National Parliaments and the European Union

Author(s):  
Katrin Auel

The role and position of national parliaments in European Union (EU) affairs have undergone a long, slow, and sometimes rocky, but overall rather remarkable, development. Long regarded as the victims of the integration process, they have continuously strengthened their institutional prerogatives and have become more actively involved in EU affairs. Since the Lisbon Treaty, national parliaments even have a formal and direct role in the European legislative process, namely, as guardians of the EU’s subsidiarity principle via the so-called early warning system. To what extent institutional provisions at the national or the European level provide national parliaments with effective means of influencing EU politics is still a largely open question. On the one hand, national parliaments still differ with regard to their institutional prerogatives and actual engagement in EU politics. On the other hand, the complex decision-making system of the EU, with its multitude of actors involved, makes it difficult to trace outcomes back to the influence of specific actors. Yet it is precisely this opacity of the EU policymaking process that has led to an emphasis on the parliamentary communication function and the way national parliaments can contribute to the democratic legitimacy of the EU by making EU political decisions and processes more accessible and transparent for the citizens. This deliberative aspect is also often emphasized in approaches to the role of national parliaments in the EU that challenge the territorially defined, standard account of parliamentary representation. Taking the multilevel character of the EU as well as the high degree of political and economic interdependence between the member states into account, parliamentary representation is conceptualized as extending beyond the nation-state and as shared across the EU, with a strong emphasis on the links between parliaments through inter-parliamentary cooperation and communication as well as on the representation of other member states’ citizens interests and concerns in parliamentary debates. Empirical research is still scarce, but existing studies provide evidence for the development of an increasingly dense web of formal and informal interactions between parliaments and for changes in the way national parliamentarians represent citizens in EU affairs.

2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (7) ◽  
pp. 1223-1255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miroslava Scholten ◽  
Marloes van Rijsbergen

Although not explicitly regulated by the EU treaties, EU agencies not only exist but also have increased in number and power. In addition, while EU agencies may exercise very similar functions to those of the Commission, Articles 290 and 291 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) do not list agencies among the possible authors of non-legislative acts. The existing situation raises the questions of the extent to which the ongoing agencification in the EU is legitimate and what its limits are. This article addresses these questions in the light of the old and new Treaties and case law, including the just releasedESMA-shortsellingcase. It shows that while the Lisbon Treaty made a few steps forward on the road of legitimizing EU agencies and delegating important powers to them, the scope of powers that EU agencies can have remains unclear. In this respect, the European Court of Justice's lenient approach in theESMA-shortsellingcase is unfortunate because it neither clarifies the issue nor pushes the Union Legislator and the Member States to address it. Consequently, in the absence of clear limits, further agencification is likely to persist at the risk of increasing the democratic legitimacy deficit and remaining accountability gaps.


elni Review ◽  
2009 ◽  
pp. 79-82
Author(s):  
Ana Barreira

The European Commission has recognised that “[l]aws do not serve their full purpose unless they are properly applied and enforced”. In addition “[t]he European Institutions and the Member States should continue to develop their work to ensure that Community law is correctly applied and implemented”. There are diverse tools for guaranteeing compliance such as compliance indicators, compliance and enforcement strategies and environmental inspections, the purpose of which is to supervise compliance. This article focuses on the latter. Firstly, the way in which this instrument was incorporated under Community environmental policy is examined. Secondly, the current status of environmental inspections at EU level is briefly analysed. Thereafter, it will concentrate on the proposals for the review of this tool, ending with some recommendations on how environmental inspections should be regulated in the European Union with a focus on the demands of European Environmental Bureau (EEB) on this matter.


Author(s):  
Andrii Martynov

The politics of the European Union are different from other organizations and states due to the unique nature of the EU. The common institutions mix the intergovernmental and supranational aspects of the EU. The EU treaties declare the EU to be based on representative democracy and direct elections take place to the European Parliament. The Parliament, together with the European Council, works for the legislative arm of the EU. The Council is composed of national governments thus representing the intergovernmental nature of the European Union. The central theme of this research is the influence of the European Union Political system the Results of May 2019 European Parliament Election. The EU supranational legislature plays an important role as a producer of legal norms in the process of European integration and parliamentary scrutiny of the activities of the EU executive. The European Parliament, as a representative institution of the European Union, helps to overcome the stereotypical notions of a “Brussels bureaucracy” that limits the sovereignty of EU member states. The European Parliament is a political field of interaction between European optimists and European skeptics. The new composition of the European Parliament presents political forces focused on a different vision of the strategy and tactics of the European integration process. European federalists in the “European People’s Party” and “European Socialists and Democrats” consider the strategic prospect of creating a confederate “United States of Europe”. The Brexit withdrawal from the EU could help the federalists win over European skeptics. Critics of the supranational project of European integration do not have a majority in the new composition of the European Parliament. But they are widely represented in many national parliaments of EU Member States. The conflicting interaction between European liberals and far-right populists is the political backdrop for much debate in the European Parliament. The result of this process is the medium term development vector of the European Union.


Author(s):  
Dieter Grimm

This chapter examines the role of national parliaments in the European Union. It first considers the general trend towards de-parliamentarization in the EU before describing the European situation by distinguishing three separate phases, in which the national parliaments have different functions: the transfer of sovereign rights from the Member States to the EU, the exercise of those transferred rights by the EU, and the implementation of European decisions by the Member States. The chapter then explores the question of whether the European Parliament is capable of compensating at the European level for the erosion of legislative authority at the national level. Finally, it discusses the proposal that the European Parliament be vested with the powers typically possessed by national parliaments as a solution to the EU’s legitimacy crisis and argues that full parliamentarization is not the answer.


Author(s):  
Dieter Grimm

Europe is in crisis. With rising unrest among citizens of European Union Member States exemplified by the UK’s decision to leave the European Union (EU), and the growing popularity of anti-EU political parties, this book presents the argument that Europe has to change its method of further integration or risks failure. The book asserts that currently the EU does not have enough sources of legitimation to uphold itself, surviving solely on the legitimation provided by Member States. One popular remedy is the suggestion of ‘parliamentarization’ of the EU, giving the European Parliament the powers typically possessed by national parliaments as a means of heightening its legitimation. This is criticized by the book as expanding the Parliament’s powers would not change the effects of over-constitutionalization as the Parliament is inferior to the constitution. In order to reduce the EU’s legitimacy deficit, the book makes several recommendations, including the re-politicization of the decision-making processes, which can be achieved by reducing treaties to the capacity necessary for their constitutional function; the reinvigoration of European Parliament elections, by having ‘Europeanized’ parties to increase engagement with European society and give voters the opportunity to more immediately influence European politics; and a new division of powers based on subject matter to restrain European expansionism, reserving particular areas of policy to the responsibility of Member States even if this affects the common market.


2020 ◽  
pp. 67-99
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the division of competence and the transfer of powers from member states to the European Union (EU) in relation to the law-making process. It explains that the transfer of powers is designed to provide EU institutions with law-making powers to enable the EU to carry out its duties. The chapter highlights shifting dynamics in the policy-making procedures of the EU, particularly the balance between the legitimacy of the European Parliament and the legislative superiority of the Council of Ministers. It also discusses the participation of the institutions in the legislative process and the law-making principles and procedures.


Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the division of competence and the transfer of powers from member states to the European Union (EU) in relation to the law-making process. It explains that the transfer of powers is designed to provide EU institutions with law-making powers to enable the EU to carry out its duties. The chapter highlights shifting dynamics in the policy-making procedures of the EU, particularly the balance between the legitimacy of the European Parliament and the legislative superiority of the Council of Ministers. It also discusses the participation of the institutions in the legislative process and the law-making principles and procedures.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5(166) ◽  
pp. 9-33
Author(s):  
Zbigniew Czachór ◽  
Janusz Ruszkowski

The authors attempt to examine two parallel and often treated as incomplete processes of strengthening the competences of the European Parliament and at the same time defining a place of national parliaments of Member States in the political system of the EU. The parallelism of these phenomena may seem paradoxical, since it can be assumed that despite competency competition between the EP and the national parliaments, strengthening the competences of the former does not preclude maximising the competences of the latter. The system of unification and harmonisation present in the European Union does not have to weaken national parliaments. The more so that the parliaments of the Member States try to neutralise the autonomy of EU institutions, which “appropriate” their current field of play. The analysis was made based on a research sample consisting of methods for strengthening the EP and methods for maximising the parliaments of the Member States.


2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 1287-1296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philipp Kiiver

When the German Federal Constitutional Court pronounced itself on the constitutionality of the Treaty of Lisbon, its general reasoning on the character of the European Union sounded familiar. In its judgment, the Court recalls that the German Basic Law is a Europe-friendly constitution: its Preamble and its Article 23, regarding European integration, allow, and in fact prescribe, Germany's participation in the establishment of a united Europe. However, the Court also stresses the paramount position of the member states, their peoples, and their national parliaments in the institutional architecture of the EU. Already in its Maastricht Case, the Court had put an emphasis on institutional guarantees regarding the conditions under which sovereign competences may be conferred upon the EU from its constituent member states. The Lisbon Case builds upon the Maastricht doctrine, but now adds concrete instructions to the German legislature: whenever the EU institutions wish to apply certain strategic decisions under the Treaty of Lisbon, the German government may agree to them only after the two national legislative chambers, the German Federal Parliament (Bundestag) and the German Federal Council of States (Bundesrat), have given their prior approval. The national statute that regulates this must (and will) be changed accordingly before Germany may ratify the Treaty of Lisbon. The strategic decisions in question mainly concern what the Court considers to be, or at least potentially to be, de facto treaty amendment procedures by which EU institutions may dynamically expand their competences or change decision-making rules without having to resort to the regular ratification procedure for new treaties. The most prominent example is the so-called passerelle (or simplified treaty revision procedure), allowing the European Council unanimously, and with the European Parliament's assent, to introduce qualified majority voting and co-decision in areas where this does not yet apply. National parliaments are informed six months in advance and each of them may cast a binding veto, but ordinary positive ratification in all member states is not required. Also for the application of the flexibility clause, allowing for EU action to attain EU goals in the absence of a specific legal basis, the German Constitutional Court requires prior bicameral approval by the national legislature. The Court rejects the idea of future treaty amendment by tacit consent, because that would undermine the prerogatives of the national legislature and, essentially, German sovereign statehood. At the risk of sounding corny, we may therefore dub the Lisbon Case “Solange III,” after the two previous Solange Cases, and summarize it as follows: As long as (or, solange, in German) the European Union is not a federal state but comprises constituent member states, the people, through the national legislature, must consciously legitimize European integration step by step. The partially enhanced flexibility of future treaty reforms envisaged under the Treaty of Lisbon is, as far as Germany is concerned, undone. But what about the other member states? Where does the Lisbon case put Germany on the European map of parliamentary democracy? How do the ratification procedures on which the German Court insists compare with the procedures of national parliamentary oversight as they exist in the rest of the Union? The present article shall put the envisaged German procedures in a comparative perspective. But first it shall reflect on some of the main features of the judgment itself.


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