scholarly journals The Federal Reserve’s Dollar Swap Lines and the European Central Bank during the global financial crisis of 2007–09

2020 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 723-747 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Carré ◽  
Laurent Le Maux

Abstract Although the literature has studied the role of the Federal Reserve as the global lender of last resort in 2007–09, many aspects of the Dollar Swap Lines to the European Central Bank need further exploration. Accordingly, we provide original evidence about the auction operations, allotted amounts and interest rates with regard to the Federal Reserve’s dollar swaps and the European Central Bank’s dollar provision. More specifically, we examine the demand side of the Dollar Swap Lines (whereas the existing literature mentions the supply side only) and we scrutinise the interest rate (whereas the literature concentrates on volumes) set by the Federal Reserve, and also the rate set by the European Central Bank. Our findings cast light on the nature of the relationship between the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank. Finally, we contribute to the literature on the global lender of last resort by coining the notion of the financial dilemma, under the dollar system within a framework of globalised financial markets.

2017 ◽  
Vol 62 (01) ◽  
pp. 57-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
AD VAN RIET

Since the start of the global financial crisis, the European Central Bank (ECB) has faced exceptional challenges in fulfilling its price stability mandate, marking the start of a new era of monetary policy-making for the eurozone. This paper reviews the ECB’s evolving response from mid-2007 to early-2015, showing how it combined the standard tool of adjusting its policy interest rates with non-standard passive and active balance-sheet measures, accompanied by a forward guidance of its intended monetary stance. Altogether, the ECB stayed focused on price stability while fulfilling the two classical roles of lender of last resort to resolve money market tensions and market maker of last resort to repair monetary transmission. Addressing the many challenges was complicated by the nexus between fragile banks and vulnerable governments, the ensuing financial fragmentation and the complex institutional and political structure of the eurozone. Looking ahead, the new reinforced European financial architecture could make the ECB’s monetary policy task of maintaining price stability for the eurozone easier to accomplish.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 18-46
Author(s):  
Andrea Cecrdlova

The latest global crisis, which fully erupted in 2008, can have a significant impact on central banks credibility in the long run. During the last crisis, monetary authorities encountered zero interest rate levels and, as a result, started to use non-standard monetary policy instruments. The Czech National Bank decided to use a less standard instrument in November 2013, when it started to intervene on the foreign exchange market in order to keep the Czech currency at level 27 CZK / EUR. However, the European Central Bank also adopted a non-standard instrument, when chose a path of quantitative easing in 2015 in order to support the euro area economy by purchasing financial assets. The question remains whether the approach of Czech National Bank or the approach of European Central Bank in the crisis and post-crisis period was a more appropriate alternative. With the passage of time from the global financial crisis, it is already possible to compare the approaches of these two central banks and at least partially assess what approach was more appropriate under the given conditions. When comparing the central banks approaches to the crisis, the Czech National Bank was better, both in terms of the rate of interest rate cuts and the resulting inflation with regard to the choice of a non-standard monetary policy instrument. The recent financial crisis has revealed the application of moral hazard in practice, both on behalf of the European Central Bank and the Czech National Bank, which may have a significant impact on their credibility and independence in the coming years.


2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Rodríguez ◽  
Carlos Carrasco

The paper analyses the monetary policy responses of the European Central Bank (ECB) to the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. Our goals are on the one hand to explain chronologically the main measures in conventional and unconventional policies adopted by the ECB and on the other hand to analyse their effects on key interest rates, monetary aggregates and the money multiplier. The assessment is that the ECB?s monetary policy responses to the crisis have been ?too little, too late?, constrained by the institutional framework, which prevents the ECB from acting as a true central bank with the role of lender of last resort.


e-Finanse ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-63
Author(s):  
Natalia Białek

Abstract This paper argues that the loose monetary policy of two of the world’s most important financial institutions-the U.S. Federal Reserve Board and the European Central Bank-were ultimately responsible for the outburst of global financial crisis of 2008-09. Unusually low interest rates in 2001- 05 compelled investors to engage in high risk endeavors. It also encouraged some governments to finance excessive domestic consumption with foreign loans. Emerging financial bubbles burst first in mortgage markets in the U.S. and subsequently spread to other countries. The paper also reviews other causes of the crisis as discussed in literature. Some of them relate directly to weaknesses inherent in the institutional design of the European Monetary Union (EMU) while others are unique to members of the EMU. It is rather striking that recommended remedies tend not to take into account the policies of the European Central Bank.


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-86
Author(s):  
Marcell Zoltán Végh ◽  
Anita Pelle

Az elhúzódó európai válság során az Európai Központi Bank (EKB) szerepe is átalakult. Egyrészt válság idején, inflációs nyomás helyett deflációs veszéllyel szembesülve, a stabilitás biztosítása mást implikál, mint szokványos időkben. Másrészt tartósan nulla százalék körüli kamat mellett az eszköztárnak kevésbé bevált további elemeit kell bevetni. Az EKB esetében 2010. májusban indult új korszak az első eszközvásárlási programmal, amelyet több hasonló követett. A jegybank mérlege néhány év alatt több mint kétszeresére duzzadt, a legdinamikusabban bővülő tétel eszközoldalon az euróövezetbeli értékpapírok kategóriája lett. Mindeközben az EKB-nak a kiépülő bankunióban is központi szerep jutott. A bankfelügyelet élesítésére 2017 nyarán került sor, az eszközvásárlási programot pedig 2018 végéig vezették ki. Az EKB tehát új és jelentős feladatokat vállalt az európai válságkezelésben, alapvetően sikerrel. In the course of the prolonged European crisis, the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) has also changed. Firstly, in times of crisis, facing risks of deflation instead of inflationary pressure, ensuring stability implies other methods than in usual times. Secondly, with long-lastingly around-zero per cent interest rates, further, less used monetary policy tools are needed. In case of the ECB a new era started in May 2010, with the first asset purchase programme, which was then followed by several similar ones. The central bank’s balance sheet more than doubled in a few years’ time; the most dynamically growing item on the asset side was the category of Eurozone securities. In the meanwhile the ECB was assigned a central role in the newly developed banking union as well. Supervision was put in place in summer 2017 and the asset purchase programme was phased out by the end of 2018. Overall, the ECB undertook new and significant roles in European crisis management – fundamentally with success.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Rodolfo Tomás da Fonseca Nicolay ◽  
Claudio Oliveira de Moraes ◽  
Bruno Pires Tiberto

The global financial crisis has revealed that the coordination between monetary policy and financial stability should be part of economic policy. This study examines the effects of monetary policy on the capital buffer (financial stability proxy) in the Brazilian economy and, in particular, how communication about both monetary policy and normative macroprudential policy affect the capital buffer maintained by banks. The study presents three main results: i) banks react strongly to monetary policy changes by increasing (reducing) the capital buffer in response to an increase (decrease) in the interest rate; ii) banks increase (decrease) the capital buffer when the central bank monetary policy communication signals an increase (decrease) in interest rates; and iii) banks use the capital buffer to accommodate the new measures of regulatory capital: the announcement of restrictive (liberalizing) capital measures reduces (increases) the capital buffer.


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