Federal Statutes, Executive Orders and “Self-Executing Custom”

1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (2) ◽  
pp. 371-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederic L. Kirgis
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Law ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
The United States ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Federal Law ◽  
Executive Orders ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
The Face ◽  
Federal Statute

A hotly debated issue raised in this publication’s October 1986 Agora and, repeatedly, during the drafting of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) has to do with the relationship between customary international law and federal law in the United States. Most of the debate addressed whether a newly emerged custom would supersede an earlier federal statute or self-executing treaty. The reporters of the Restatement took a strong stand at first, placing custom on the same plane as federal statutes and self-executing treaties: in case of conflict, the latest in time should prevail. Criticism rolled in, and the reporters eventually retreated a bit. The final version says only that since custom and international agreements have equal authority in international law, and both are law of the United States, “arguably later customary law should be given effect as law of the United States, even in the face of an earlier law or agreement, just as a later international agreement of the United States is given effect in the face of an earlier law or agreement.”’

Customary International Law and U.S. Judicial Power

2020 ◽  
pp. 251-264
Author(s):  
Thomas H. Lee
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
International Law ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
The United States ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
The Third

This chapter describes specific points of divergence between the Third and Fourth Restatements of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States regarding how U.S. courts should engage with customary international law. The Third Restatement, adopted in 1987, envisioned U.S. courts fluent in and engaged with international law, deploying a U.S. foreign relations jurisprudence in dialogue with international law and lawyers. Customary international law was a central feature of this vision because it was the prime pathway for human rights litigation in federal courts when U.S. treaty-based human-rights initiatives had stalled. Appearing thirty years later, the Fourth Restatement exhibits a fundamentally different orientation toward customary international law. Customary international law is no longer embraced as it was in the Third Restatement as an opportunity to play offense, to advance the international law of human rights. That vision inspired a reaction among some U.S. legal scholars who questioned the U.S. federal law status of customary international law and the legitimacy of U.S. judges advancing the customary international law of human rights. The Fourth Restatement seeks a middle ground by defending against this revision of customary international law’s status role in the United States, concerned that the revisionist view might encourage and provide cover for U.S. courts to dismiss cases and claims with foreign policy ramifications that they should be adjudicating. The approaches of the two Restatements, taken together, have contributed to the disengagement of U.S. judges from customary international law altogether, to the detriment of U.S. conduct of foreign policy and contrary to the original constitutional specification of the judicial power of the United States as reflected in Article III, the Judiciary Act of 1789 that established the federal courts, and early historical practice.

A Law of the Future or A Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals and the International Law of Expropriation

1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (3) ◽  
pp. 474-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick M. Norton
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Law ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
The United States ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
The Past ◽  
United Nations General ◽  
Full Compensation ◽  
United Nations General Assembly

One precedent creates another. They soon accumulate and constitute law. What yesterday was fact, today is doctrine.Junius†Less than twenty years ago, a large majority of the United Nations General Assembly declared the customary international law of expropriation dead. Eighty-six governments supported a resolution holding that a state expropriating foreign property “is entitled to determine the amount of possible compensation and the mode of payment, and … any disputes which might arise should be settled in accordance with the national legislation of [that] State.” Scholars cited this and other General Assembly resolutions as evidence that international law no longer required full compensation for the expropriation of foreign property. This view had sufficient support to precipitate an acrimonious dispute in the preparation of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which reaffirmed only in its later drafts the traditional “Hull formula.”

The Constitution of the United States and Foreign Relations

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin S. Flaherty
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
International Law ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
The United States ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Status ◽  
Executive Agreements

Foreign relations under the US Constitution starts with the paradox, also seen in domestic matters, of relatively scant text providing guidance for the exercise of vast power. Founding understandings, structural inference, and ongoing constitutional custom and precedent have filled in much, though hardly all, of the framework over the course of two hundred years. As a result, two basic questions frame the relationship between the Constitution and US foreign policy: (1) which parts of the US government, alone or in combination, properly exercise authority in the making of foreign policy; and (2) once made, what is the status of the nation’s international legal obligations in the US domestic legal system. The making of American foreign policy is framed by the Constitution’s commitment to separation of powers. Congress, the president, and the courts are all allocated discrete yet significant foreign affairs authority. Determining the exact borders and overlaps in areas such as the use of military force, emergency measures, and treaty termination continues to generate controversy. The status of international law in the US legal system in the first instance turns on whether resulting obligations derive from agreements or custom. The United States enters into international agreements in three ways: treaties, congressional-executive agreements, and sole executive agreements. Complex doctrine deals with the domestic applicability of treaties in particular. US courts primarily apply customary international law in two basic ways. They can exercise a version of their common lawmaking authority to fashion rules of decision based on international custom. They also apply customary international law when incorporated into domestic law by statute.

Jurisdiction, State Immunity, and Judgments in the Restatement (Fourth) of US Foreign Relations Law

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-135
Author(s):  
William S Dodge
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Law ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
The United States ◽  
Great Frequency ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
State Immunity ◽  
American Law ◽  
The Law ◽  
Domestic Law

Abstract In 2018, the American Law Institute published the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law, which restates the law of the United States governing jurisdiction, state immunity, and judgments. These issues arise with great frequency in international cases brought in US courts, including cases involving Chinese parties. This article provides an overview of many of the key provisions of the Restatement (Fourth). The article describes the Restatement (Fourth)’s treatment of the customary international law of jurisdiction, as well the rules of US domestic law based on international comity that US courts apply when deciding international cases.

How May Tribunals Apply the Customary Necessity Rule to the Argentine Cases? An Analysis of ICSID Decisions with Respect to the Interaction between Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT and the Customary Rule of Necessity

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
El-Hage Javier
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Law ◽  
United States Of America ◽  
The United States ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Specific Focus ◽  
Argentine Republic ◽  
The Face ◽  
The U.S

This chapter addresses the question of why the nine decisions from the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) arising under the treaty between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of investment have been so inconsistent in the face of largely undisputed facts and identical legal norms. It first sets forth, in abstract, a set of interpretive parameters and corresponding legal rationales that may be followed by tribunals when dealing with situations in which treaty and customary international law rules interact. It then analyzes each of the Argentine decisions according to the interaction rationales chosen by tribunals and committees, with a specific focus on the consistency of their own arguments for the application of the rule of necessity of customary international law.

Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Public International Law

2020 ◽  
pp. 303-318
Author(s):  
Austen Parrish
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Law ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public International Law ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Illegal Activity ◽  
International Legal System ◽  
Personal Jurisdiction

This chapter explores how the Fourth Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States charts a new, unexpected path in the area of adjudicatory jurisdiction. The Fourth Restatement breaks with common understandings to find that personal jurisdiction is not a concern of international law. It indicates that “with the significant exception of various forms of immunity, modern customary international law generally does not impose limits on jurisdiction to adjudicate.” The Fourth Restatement’s discussion of adjudicatory jurisdiction also appears to premise its conclusion on two unorthodox approaches to international law. First, it implies that fundamental structural limits of the international legal system can disappear unless states are vigilant in protesting illegal activity of other states. However, states are not required to persistently protest illegal activity, and it is far from clear that the absence of protests can nullify long-standing principles of sovereignty. Second, the Restatement appears to assume that states have unfettered authority absent a limiting customary rule. Yet international legal practice has not traditionally addressed jurisdictional questions that way.

scholarly journals Alien Tort Claims and the Status of Customary International Law

2012 ◽  
Vol 106 (3) ◽  
pp. 531-546 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos M. Vázquez
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
The United States ◽  
Modern Human ◽  
Federal Law ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
The Status ◽  
Federal Jurisdiction

Much of the recent debate about the status of customary international law in the U.S. legal system has revolved around the alien tort provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789, currently section 1350 of Title 28. In Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, the decision that launched modern human rights litigation in the United States, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit relied on the view that customary international law has the status of federal common law in upholding section 1350’s grant of federal jurisdiction over a suit between aliens. The court’s position that customary international law was federal law was the prevailing view at the time—a view that has subsequently been dubbed the “modern position.” It was the view set forth in the black letter of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law. Filártiga triggered a revisionist challenge to the modern position, with revisionists arguing that customary international law has the status of federal law only if given that status through statute or treaty, or perhaps through sole executive action; in the absence of such incorporation, customary international law has, at best, the status of State law in our legal system.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document