scholarly journals Can the patients always make rational choice?: Libertarian paternalism and behavioral economics perspectives

2016 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. vii58
Author(s):  
Kei Hirai
1998 ◽  
Vol 50 (5) ◽  
pp. 1551 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Posner

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 41-53
Author(s):  
Michael Möcker ◽  
Klaus Mann

Non-adherence to medical advice is a serious problem to patients, health policy and practitioners. This article outlines concepts of behavioral economics that might lead a patient to decide against the provider's recommendations and thus to be non-adherent. Especially the timing of pay-offs and dynamic inconsistency, their uncertainty and ambiguity aversion, loss-aversion and numerous heuristics like the peak-end-rule are discussed. The paper concludes with some hints on “libertarian” paternalism that may improve the situation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 464-489 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marek Hudik

I compare two interpretations of the rational choice theory: decision-theoretic and price-theoretic. The former takes the assumption of utility maximization as a literal description of a decision procedure. The latter considers it as a modeling device used to explain changes/variability of behavior on an aggregate level. According to the price-theoretic interpretation, these changes/variability are explained by constraints (“prices”) rather than differences in intrinsic characteristics between human populations (“tastes”). While the decision-theoretic interpretation of rationality represents a possible foundation of the price-theoretic interpretation of rationality, I argue that it is not its only possible foundation. I then show that critiques raised by behavioral economics apply to the decision-theoretic interpretation and much less so to the price-theoretic one. From the perspective of the price theory, behavioral and rational choice models are predominantly complementary. Price-theoretic interpretation helps to explain why the rational choice theory continues to play an important role in economics, even after the behavioral revolution. JEL codes: D01, D03, B41, A10


2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Trine Antonsen ◽  
Erik Lundestad ◽  

The paper focuses on Albert Borgmann’s philosophy of technology. We argue in support of Borgmann’s “Churchill principle” (“we shape our buildings, and afterwards they shape us”) as presented in Real American Ethics (RAE) (2006) by comparing it to findings within behavioral economics in general and to the “libertarian paternalism” of Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler in particular. According to our interpretation of it, the Churchill principle implies that because our material environment in fact influences our choices, this environment can and should be rearranged so that we “automatically” will tend to make better decisions. Having defended the Churchill principle, we go on to discuss how this principle is related to Borgmann’s approach in Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life (TCCL) (1984). In this earlier work, Borgmann suggests we reform technology by making room for focal practices, that is, meaningful practices in which we develop our skills and excellences. We argue that while these two works have different basic approaches—rearranging the material environment in RAE and developing certain skills and excellences in TCCL—they can and ought to be seen, not as mutually excluding, but as supplementing one another. Together they form a highly salient critique of technology that takes into consideration questions of the good life without becoming overly paternalistic.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Pi

Abstract Skeptics of rational choice theory have long predicted that behavioral economics would radically transform the legislation, adjudication, and analysis of law. Using tort law as an exemplar, this Article maps out the narrow set of conditions where substantive law can be modified to accommodate irrational decision-makers. Specifically, this Article demonstrates that if injurers are systematically biased, and the due care standard can be expressed quantitatively, and victims are unable to take meaningful precautions, then imposing punitive damages can induce irrational injurers to exercise efficient precautionary care. In all other cases, it is better that the law adopt a presumption of rationality, regardless whether individuals behave rationally in fact.


2017 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-40
Author(s):  
Daniel Sazhin ◽  
Matthew Morey

John Cochrane, a leading economist, has consistently expressed a skeptical view toward behavioral economics and libertarian-paternalism. Specifically, he has consistently voiced his disagreement with the premise of “protecting” people from their own choices. However, in his hobby of piloting gliders, he has strongly argued that pilots will make behavioral errors. Indeed, he notes that pilots can be tempted to make unsafe decisions and has argued for specific rules to help prevent pilot error. In this article, we examine this contradiction. In doing so, it provides an interesting case study of how our beliefs in one system can be quite different in another. JEL Classifications: B31, D91, G40


2017 ◽  
Vol 71 (S1) ◽  
pp. S249-S263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janice Gross Stein

AbstractAlmost forty years ago, a small group of scholars drew on cognitive psychology to explain anomalous patterns of behavior by leaders on issues of international security. Although it made significant contributions to theory and research, that scholarship did not diffuse broadly into the field. Drawing on concepts in psychology and behavioral economics, research that uses new methods is now producing a wave of scholarship in international relations exemplified by the work in this special issue. Analysis of the use of prospect theory over the last three decades identifies the scope conditions that enable the predictions of rational choice and psychological theories. These scope conditions motivate the focus on the heterogeneity of decision makers that is at the core of current contributions. Future research will move beyond the now-sterile debate between rational choice and psychology.


2015 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 49-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bojan Krstic ◽  
Milos Krstic

In this paper, we have tried to explain the normative turn in more recent work on experimental economics and behavioral economics. In section two, we discussed the various arguments that philosophers have offered in related to a normative interpretation of rational choice theory. We used the Friedman-Savage work on Expected Utility Theory as an example of the differences between the way that economists and philosophers see rational choice theory. We concluded that economists have traditionally equated the normative with ethically. In the third part, we examined the results of experimental and behaviorial economic literature with emphasis on the influence of experimental psychology. We presented a number of empirical anomalies and we agreed that representatives of economic psychology tend to view rational choice theory as a normative theory of rationality. In the last part, we examined some of the causes and consequences of the normative turn.


2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 244
Author(s):  
Timothy Wilkinson

How are we supposed to decide the rights and wrongs of banning smoking in bars, restricting adverts for junk food, nagging people into being screened for cancers, or banning the sale of party pills? The aim of this paper is to think through the political ethics of trying to make people healthier through influencing or restricting their choices. This paper covers: (1) Paternalism. What it is, what it assumes. (2) The place of health in well-being, and how this makes paternalism problematic. (3) The mistakes people make in acting in their own interests, and the implications for pro-health paternalism. (4) Autonomy objections to paternalism. The paper (5) finishes on a note of hope, by commending the currently fashionable libertarian paternalism: trying to have one’s carrot cake and eat it too. A persistent theme is that thinking sensibly about making people healthier needs subtlety, not broad, ringing declarations. KEYWORDS: Paternalism; nanny state; health; autonomy; rational choice


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