Detention as the Default: How Greece, with the support of the EU, is generalizing administrative detention of migrants

Putting migrants and asylum seekers into detention for administrative reasons is a common practice in Greece, despite this policy contravening human rights. Greek authorities are using detention and the new EU-funded closed compounds as a way to discourage people from seeking asylum in Europe. Detention, as outlined in Greek law, should only be used as a final resort and only then in specific instances. Detention carries with it not only a financial cost, but also a considerable moral cost. Detention without just cause violates basic human rights, such as freedom of movement, the right to health and the right to family life. Alternatives to detention exist and must be prioritized.

An Economic Analysis of Rebates Conditional on Positive Reviews

In the prevailing e-commerce environment, conditional rebates have emerged as a common business practice on leading online platforms such as Taobao. Because rebates are only offered to purchasing consumers who post positive online reviews, a key concern is that it can easily induce fake reviews that might harm consumers. We theoretically analyze the seller’s optimal conditional-rebate strategies based on heterogeneous consumers’ online-review-posting behavior and derive three practically important findings. First, it is not always profitable for strategic sellers to pursue the conditional-rebate strategy. Blindly offering incentives may not help achieve the goal of review manipulation. Second, the conditional-rebate strategy does not necessarily result in fake reviews. Fake reviews occur only if consumers’ moral cost is low and the review-posting cost is not too high. Third, under certain conditions, offering conditional rebates can even increase consumer surplus and social welfare. Platform owners or policy designers can help reduce social losses by offering transparent sales information and by appropriately controlling the platform review-posting cost to induce quality reviews. Our study offers new insights into the fake-review phenomenon induced by conditional rebates and sheds new light on the policy debate about whether platforms should completely ban incentivized reviews.

Distance to news: how social media information affects bribe-giving in India

While recent empirical evidence reveals some effective interventions in preventing corruption among bureaucrats and politicians, there has been little discussion on how to prevent the bribe-giving behavior of ordinary citizens. This paper investigates the role of social media information in influencing the supply of bribes by citizens instead of the demand side. We, therefore, developed and published an original news application in India and implemented a 3-month experiment. In this application, we randomly circulate live news related to corruption to users and incorporate a lab experiment into the app system to elicit users’ bribery behavior every week. We find that corruption news involving politicians within a close geographical proximity lowers users’ moral costs against the anti-social bribery act, leading to an increase in the amount of bribes. However, news of accused citizens and officials within the geographic proximity increases their moral cost against bribes and decreases the amount. This suggests that individually tailored local information on corruption may be an effective tool to reduce citizens’ supply of bribes.

Resultant Luck and the Fairness Intuition

This chapter examines the ‘Fairness Intuition’, which is the other fundamental constituent in the Anti-Luck Account. The Fairness Intuition holds that it is unfair, not just irrelevant, to hold one agent to be more blameworthy than another if the differences in the outcome of their acts reflect only luck. The Fairness Intuition prescribes ‘Equal Worlds’ for the allocation of blameworthiness, rather than ‘Lucky Worlds’. That does not mean that an agent who would have been more blameworthy than another agent in a Lucky World will be less blameworthy in an Equal World. It all depends. Luck cannot be evaded even in Equal Worlds, which contain ‘fate-sharing luck’. So it is far from clear that, even in terms of fairness, Equal Worlds are preferable to Lucky Worlds. The ‘Moral Cost Argument’ locates an explanation for why one agent may be more blameworthy than another, though the differences between them may reflect only luck: this agent is consequentially liable to be blamed for the foreseeable results of what she does. That liability is present in ‘Bad Cases’, which call for blameworthiness, but it is missing in ‘Good Cases’, which call for praiseworthiness. Thus an asymmetrical attitude to Good Cases and Bad Cases is favoured.

Neural basis of corruption in power-holders

Corruption often involves bribery, when a briber suborns a power-holder to gain advantages usually at a cost of moral transgression. Despite its wide presence in human societies, the neurocomputational basis of bribery remains elusive. Here, using model-based fMRI, we investigated the neural substrates of how a power-holder decides to accept or reject a bribe. Power-holders considered two types of moral cost brought by taking bribes: the cost of conniving with a fraudulent briber, encoded in the anterior insula, and the harm brought to a third party, represented in the right temporoparietal junction. These moral costs were integrated into a value signal in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was selectively engaged to guide anti-corrupt behaviors when a third party would be harmed. Multivariate and connectivity analyses further explored how these neural processes depend on individual differences. These findings advance our understanding of the neurocomputational mechanisms underlying corrupt behaviors.

KEEPING JUSTICE (LARGELY) OUT OF CHARITY: PLURALISM AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR BETWEEN CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS AND THE STATE

Justice can be pursued by the state, or through voluntary charity. This paper seeks to contribute to the debate about the appropriate division of labor between government and charitable agencies by developing a positive account of the charity sector's moral foundations. The account given here is grounded in a legal conception of charity, as a set of subsidies and privileges designed to cultivate a wide variety of activities aimed at enhancing civic virtue and autonomy. Among other things, this implies that a charity sector oriented largely around the pursuit of justice will come at a moral cost to a liberal society, at least when the state is in a position to take the greater share of the responsibility. So, a positive account of charity provides at least a pro tanto reason for preferring a division of labor in which the state takes a greater share of the responsibility for pursuing justice. As well as developing and defending this conception in its own right, we apply it in offering some criticisms and enhancements of existing views about the division of labor.

War Crimes and the Asymmetry Myth

The “asymmetry myth” is that war crimes are committed by one's enemies but never, or hardly ever, by one's own combatants. The myth involves not only a common failure to acknowledge our own actual war crimes but also inadequate reactions when we are forced to recognize them. It contributes to the high likelihood that wars, just or unjust in their causes, will have a high moral cost. This cost, moreover, is a matter needing consideration in the jus ante bellum circumstances of preparedness for war as well as of conduct within it. As part of the symposium on Ned Dobos's book, Ethics, Security, and the War-Machine, I will argue that the strength of the asymmetry myth is sustained by certain forms of romantic nationalism linked to the glamorization of military endeavor.

Doing Justice, Preventing Crime

In the 2020s, no informed person disagrees that punishment policies and practices in the United States are unprincipled, chaotic, and much too often unjust. The financial costs are enormous. The moral cost is greater: countless individual injustices; mass incarceration; the world’s highest imprisonment rate; extreme disparities, especially affecting members of racial and ethnic minority groups; high rates of wrongful conviction; assembly-line case processing; and a general absence of respectful consideration of offenders’ interests, circumstances, and needs. The main ideas in this book about doing justice and preventing crime are simple: Treat people charged with and convicted of crimes justly, fairly, and even-handedly, as anyone would want done for themselves or their children. Take sympathetic account of the circumstances of peoples’ lives. Punish no one more severely than he or she deserves. Those propositions are implicit in the rule of law and its requirement that the human dignity of every person be respected. Three major structural changes are needed. First, selection of judges and prosecutors, and their day-to-day work, must be insulated from political influence. Second, mandatory minimum sentence, three-strikes, life without parole, truth in sentencing, and similar laws must be repealed. Third, correctional and prosecution systems must be centralized in unified state agencies.

Moral Sunk Costs in War and Self-Defence

The problem of moral sunk costs pervades decision-making with respect to war. In the terms of just war theory, it may seem that incurring a large moral cost results in permissiveness: if a just goal may be reached at a small cost beyond that which was deemed proportionate at the outset of war, how can it be reasonable to require cessation? On this view, moral costs already expended could have major implications for the ethics of conflict termination. Discussion of sunk costs in moral theorizing about war has settled into four camps: Quota, Prospect, Addition, and Discount. In this paper, I offer a mathematical model that articulates each of these views. The purpose of the mathematisation is threefold. First, to unify the sunk costs problem. Second, to show that these views differ in the nature of their justifications: some are justified qualitatively and others quantitatively. Third, to clarify the differential force of qualitative and quantitative critiques of these four views.