legal regulations. This article discusses these issues from the perspective of ius ad bellum, in particular the right to self-defence. It shows the main controversial points on the scope of invoking the right to self-defence in such cases, in particular the possibility of invoking the right to self-defence in response to an attack by a non-state entity, the question of pre-emptive self-defence, the importance of the severity of the force used as a condition allowing for the use of force in self-defence, and the relevance of the principles of proportionality and necessity. The article also presents an outline of the vast and highly controversial issues associated with the definition of terrorism from the point of view of international law.


Author(s):  
Victor Tadros

This chapter partially defends the significance of intentions to permissibility against critics and explores some different views about their relevance by exploring a range of contexts in just war theory where views about the significance of intentions make a difference in our judgments about the permissibility of military action. It clarifies two components of the doctrine of double effect (DDE) and distinguishes different versions of it. It then compares the DDE with some competing explanations of the intuitive difference between terror bombing and tactical bombing, arguing that the DDE is an important component of the right overall view of the permissibility of killing in war.


Author(s):  
Alec D. Walen

Much contemporary just war theory is modeled on the theory of self-defense. The dominant account of rights used by people interested in the right of self-defense is doubly problematic: its internal tensions undermine the plausibility of the views people try to defend, and it is in some ways morally distorting. This book is primarily concerned with developing and then deploying a new account of rights, one that will put the discussion of the right to defend against threats on more solid footing. The introductory chapter covers four themes. First, to explain why the current state of just war theory calls for a new account of rights, the chapter traces a brief history of recent discussions of the right of self-defense. Second, the chapter describes when it is permissible to defend against threats. Third, it explains how this relates to current law and to other philosophical work on the topic. Finally, it sketches an outline of the rest of the book.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (01) ◽  
pp. 111-135
Author(s):  
Sami Ud Din ◽  
Dr. Dost Muhammad

Armed struggle is an issue of life- and -death judgments and that’s why it needs solid justification from ethical and religious principles. Defending human life and preserving the society from anarchy, disintegration and destruction sometimes waging armed struggle become necessary and a group of people or nation is compelled to do so. Now one of the important aspects in this regard is, in which circumstances the nation is allowed for an armed struggle. All of the major world religions provide guidelines in this domain from strong militancy to absolute pacifism and just war theory. Islam too acknowledges the right of defense and preserving life to human beings. This paper seeks to map out the ideological approaches to armed struggle in Islam. The important scriptures from the holy Quran, Narrations of the holy prophet are briefly introduced and the relevant verses are extracted and summarized in the light of exegesis.


2004 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Rodin

In War and Self-Defense I attempt to generate a dilemma for the just war theory by arguing that the right of national defense cannot be reduced to personal rights of self-defense, nor can it be explained through an analogy with them. Jeff McMahan, David Mapel, and Fernando Tesón doubt this conclusion. In response I argue, first, that their objections are not as opposed to my basic project as they may at first appear. This is because they are premised on a conception of national defense that differs substantially from mainstream just war theory and international law. Second, I argue that McMahan's and Mapel's defense of the reductive argument is unconvincing because (among other things) it is premised on an inadequate view of the norm of proportionality. On the other hand Tesón's defense of the analogical view, based on a conception of the moral value of the just institutions of a legitimate state, cannot account for certain basic features of the international legal and moral order. These include the presumption that even unjust states can possess the right of self-defense against aggression and that it is impermissible for one just state to conquer and rule another just state. Finally I argue that the attempt to bolster the right of national defense through the concept of punishment is inappropriate because it ignores the crucial requirement for proper moral authority in the agent of punishment.


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