1. Why the mystery?

2017 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Susan Blackmore
Keyword(s):  
Rene Descartes ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Thomas Nagel ◽  
Cartesian Dualism ◽  
Daniel Dennett ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
René Descartes ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
Agreed Definition

What is consciousness? What does it do? Could we have evolved without it? ‘Why the mystery?’ considers the definition of consciousness and how psychologists, neuroscientists, and philosophers have tried to explain it. From the Cartesian dualism of René Descartes to the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness, a phrase coined in 1994 by the Australian philosopher David Chalmers, and the question ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ of American philosopher Thomas Nagel, it is shown that there is no generally agreed definition of consciousness. Subjectivity (or phenomenality), qualia, and the ideas of philosopher Daniel Dennett are also discussed.

scholarly journals Menopause and Methodological Doubt

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheila Spence
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Research ◽  
Rene Descartes ◽  
The Self ◽  
Cartesian Dualism ◽  
Hermeneutic Approach ◽  
René Descartes ◽  
Susan Bordo ◽  
Experiences Of Women ◽  
The Way

Menopause and methodological doubt be gins by making a tongue-in- cheek comparison between Descartes' methodological doubt and the self- doubt that can arise around menopause. A hermeneutic approach is taken in which Cartesian dualism and its implications for the way women are viewed in society are examined, both through the experiences of women undergoing menopause and through the commentary of several contributors in Feminist Interpretations of Réné Descartes by Susan Bordo (1999). This examination is located inside the story of the paper, which was written over the duration of a university hermeneutics course, and reflects the author's evolving understanding of hermeneutic interpretation within qualitative research.

Explaining the “hard” problem

2019 ◽  
pp. 116-139
Author(s):  
Peter Carruthers
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Phenomenal Concepts ◽  
Reductive Explanation ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Global Workspace ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
Global Workspace Theory

This chapter shows that global-workspace theory can be developed into a satisfying, fully reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness. It shows how globally broadcast nonconceptual content enables higher-order thoughts about that content, where those thoughts can lack conceptual connections with physical, functional, or representational facts. As a result, zombies are conceivable and an (epistemic) explanatory gap is opened up. But the thoughts in question can themselves be given a fully naturalistic explanation. Hence all of the facts involved in consciousness can be fully explained. The chapter defends the reality of the phenomenal concepts needed to make this account work, and replies to a dilemma for the account proposed by David Chalmers.

Intentionality and Phenomenality: A Phenomenological Take on the Hard Problem

2003 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 63-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Zahavi
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Neural Mechanisms ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Process Information ◽  
Conscious Mind ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Ice Cube ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Mind

In his bookThe Conscious MindDavid Chalmers introduced a now-familiar distinction between the hard problem and the easy problems of consciousness. The easy problems are those concerned with the question of how the mind can process information, react to environmental stimuli, and exhibit such capacities as discrimination, categorization, and introspection (Chalmers 1996, 4; 1995, 200). All of these abilities are impressive, but they are, according to Chalmers, not metaphysically baffling, since they can all be tackled by means of the standard repertoire of cognitive science and explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. This task might still be difficult, but it is within reach. In contrast, the hard problem — also known astheproblem of consciousness (Chalmers 1995, 201) — is the problem of explaining why mental states have phenomenal or experiential qualities. Why is it like something to ‘taste coffee,’ to ‘touch an ice cube,’ to ‘look at a sunset,’ etc.? Why does it feel the way it does? Why does it feel like anything at all?

INCOMPLETE NATURE AND SELF - BODY PROBLEM: EMERGENTIST TRANSCENDENCE OF THE DUALISM OF SPIRIT AND MATTER

METOD ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 77-90
Author(s):  
Ivan Fomin ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Dynamic Coupling ◽  
Self And Other ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Forms Of Life ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
Material Information ◽  
The Way

The article presents an overview of the key arguments of Terrence Deacon's theory of how mind emerged from matter. Deacon’s emergentism is analyzed as a way of refocusing the «hard problem» of consciousness. He suggests considering the phenomenon of consciousness as a dynamic coupling of mutually constraining processes. Such coupling is the defining feature of the subjective self and other teleodynamic phenomena. So self cannot be found as something embodied in existing material substrates. Consciousness is not present in such substrates themselves, but in the way different processes unfolding in these substrates constrain each other. Deacon shows that even looking at the simplest forms of life (autogens) one can observe that in them each part, interacting with other parts, creates the whole, and the whole as a synergetic complex makes possible the reproduction of its parts. The same principle underlies the organization of subjective consciousness, as subjective consciousness is hierarchically entangled with other levels of sentience. Thus, Deacon's emergentism is an attempt to take seriously the problem of the interrelation of spirit and matter by not simply to disregarding explanations that refer to the spiritual substance, but by offering the models of consciousness, sentience and purposiveness that could convincingly solve fundamental questions about the nature of consciousness in an alternative way. It is also an attempt to avoid the «naturalistic dualism» of David Chalmers, which involves splitting material information into physical and phenomenal aspects. According to Deacon, in explaining subjective self, one can do without both Cartesian spiritual substance and Chalmers' phenomenal information, but then what is necessary is to acknowledge the significance of absential phenomena (the phenomena that are intrinsically existing in relation to something missing, separate or nonexistent).

scholarly journals Not All Structure and Dynamics Are Equal

Entropy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (9) ◽  
pp. 1226
Author(s):  
Garrett Mindt
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Phenomenal Experience ◽  
Intrinsic Structure ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Structure And Dynamics ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Relationship

The hard problem of consciousness has been a perennially vexing issue for the study of consciousness, particularly in giving a scientific and naturalized account of phenomenal experience. At the heart of the hard problem is an often-overlooked argument, which is at the core of the hard problem, and that is the structure and dynamics (S&D) argument. In this essay, I will argue that we have good reason to suspect that the S&D argument given by David Chalmers rests on a limited conception of S&D properties, what in this essay I’m calling extrinsic structure and dynamics. I argue that if we take recent insights from the complexity sciences and from recent developments in Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of Consciousness, that we get a more nuanced picture of S&D, specifically, a class of properties I’m calling intrinsic structure and dynamics. This I think opens the door to a broader class of properties with which we might naturally and scientifically explain phenomenal experience, as well as the relationship between syntactic, semantic, and intrinsic notions of information. I argue that Chalmers’ characterization of structure and dynamics in his S&D argument paints them with too broad a brush and fails to account for important nuances, especially when considering accounting for a system’s intrinsic properties. Ultimately, my hope is to vindicate a certain species of explanation from the S&D argument, and by extension dissolve the hard problem of consciousness at its core, by showing that not all structure and dynamics are equal.

scholarly journals The mind-body Cartesian dualism and psychiatry

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-3 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Rene Descartes ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Causal Interaction ◽  
Cartesian Dualism ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
René Descartes ◽  
The Mind

The French philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650) argued that the natures of mind and body are completely different from one another and that each could exist by itself. How can these two structures with different natures causally interact in order to give rise to a human being with voluntary bodily motions and sensations? Even today, the problem of mind-body causal interaction remains a matter of debate.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document