Foreign Economic Aid

Author(s):  
Jeffrey F. Taffet

In the first half of the 20th century, and more actively in the post–World War II period, the United States government used economic aid programs to advance its foreign policy interests. US policymakers generally believed that support for economic development in poorer countries would help create global stability, which would limit military threats and strengthen the global capitalist system. Aid was offered on a country-by-country basis to guide political development; its implementation reflected views about how humanity had advanced in richer countries and how it could and should similarly advance in poorer regions. Humanitarianism did play a role in driving US aid spending, but it was consistently secondary to political considerations. Overall, while funding varied over time, amounts spent were always substantial. Between 1946 and 2015, the United States offered almost $757 billion in economic assistance to countries around the world—$1.6 trillion in inflation-adjusted 2015 dollars. Assessing the impact of this spending is difficult; there has long been disagreement among scholars and politicians about how much economic growth, if any, resulted from aid spending and similar disputes about its utility in advancing US interests. Nevertheless, for most political leaders, even without solid evidence of successes, aid often seemed to be the best option for constructively engaging poorer countries and trying to create the kind of world in which the United States could be secure and prosperous.

2008 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 517-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan L. Smith

During World War II, scientists funded by the United States government conducted mustard gas experiments on 60,000 American soldiers as part of military preparation for potential chemical warfare. One aspect of the chemical warfare research program on mustard gas involved race-based human experimentation. In at least nine research projects conducted during the 1940s, scientists investigated how so-called racial differences affected the impact of mustard gas exposure on the bodies of soldiers. Building on cultural beliefs about “race,” these studies occurred on military bases and universities, which became places for racialized human experimentation.


1965 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 541-556 ◽  
Author(s):  
James F. Creagan

The movement of Mexican laborers across the international boundary into the southwestern United States has been occurring since the establishment of a boundary in that area. It is a natural movement of worker toward the source of work. Interests of the governments involved have caused checks to be placed upon this movement of workers. Public Law 78 represented one of the recent attempts of the United States government, through co-operation with the Mexican government, to regulate the movement of migrant workers.In this article I will briefly trace the history of PL 78. The impact of this law upon Mexico and its relevance for United States relations with that country are of importance.


2018 ◽  
Vol 73 (02) ◽  
pp. 435-468 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin O. Fordham

AbstractThe United States' 1890–91 decision to begin building a battleship fleet, an important point in its development as a world power, can illuminate the domestic sources of foreign policy ambition. An analysis of roll-call votes in the House of Representatives indicates that socioeconomic divisions arising from industrialization strongly influenced support and opposition to the battleship fleet. This relationship worked mainly through trade policy interests: members of Congress from import-competing states tended to support the effort, while those from export-oriented states tended to oppose it. The patriotic symbolism of battleships at a time of labor unrest also helped motivate support for the program, though evidence of this pattern is less conclusive. Although party affiliation was crucial, it was also partly a function of economic structure, which shaped the two parties’ electoral fortunes. The impact of trade interests during this period is a mirror image of what previous research has found concerning the post-World War II era, when export-oriented interests tended to support American global activism and import-competing interests to oppose it. The reason for the difference is the Republican Party's commitment to trade protection, which strongly influenced both the goals of the policy and the identity of its supporters.


Author(s):  
Graham Cross

Franklin D. Roosevelt was US president in extraordinarily challenging times. The impact of both the Great Depression and World War II make discussion of his approach to foreign relations by historians highly contested and controversial. He was one of the most experienced people to hold office, having served in the Wilson administration as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, completed two terms as Governor of New York, and held a raft of political offices. At heart, he was an internationalist who believed in an engaged and active role for the United States in world. During his first two terms as president, Roosevelt had to temper his international engagement in response to public opinion and politicians wanting to focus on domestic problems and wary of the risks of involvement in conflict. As the world crisis deepened in the 1930s, his engagement revived. He adopted a gradualist approach to educating the American people in the dangers facing their country and led them to eventual participation in war and a greater role in world affairs. There were clearly mistakes in his diplomacy along the way and his leadership often appeared flawed, with an ambiguous legacy founded on political expediency, expanded executive power, vague idealism, and a chronic lack of clarity to prepare Americans for postwar challenges. Nevertheless, his policies to prepare the United States for the coming war saw his country emerge from years of depression to become an economic superpower. Likewise, his mobilization of his country’s enormous resources, support of key allies, and the holding together of a “Grand Alliance” in World War II not only brought victory but saw the United States become a dominant force in the world. Ultimately, Roosevelt’s idealistic vision, tempered with a sound appreciation of national power, would transform the global position of the United States and inaugurate what Henry Luce described as “the American Century.”


2004 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas M. Thompson ◽  
Gregory N. Stull

Abstract The use of instream structures to modify aquatic habitat has a long history in the United States. Pioneering work by wealthy landowners in the Catskills region of New York produced a range of designs in the decades preceding the Great Depression in an effort to replenish fish populations depleted from overfishing. The scientific evaluation of structures began in 1930. Within two years, a Michigan research team claimed improved fish populations. Cheap labor and government-sponsored conservation projects spearheaded by the Civilian Conservation Corps allowed the widespread adoption of the techniques in the 1930s, before adequate testing of the long-term impact of the devices. The start of World War II temporarily ended the government conservation efforts and prevented the continued evaluation of structures. During the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, designs of instream structures remained essentially unchanged. Meanwhile, the small number of evaluations of the impact of the structures often were flawed. The continued use of early designs of instream structures helped instill a false belief that instream structures were proven to be a benefit to fish. Even modern use of instream structures continues to rely on the basic blueprints developed in the Catskills, despite documented problems with the use of these designs.


2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomonori Ishida

AbstractIn January 1983, Japan finalized an economic assistance agreement with the Republic of Korea (ROK), pledging to extend $4 billion in economic aid to the country concerned. Prior to the finalization of the agreement, both countries held rounds of negotiation on the aid package conditions, and this led to them entering into a period of growing political friction. Despite this, a political consensus was eventually hammered out in 1983 over their disagreement, and this had a far-reaching effect in stabilizing the political relationship between the countries. Substantial academic research has been carried out on this topic, but the reasons behind Japan’s commitment to rounds of political negotiation with the ROK have yet to be positively analyzed and convincingly substantiated. In light of this fact, the main aim of this article is to analyze the motivational forces that brought Japan to the negotiating table with the ROK. More specifically, it focuses on analyzing the effects of the formalization process of the US-Japan agreement that served to induce Japan to address the ROK-aid negotiation issue conscientiously. The analysis reveals clearly that the major factor that spurred Japan to revisit its ROK’s aid package conditions was Japan’s concern over its security burden-sharing scheme with the United States. It is likely that in July 1981, in his summit meeting with President Ronald Reagan, Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō pledged to initiate official talks with the ROK in response to the ROK’s request for an extended economic aid package. In tracing the course of US-Japan political negotiations from the period between 1977 and the formalization of the ROK’s aid agreement, this analysis reveals that the United States and Japan were of one mind concerning the need for the agreement as one of the critical means of resolving a myriad of their security concerns. It is also shown, however, that the countries arrived at their shared view from different perspectives, which were politically beneficial to their own interests. On the one hand, the United States expected Japan to assume greater responsibilities in security burden sharing, in line with its global economic status. On the other hand, partly because of the political limitations of shouldering a regional security role, Japan’s primary concern was to minimize its share of security burdens as far as possible and in such a way as not to disrupt its harmonious relationship with the United States. On top of this, insofar as the United States was concerned, it seemed to be unwise to request that Japan overshare the bilateral security defense expenditure, which might be detrimental to its political stability at home and at the same time might affect the credibility of their security alliance. In sum, the article shows that the consensus on aid for the ROK was beneficial to both Japan and the United States in terms of resolving their differences in the political operation of their security alliance scheme, including burden-sharing responsibilities. This was the real reason for Japan’s commitment to revisit its economic aid package with the ROK.


2002 ◽  
Vol 71 (4) ◽  
pp. 633-662 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kil J. Yi

The United States had three challenges in Asia in the mid-1960s: a hostile China, an assertive Japan, and a faltering South Vietnam. The Johnson administration's solution to these problems was to promote the normalizing of relations between its two vital Asian allies, Japan and South Korea. The two countries had refused to recognize each other diplomatically since the end of Japan's colonial rule over Korea after World War II. The acrimonious relations between Seoul and Tokyo weakened the containment wall in Northeast Asia while depriving Korea of Japanese investments, loans, and markets. These problems forced the United States to commit extensive military and economic assistance to Korea. As expected, a Tokyo-Seoul rapprochment buttressed the West's bulwark against communist powers in the region and hindered a potential Beijing-Tokyo reconciliation. It opened the road for Japan's economic penetration into Korea and enabled Seoul to receive Tokyo's help in economic development. Reassured by the friendship between Korea and Japan, Washington forged an alliance with Seoul in the Vietnam War. Between 1965 and 1973 Korea dispatched 300,000 soldiers in Vietnam, making it the second largest foreign power in support of Saigon. The Korea-Japan rapprochment proved to be a powerful remedy for America's problems in Asia.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 119
Author(s):  
I Basis Susilo ◽  
Annisa Pratamasari

This paper examines the American Revolution as an inspiration for Indonesia’s founding fathers to fight for their nation’s independence in 1945. This paper was sparked by the existence of  the pamphlet ‘It's 1776 in Indonesia’ published in 1948 in the United States which presupposes the link between Indonesian Revolution and the American Revolution. The basic assumption of this paper is that Indonesian founding fathers were inspired by the experiences of other nations, including the Americans who abolished the British colonization of 13 colonies in North American continent in the eigthenth century. American inspiration on the struggle for Indonesian independence was examined from the spoken dan written words of three Indonesian founding fathers: Achmad Soekarno, Mohamad Hatta and Soetan Sjahrir. This examination produced two findings. First, the two Indonesian founding fathers were inspired by the United States in different capacities. Compared to Hatta and Sjahrir, Soekarno referred and mentioned the United States more frequent. Second, compared to the inspirations from other nations, American inspiration for the three figures was not so strong. This was because the liberal democratic system and the American-chosen capitalist system were not the best alternative for Soekarno, Hatta and Sjahrir. Therefore, the massive exposition of the 1776 Revolution in 1948 was more of a tactic on the Indonesian struggle to achieve its national objectives at that time, as it considered the United States as the most decisive international post-World War II political arena.


Author(s):  
Damion Thomas

This chapter examines the “challenges, contradictions, and political nature” of African American sports emissaries during the early Cold War era. Recognizing the impact that Soviet declarations of American mistreatment of blacks were having on global public opinion about the United States, government officials planned goodwill trips that provided opportunities for people around the world to meet successful African Americans whose abilities on the playing field and loyalty to the nation represented a positive counterweight to the claims being posited by adversaries of the United States. The chapter devotes special attention to athletes' response to the program, most of whom were initially unaware of the underlying political purpose of their trips. There was an unintended politicizing effect for the athletes, as many used the forum to distance themselves from domestic policies, push for civil rights, and find common cause with subjugated peoples around the world. An increased unwillingness for citizen diplomats to “stay on message” resulted in the programs being scaled back in the late 1960s.


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