Jurisdiction, State Immunity, and Judgments in the Restatement (Fourth) of US Foreign Relations Law

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-135
Author(s):  
William S Dodge

Abstract In 2018, the American Law Institute published the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law, which restates the law of the United States governing jurisdiction, state immunity, and judgments. These issues arise with great frequency in international cases brought in US courts, including cases involving Chinese parties. This article provides an overview of many of the key provisions of the Restatement (Fourth). The article describes the Restatement (Fourth)’s treatment of the customary international law of jurisdiction, as well the rules of US domestic law based on international comity that US courts apply when deciding international cases.

2020 ◽  
pp. 251-264
Author(s):  
Thomas H. Lee

This chapter describes specific points of divergence between the Third and Fourth Restatements of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States regarding how U.S. courts should engage with customary international law. The Third Restatement, adopted in 1987, envisioned U.S. courts fluent in and engaged with international law, deploying a U.S. foreign relations jurisprudence in dialogue with international law and lawyers. Customary international law was a central feature of this vision because it was the prime pathway for human rights litigation in federal courts when U.S. treaty-based human-rights initiatives had stalled. Appearing thirty years later, the Fourth Restatement exhibits a fundamentally different orientation toward customary international law. Customary international law is no longer embraced as it was in the Third Restatement as an opportunity to play offense, to advance the international law of human rights. That vision inspired a reaction among some U.S. legal scholars who questioned the U.S. federal law status of customary international law and the legitimacy of U.S. judges advancing the customary international law of human rights. The Fourth Restatement seeks a middle ground by defending against this revision of customary international law’s status role in the United States, concerned that the revisionist view might encourage and provide cover for U.S. courts to dismiss cases and claims with foreign policy ramifications that they should be adjudicating. The approaches of the two Restatements, taken together, have contributed to the disengagement of U.S. judges from customary international law altogether, to the detriment of U.S. conduct of foreign policy and contrary to the original constitutional specification of the judicial power of the United States as reflected in Article III, the Judiciary Act of 1789 that established the federal courts, and early historical practice.


1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (3) ◽  
pp. 474-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick M. Norton

One precedent creates another. They soon accumulate and constitute law. What yesterday was fact, today is doctrine.Junius†Less than twenty years ago, a large majority of the United Nations General Assembly declared the customary international law of expropriation dead. Eighty-six governments supported a resolution holding that a state expropriating foreign property “is entitled to determine the amount of possible compensation and the mode of payment, and … any disputes which might arise should be settled in accordance with the national legislation of [that] State.” Scholars cited this and other General Assembly resolutions as evidence that international law no longer required full compensation for the expropriation of foreign property. This view had sufficient support to precipitate an acrimonious dispute in the preparation of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which reaffirmed only in its later drafts the traditional “Hull formula.”


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (2) ◽  
pp. 371-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederic L. Kirgis

A hotly debated issue raised in this publication’s October 1986 Agora and, repeatedly, during the drafting of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) has to do with the relationship between customary international law and federal law in the United States. Most of the debate addressed whether a newly emerged custom would supersede an earlier federal statute or self-executing treaty. The reporters of the Restatement took a strong stand at first, placing custom on the same plane as federal statutes and self-executing treaties: in case of conflict, the latest in time should prevail. Criticism rolled in, and the reporters eventually retreated a bit. The final version says only that since custom and international agreements have equal authority in international law, and both are law of the United States, “arguably later customary law should be given effect as law of the United States, even in the face of an earlier law or agreement, just as a later international agreement of the United States is given effect in the face of an earlier law or agreement.”’


1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 759-764
Author(s):  
Bernard H. Oxman ◽  
Diane Marie Amann

United States v. Balsys. 118 S.Ct. 2218.U.S. Supreme Court, June 25, 1998.Resolving a long-open question, the U.S. Supreme Court held in this 7-2 decision that a witness in a domestic proceeding may not invoke the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination if the witness fears that the testimony may be used in a prosecution outside the United States. Although grounded in domestic law, the three opinions in Balsys reveal tension between the judiciary's traditional deference to the political branches in foreign relations matters and its concern over the risk that individuals subject to prosecution abroad will suffer deprivation of liberty because of that deference.


2013 ◽  
Vol 107 ◽  
pp. 47-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Cerone

In assessing the legality of the killing of Osama bin Laden one is reminded of a saying about the situation in Lebanon. If you think you understand it, it has not been properly explained to you.Of course, one major obstacle is that we do not have all the facts. However, we also do not have all the law.The complexity of analyzing the legality of the killing begins with the threshold issue of applicable law. Is the conduct to be analyzed according to domestic law or international law? If domestic law, then which country’s domestic laws are applicable? Certainly that of the United States and Pakistan would be applicable. Saudi law might also apply (e.g., on the basis of nationality), in addition to the laws of those countries that have another basis under their domestic law for exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction (e.g., on the universality principle).


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-164
Author(s):  
Kazuki Hagiwara

The United States suspended the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) ‘in accordance with customary international law’. However, State practice prior to the International Law Commission's codification of the law of treaties did not contribute to clarifying the extent of a right to suspend and the proper conditions for its exercise under customary international law. The few instances regarding suspension due to a serious breach did not demonstrate how the treaties in question were suspended but were a mere reference to a right of suspension in diplomatic or political documents. Against that backdrop, this article seeks to delineate what customary rules the United States believed it was observing and to clarify to what extent those rules are identical to or different from the codified rules on suspension in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Convention). Because the codified procedural safeguards or the mechanism of acquiescence under Article 65 of the Convention were considered as the progressive development of international law, it appears possible to suspend the INF Treaty unilaterally outside the Convention and under the customary rules by which the United States is bound. The INF Treaty was suspended by the United States and by Russia in sequence. That Russian suspension appears to have been an exceptio non adimpleti contractus to prevent the asymmetric execution of the INF Treaty that had been previously suspended by the United States.


Author(s):  
Martin S. Flaherty

Foreign relations under the US Constitution starts with the paradox, also seen in domestic matters, of relatively scant text providing guidance for the exercise of vast power. Founding understandings, structural inference, and ongoing constitutional custom and precedent have filled in much, though hardly all, of the framework over the course of two hundred years. As a result, two basic questions frame the relationship between the Constitution and US foreign policy: (1) which parts of the US government, alone or in combination, properly exercise authority in the making of foreign policy; and (2) once made, what is the status of the nation’s international legal obligations in the US domestic legal system. The making of American foreign policy is framed by the Constitution’s commitment to separation of powers. Congress, the president, and the courts are all allocated discrete yet significant foreign affairs authority. Determining the exact borders and overlaps in areas such as the use of military force, emergency measures, and treaty termination continues to generate controversy. The status of international law in the US legal system in the first instance turns on whether resulting obligations derive from agreements or custom. The United States enters into international agreements in three ways: treaties, congressional-executive agreements, and sole executive agreements. Complex doctrine deals with the domestic applicability of treaties in particular. US courts primarily apply customary international law in two basic ways. They can exercise a version of their common lawmaking authority to fashion rules of decision based on international custom. They also apply customary international law when incorporated into domestic law by statute.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (2) ◽  
pp. 438-442 ◽  
Author(s):  

In 1983, President Reagan announced the policy of the United States to accept the normative provisions of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea as reflecting the customary international law of the sea (in matters other than deep seabed mining).


2020 ◽  
pp. 391-410
Author(s):  
Beth Stephens

This chapter evaluates the “terrorism” exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The Fourth Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States sets out to “restate” the law of the United States and “relevant portions of international law,” not to critique U.S. law or settle debates about the content of international law. However, that task is complicated when the law of the United States triggers questions about unresolved international law issues. The “terrorism” exception to the FSIA illustrates this complexity. Congress, the executive branch, and the judiciary have employed the exception as a politically motivated weapon to target disfavored states, while excluding U.S. allies, politically powerful states, and the United States itself from the reach of the statute. The text of the Fourth Restatement merely restates the U.S. law governing the “terrorism” exception, without identifying international law concerns or analyzing the issues they raise. The chapter, by contrast, offers a critique of the “terrorism” exception, focusing on the statute as written, as amended to reach particular targets, and as applied in practice. A well-crafted statutory exception to sovereign immunity for state human rights violations would be a welcome addition to human rights accountability. The “terrorism” exception falls far short of that goal.


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