12. Legal reasoning and ethics

2021 ◽  
pp. 267-284
Author(s):  
Emily Finch ◽  
Stefan Fafinski

This chapter provides an introduction to legal reasoning. It first outlines the skills to analyse how judges decide cases. There are various points of view that judges can (and do) take in deciding the outcomes of cases, so the chapter introduces some of the theory behind judicial reasoning before moving on to show how judges reason in practice, how one case can give rise to multiple judgments, and the importance of legal ethics.

Author(s):  
Emily Finch ◽  
Stefan Fafinski

This chapter provides an introduction to legal reasoning. It first outlines the skills to analyze how judges decide cases. There are various points of view that judges can (and do) take in deciding the outcomes of cases, so the chapter introduces some of the theory behind judicial reasoning before moving on to show how judges reason in practice, how one case can give rise to multiple judgments, and the importance of legal ethics.


Legal Skills ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 253-270
Author(s):  
Emily Finch ◽  
Stefan Fafinski

This chapter provides an introduction to legal reasoning. It first outlines the skills to analyse how judges decide cases. There are various points of view that judges can (and do) take in deciding the outcomes of cases, so the chapter introduces some of the theory behind judicial reasoning before moving on to show how judges reason in practice, how one case can give rise to multiple judgments, and the importance of legal ethics.


Author(s):  
Emily Finch ◽  
Stefan Fafinski

Legal Skills is structured in three parts, covering a full range of legal skills. The first part deals with sources of law and includes information on finding and using legislation, case law, books, journals, and official publications, making sure you understand where the law comes from, and how to use it. The second part covers academic legal skills and provides advice on study and writing skills, legal reasoning, referencing and avoiding plagiarism, essay writing, dissertations, problem solving, and revision and examinations. The final part of the book covers the practical legal skills of oral presentation, mooting, and negotiation. This sixth edition includes a new section on legal ethics and codes of professional conduct, and completely rewritten chapters on presentation skills, and negotiation skills, including a brand new scenario, together with a large number of other enhancements throughout.


Author(s):  
Emily Finch ◽  
Stefan Fafinski

Legal Skills is structured in three parts, covering a full range of legal skills. The first part deals with sources of law and includes information on finding and using legislation, case law, books, journals, and official publications, making sure you understand where the law comes from, and how to use it. The second part covers academic legal skills and provides advice on study and writing skills, legal reasoning, referencing and avoiding plagiarism, essay writing, dissertations, problem solving, and revision and examinations. The final part of the book covers the practical legal skills of oral presentation, mooting, and negotiation. This sixth edition includes a new section on legal ethics and codes of professional conduct, and completely rewritten chapters on presentation skills, and negotiation skills, including a brand new scenario, together with a large number of other enhancements throughout.


2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 191
Author(s):  
George Raitt

Legal theorists advance conflicting theories to explain judicial reasoning, for example, that judges’ decisions are constrained but not determined by legal materials, that judges do not apply legal principles but make value judgments, and that they make pragmatic judgments based on an assessment of the consequences of their decisions. Like cases should be decided alike, but theorists disagree on the role of analogy in legal reasoning and how one determines which similarities and differences are relevant. Judicial decisions revise and adapt previously decided cases. The concept of fidelity to precedent in legal reasoning can be illuminated by recent research into fidelity to source in adaptation studies. Research into literary adaptations shows that similarity and difference are not mutually exclusive and that an analysis of differences may undermine determinations of relevant similarity. By reading decided cases as intertextually situated adaptations, underlying views of the world that might not otherwise be evident in judicial reasoning can be interrogated.


2005 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 347-366
Author(s):  
André Jodouin

This article is a survey of the attitudes of legal writers concerning judicial creation. A number of articles, studies and case comments in the areas of mens rea, duress and drunkenness are canvassed in order to determine their authors' views on the legitimacy of the rules established by courts in the above areas. Judicial creation often involves departures from traditional legal reasoning; the attitude of legal writers towards these departures is also studied. Finally, it is sought to establish the views of the doctrine on the characteristics and qualities which judicial creation should present. A number of points emerge from the study : attitudes towards judicial creation are generally favorable. The legitimacy of the creative role is most often taken for granted. As regards judicial reasoning, departures from stare decisis are generally seen as valid ; less unanimity is reached on departures from traditional rules of construction. There does not appear to be any perceptible difference between the attitudes of common law and civilian writers on judicial creation except on the point of rules of construction, where civilians seem somewhat more inclined to traditional views. In all cases, it was found difficult to determine the philosophical perspectives of the writers although these would normally be expected to have a strong bearing on the issue oj judicial creativity.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (9(5)) ◽  
pp. 577-595
Author(s):  
Emily Kidd White

Legal reasoning in the common law tradition requires judges to draw on concepts, and examples that are meant to resonate with a particular emotional import and operate in judicial reasoning as though they do. Judicial applications of constitutional rights are regularly interpreted by reference to past violations (either through precedent, contextual framings, and/or legislative history), which in turn elicit a series of emotions which work to deepen and intensify judicial understandings of a right guarantee (freedom of association, freedom of expression, equality, security of the person, etc.). This paper examines the way in which invocations of past political histories, and rights abuses (however ill or well-defined), work to conjure up a set of service emotions (emotions which work to establish a particular frame of mind), which guide judicial applications of doctrine in cases concerning an alleged violation of a constitutional right. El razonamiento jurídico en la tradición de derecho consuetudinario exige que los jueces partan de conceptos y de ejemplos que se supone se hacen eco de un significado emocional concreto y que, en el razonamiento judicial, operan como si de hecho así fuera. La aplicación judicial de derechos constitucionales se interpreta generalmente por medio de referencias a delitos anteriores (a través de encuadres contextuales precedentes o bien a través de la historia legislativa), lo que, a su vez, invoca una serie de emociones que profundizan e intensifican la interpretación judicial de una garantía jurídica (libertad de asociación, libertad de expresión, igualdad, seguridad de la persona, etc.). Este artículo analiza la forma en que las invocaciones a la historia política o a abusos de derechos (por mal o bien definidos que estén) sirven para formar un conjunto de emociones de servicio (que sirven para establecer un estado de ánimo concreto), que guían la aplicación judicial de la doctrina en casos de presuntas violaciones de derechos constitucionales.


Author(s):  
Eva Steiner

This chapter examines judicial reasoning in France. In France, the long-established assumptions, still deeply rooted in the French legal mind, that only the legislature can make the law and that codes provide a self-contained and internally consistent body of legislation, have greatly contributed to the deductive model of legal reasoning which prevails in the French judicial method. In such a system, codes are deemed to provide the axioms and postulates from which conclusions are drawn. From this it follows that judicial decisions cannot, overtly at least, be the outcome of what the judge feels to be the best solution. They are primarily the result of applying a rule of law to an actual situation. However, the chapter shows how in practise judges has been able to introduce value judgement in their decisions despite the constraints of the system.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (9(5)) ◽  
pp. 577-595
Author(s):  
Emily Kidd White

Legal reasoning in the common law tradition requires judges to draw on concepts, and examples that are meant to resonate with a particular emotional import and operate in judicial reasoning as though they do. Judicial applications of constitutional rights are regularly interpreted by reference to past violations (either through precedent, contextual framings, and/or legislative history), which in turn elicit a series of emotions which work to deepen and intensify judicial understandings of a right guarantee (freedom of association, freedom of expression, equality, security of the person, etc.). This paper examines the way in which invocations of past political histories, and rights abuses (however ill or well-defined), work to conjure up a set of service emotions (emotions which work to establish a particular frame of mind), which guide judicial applications of doctrine in cases concerning an alleged violation of a constitutional right. El razonamiento jurídico en la tradición de derecho consuetudinario exige que los jueces partan de conceptos y de ejemplos que se supone se hacen eco de un significado emocional concreto y que, en el razonamiento judicial, operan como si de hecho así fuera. La aplicación judicial de derechos constitucionales se interpreta generalmente por medio de referencias a delitos anteriores (a través de encuadres contextuales precedentes o bien a través de la historia legislativa), lo que, a su vez, invoca una serie de emociones que profundizan e intensifican la interpretación judicial de una garantía jurídica (libertad de asociación, libertad de expresión, igualdad, seguridad de la persona, etc.). Este artículo analiza la forma en que las invocaciones a la historia política o a abusos de derechos (por mal o bien definidos que estén) sirven para formar un conjunto de emociones de servicio (que sirven para establecer un estado de ánimo concreto), que guían la aplicación judicial de la doctrina en casos de presuntas violaciones de derechos constitucionales.


1993 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 539-540

One of the fields of study which has been developed in recent years is that of Bioethics and the Law, including questions relating to the transplanting of organs. The problems raised by organ transplants are of concern to numerous disciplines, and the present issue of the Israel Law Review examines this topic from various points of view — ethical and halakhic, as well as legal.In his article on the ethical implications of the buying and selling of organs, Noam Zohar subjects the generally negative attitude adopted towards both practices to a philosophical analysis, and argues that neither one is as objectionable as it appears at first sight. This article also poses a challenge to the application of traditional legal reasoning to the area of biomedical law.The halakhic position on organ transplantation is presented by Mordechai Halperin in a wide-ranging discussion of the topic. Of particular interest are his remarks concerning the possibility of coercing organ donation, and of trading in human organs in accordance with Jewish law.


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