Products, Patents, Proportionality – How German Patent Law Responds to 21st Century Challenges

2020 ◽  
Vol 69 (6) ◽  
pp. 578-584
Author(s):  
Julia Schönbohm ◽  
Natalie Ackermann-Blome

Abstract German patent law faces challenges in trying to accommodate a changing technological and economic reality. As a result, recent legislative initiatives have been dominated by discussions about adjusting the German Patent Act, especially with regard to the claim for an injunction. This article gives a brief overview of these new challenges as well as the legal background of injunctions in German patent law and the underlying case law. It also evaluates the proposed amendment of the provision on injunctions in the discussion draft of the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection (BMJV) on the modernisation of patent law of 14 January 2020.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Ackermann

Abstract In the case law of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office (EPO), increasing importance is being attached to the concept of ‘plausibility’, which, however, has no literal basis in the EPC. Nevertheless, many decisions in which inventive step (Art. 56 EPC) is assessed address the question of whether the claimed solution was at least ‘plausible’ at the effective date. For medical use claims, a ‘plausibility test’ is even performed for assessing sufficiency of disclosure (Art. 83 EPC). Starting from this example, the following article shows why German patent law does not need ‘plausibility’.


The role of the author and the meaning of authorship is examined first in the context of legislation and case law and second as seen by critical theorists. The author’s position as natural rights holder and moral rights holder within the ambit of the law is considered against existing legislation and case law. The discussion then moves to an account of the author as creator, first in the 21st century and, thereafter, in the digital era. New challenges to authorship and changes in the perceptions of readers are highlighted and discussed.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Lemley

In Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court declined calls to categoricallyexclude business methods - or any technology - from the patent law. It alsorejected as the sole test of subject matter eligibility the FederalCircuit’s deeply-flawed "machine or transformation" test, under which noprocess is patentable unless it is tied to a particular machine ortransforms an article to another state or thing. Subsequent developmentsthreaten to undo that holding, however. Relying on the Court’s descriptionof the Federal Circuit test as a "useful and important clue', the U.S.Patent and Trademark Office, patent litigants, and district courts have allcontinued to rely on the machine-or-transformation test in the wake ofBilski: no longer as the sole rule, but as a presumptive starting pointthat threatens to effectively become mandatory. In this Article, we suggesta new way to understand the exclusion of abstract ideas from patentablesubject matter. No class of invention is inherently too abstract forpatenting. Rather, the rule against patenting abstract ideas is an effortto prevent inventors from claiming their ideas too broadly. By requiringthat patent claims be limited to a specific set of practical applicationsof an idea, the abstract ideas doctrine both makes the scope of theresulting patent clearer and leaves room for subsequent inventors toimprove upon - and patent new applications of - the same basic principle.Recasting the abstract ideas doctrine as an overclaiming test eliminatesthe constraints of the artificial machine-or-transformation test, as wellas the pointless effort to fit inventions into permissible or impermissiblecategories. It also helps understand some otherwise-inexplicabledistinctions in the case law. Testing for overclaiming allows courts tofocus on what really matters: whether the scope of the patentee's claimsare commensurate with the invention’s practical, real-world contribution.This inquiry, we suggest, is the touchstone of the abstract ideas analysis,and the way out of the post-Bilski confusion.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. E-180-E-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geraint Howells ◽  
Gert Straetmans

Abstract This paper analyses the ways in which the Unfair Contract Terms and Unfair Commercial Practices Directives try to steer a path between imposing a common European standard and allowing national variation. The open wording of the norms and safeguard clauses in both directives allows room for their flexible application. The differentiated role between the Court of Justice, as the interpreter of European law, and the national courts, as the party that applies it, provides a release valve to prevent any direct clashes and allows a subtle way for national perspectives to be reflected. The analysis finds that, irrespective of the underlying level of harmonisation, and with the backing of the European legislator’s intention of ensuring a high level of consumer protection, the CJEU is gradually painting the average European consumer with more realistic features. Here, the case law of the CJEU fulfils a bridging function between the labelling requirements in the Foodstuff Regulation, the transparency requirements in the Unfair Contract Terms Directive and the informed decision requirements in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. In these three domains the CJEU recognises that the level of customer attention may be suboptimal, even in the presence of comprehensive and correct information. The CJEU’s approach contributes to more convergence in consumer protection throughout the EU. Yet, in terms of legitimacy, it must be noted that in all cases the CJEU has maintained a clear distinction between interpretation and application. The particular constitutional legal order in which the CJEU operates only allows for a process whereby the contours of a more coherent European consumer protection policy are gradually revealed. In the absence of sufficient legislative guidance at the European and national levels, national courts may be increasingly informed by the case law of the CJEU in an effort to establish clearly desirable common expectations. Those who believe that, in practice, uniformity can be achieved overnight by simply adopting a common maximum norm appear over-optimistic.


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